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Abstract
Paradox in Thought and Natural Language
by
Ethan J Jerzak
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy
University of California, Berkeley
Professor John MacFarlane, co-chair
Professor Seth Yalcin, co-chair
Professor John Steel
Around 600BC, Epimenides, a Cretan apparently discontented with the
honesty of his compatriots, lamented that all Cretans are liars. Together
with a few innocent assumptions, well-entrenched principles of logic entail
that Epimenides’ lamentation cannot be true, and yet cannot be untrue—a
flat contradiction. What’s gone wrong? In this dissertation, I argue that
the source of the problem has been misdiagnosed as one about language
(especially formal languages). The problem runs deeper, and stems from
the structure of thought itself.
The dissertation proceeds in two main stages. The first stage (Chapter
2) makes the case that that the intuitions that underlie the paradoxes come
from natural languages, not from formal/mathematical ones. The Liar and
related paradoxes are generally presented as constraints on the latter. Their
lesson, the story goes, is that no formal theory strong enough to represent
the primitive recursive functions can include a satisfactory truth predicate. I
argue that it’s our natural-language competence with the truth predicate that
underlies our understanding of what ‘satisfactory’ means here, which shifts
the focus of the project to natural language semantics. In this domain, it’s
tempting to think (and many have thought) that the problem with Epimenides’
utterance is that it fails to express a proposition, and this failure explains
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why we have trouble assigning it a truth-value. Or, perhaps it does express
a proposition, but not the one that it seems to express. Or, perhaps it can
express a proposition, but which proposition it expresses depends on context.
I argue that all such responses fail, in part because they cannot make sense
of related attitude attributions. I can believe or disbelieve Epimenides, which
wouldn’t be possible if his utterance didn’t express the proposition it seems
to express.
In the second stage, I argue that such paradoxes arise, not from the
language/thought interface, but rather from thought itself. The first step in
this argument concerns knowledge attributions (Chapter 3), where I develop
and defend a novel solution to the Knower paradox. Then I move from
attitude attributions to attitudes themselves (Chapter 4). Just as sentential
truth and knowledge predicates gives rise to paradoxical sentences, seem-
ingly innocent combinations of beliefs and desires give rise to paradoxical
propositions—even when those beliefs and desires are not expressed in lan-
guage. The possibility of such pathological combinations isn’t accounted
for by any extant theory of mental content, and, I argue, provides support
for a non-classical theory. Finally (Chapter 5) I consider an objection to
these putative combinations of desires. I introduce what I call advisory desire
reports, which seem to exhibit the radically externalist behavior that the
previous chapter rejects. I conclude by oering reasons to think that the
availability of these readings does not undermine the case for non-classical
accounts of attitudes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Liar paradox is one of the oldest problems in philosophy. Sometime
around 600BC, Epimenides, a Cretian apparently discontented with the
honesty of his compatriots, lamented that all Cretians are liars. Together
with a few assumptions—that liars are those who only say false things, that as
a matter of fact all other Cretians are liars, and that everything Epimenides
had said until then was a lie—well-entrenched principles of logic entail that
Epimenides’ statement cannot be true, and yet cannot be untrue, a flat
contradiction. And these assumptions are not necessary in contemporary
versions of the paradox. Suppose Epimenides had simply said:
(1) The sentence I’m uttering right now isn’t true. (Liar sentence)
Then (1) can’t be true—if it were true, then it wouldn’t be true, since it says
that it isn’t true. But it also can’t be untrue, for if it were untrue, then (1)
would describe the world accurately after all, and so be true. Contradictions
are very good evidence that something has gone horribly wrong. The question
for philosophers and logicians is, what?
A flurry of philosophical and mathematical research in recent decades
has not settled on an answer. It has, however, characterized more precisely
a space of possible answers. Contemporary reactions to the Liar paradox
either:
• Place expressive limitations on languages, so that Epimenides’ sentence
isn’t actually a legitimate sentence. (Tarski (1936))
• Reject the principle that, for any sentence ϕ, ϕ is true if and only if ϕ.
(Kripke (1975))
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• Reject some part of classical propositional logic. (Priest (1987), Field
(2008))
This research has largely taken place in the context of formal languages,
like those of arithmetic or set theory. This formality has been tremendously
productive in characterizing the trade-os involved in dierent treatments
of the paradox. The upshot of all this abstract theorizing for the natural
languages in which the Liar sentence originally arose, however, is far from
clear. How should we think about these paradoxes from the perspective
of everyday English, their original source? Should we look for empirical
evidence that English mirrors one or another of these formal languages,
or do natural languages present unique considerations that open space for
more possibilities, or constraints, than pure formal logic? How should those
formal theories be incorporated into the descriptively-minded semantics that
linguists and philosophers of language have been developing for fragments
of natural language? These are among the questions I address in this
dissertation.
A related and largely unexplored question is about propositional attitudes
like belief, knowledge, and desire. Just as paradoxical sentences can arise
using the truth predicate, such sentences also arise in natural languages with
knowledge, belief, and desire attributions. Thus the question: what would it
be to believe the Liar sentence? Or to be in some paradoxical state of desire
which, as a matter of logical necessity, both must and cannot be satisfied?
The possibility of such pathological attributions isn’t accounted for by any
extant theory of propositional attitudes. These two problems, I show in this
dissertation, are intimately related by the way we attribute and reason about
propositional attitudes in natural language.
In this dissertation, I show how to adapt particular formal theories of
truth to the project of natural language semantics. I also show how to develop
plausible theories of intentional attitudes and their contents against this
background. My main contentions are that, while propositions must be part
of any satisfactory theory of truth in natural language, a brute appeal to them
to solve the paradoxes is unpromising (Chapter 2). Instead, a non-classical
account of logical consequence, which restricts certain classically valid laws
of logic, is independently motivated by theorizing about the attribution of
intentional attitudes like knowledge (Chapter 3). I bolster this argument
by showing that these paradoxes can arise even at the purely propositional,
non-linguistic level: thought alone is sucient to generate self-referential
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contents, and therefore paradoxes (Chapter 4). The most promising case
for this involves desire, and the strongest counterargument appeals to the
information-sensitivity of desire attributions. I consider the information-
sensitivity of desire attributions independently (Chapter 5), arguing for
a novel relativist theory. I conclude by suggesting that this information-
sensitivity does not suce fully to disarm the desire paradox, and explore
avenues for more detailed future work in this direction.
In what remains, I’ll walk through an overview of the structure of my
dissertation, pointing out work already done and contributions to the current
literature.
1.1 Chapter 2: Liars, Propositions, and Contexts
Here is a rough but natural picture of how (at least some core parts of)
natural language work. Language is a tool for communicating our thoughts.
It’s the job of declarative sentences to express the contents of these thoughts,
which are often called propositions, and these propositions are true or
false depending on what the world is like. It’s in virtue of expressing these
propositions that sentences can be true or false. For example, the sentences
“snow is white” and “Schnee ist weiß” both express the same proposition, that
snow is white, and whether those sentences are true depends on whether the
corresponding proposition is true. If our world happens to be so arranged
as to make snow white, then the proposition is true, and thus so are the
sentences.
Given this picture of how declarative sentences attain their truth values, a
natural first-pass diagnosis of the problem with the Liar sentence (1) is that it
simply fails to express a proposition. There is no legitimate content/thought
for the Liar sentence to express. This failure to express a proposition explains
why the sentence exhibits paradoxical behavior, and absolves theorists of
propositional attitudes from taking the paradoxes seriously. In this chapter, I
examine the most influential no-proposition theory, due to Glanzberg (2001).
He is a contextualist about truth, which means that (a) sentences have truth-
values in virtue of expressing propositions with those truth-values, and (b)
exactly which proposition a sentence expresses depends on the context in
which it is asserted. He argues that there’s a hidden context shift in the
reasoning of the Liar paradox, which explains what goes wrong while saving
classical logic.
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I argue that Glanzberg’s theory fails to achieve one of its major aims,
which is to explain the unified inferential use we make of the truth predicate.
I show that he does not avoid implausibly fragmenting the truth predicate
when we reason with it, without independent motivation from linguistic
data. Contextualist solutions must reject the inference from ‘p’ to ‘p is true’,
accepting only the weaker rule from ‘p’ to ‘p is truei’ for some contextually
dependent i. In this respect, Glanzberg’s propositional theory isn’t any better
than other theories which reject truth principles; they both considerably
weaken the inferential power of the truth predicate. I conclude the chapter
with two problems for this view. Adding propositions to the apparatus of
truth-talk doesn’t solve the paradox, at least not on its own.
1.2 Chapter 3: Non-Classical Knowledge
In this chapter, I examine more closely the relationship between paradoxes
and propositions. The starting point is an independent role that propositions
are taken to play: serving as the objects of intentional attitudes like belief,
knowledge, and desire. I show how paradoxes structurally similar to the Liar
paradox arise using these notions, taking knowledge as my primary case
study. Drawing on the literature of the Knower paradox (Maitzen (1998),
Cross (2001), Uzquiano (2004), Sainsbury (1995), Kaplan and Montague
(1960)), I argue for modeling knowledge-talk in a non-classical language,
analogous to a theory of truth developed by Hartry Field (2008). I com-
pare this proposal to other theories of paradoxical attitudes, notably Caie
(2012)’s argument that our beliefs about the Liar should inherit the same
indeterminacy present in the Liar sentence itself. I show how my treatment
of knowledge improves on his proposal, because it does not rely on contro-
versial introspection principles, which say that you can never wrong about
what you believe or desire. I also introduce a natural-language version of
the Knower paradox, which, unlike the extant literature, makes the paradox
not about the ideal knowability of sentences with mathematical content, but
about the straightforward knowledge of actual agents reasoning with English
sentences.
4
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1.3 Chapter 4: Paradoxical Desires
While Chapter 3 treats knowledge attributions, there is an open question
about the relationship between the state of knowing, and the way we talk
about that state in natural language. It’s open to argue that, while a non-
classical theory perhaps best models the way we talk about mental states
like knowledge, the fundamental nature of these mental states themselves
doesn’t require us to posit any paradoxical contents. Paradoxes do arise in
thought, but only derivatively from the language we use to talk about and
express those thoughts.
I think this view is mistaken. In Chapter 4, I present a paradoxical
combination of desires. I show why it’s paradoxical, and consider ways of
responding to it. The paradox saddles us with an unappealing disjunction:
either we reject the possibility of the case by placing surprising restrictions
on what we can desire, or we revise some bit of classical logic. I argue that
denying the possibility of the case is unmotivated on any reasonable way of
thinking about mental content. So the best response is a non-classical one,
according to which certain desires are neither determinately satisfied nor
determinately not satisfied. Thus, theorizing about paradoxical propositional
attitudes helps constrain the space of possibilities for adequate solutions to
semantic paradoxes more generally.
1.4 Chapter 5: Two Ways to Want
My argument for the existence of paradoxical combinations of attitudes
involves denying what I call radical externalism—the view, namely, that the
content of someone’s strongest desire can depend blankly on the desiderative
states of someone else (even if the desirer is entirely unaware of them).
However, certain uses of desire attributions seem to exhibit this kind of
information sensitivity. This chapter, therefore, is solely dedicated to the
question of how information factors into the content and truth value of
desire reports. I present hitherto unexplored and unaccounted for uses
of ‘wants’. I call them advisory uses, on which information inaccessible
to the desirer herself helps determine what it’s true to say she wants. I
show that extant theories by Stalnaker (1984), Heim (1992), and Levinson
(2003) fail to predict it. I also show that they fail to predict true indicative
conditionals with ‘wants’ in the consequent. I argue that these problems are
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related—intuitively valid reasoning with modus ponens on the basis of the
conditionals in question results in unembedded advisory uses.
I consider two fixes, and end up endorsing a relativist semantics, accord-
ing to which desire attributions express information-neutral propositions.
The truth of a desire attribution, on the view I arrive at, depends on the
state of information at the context of assessment. I compare ‘wants’ with
‘ought’, which exhibits similar unembedded and compositional behavior.
Finally I sketch a pragmatic account of the purpose of desire attributions
that explains why it made sense for them to evolve in this way.
1.5 Conclusion
Surprising consequences arise from the resulting picture. For one, states
of desire and belief can be such that they stand in indeterminate relations,
regarding satisfaction and truth, to the actual world. For another, there is
no such thing as a completely general negation operation on these contents
that returns true just in case the negated proposition fails to be true for any
reason (including by lacking on a truth value). Finally, the link between
suppositional reasoning and a commitment to conditionals is even looser
than is commonly supposed. The argument from A to B can be logically
valid while the conditional A→ B fails to be true.
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Chapter 2
Liars, Propositions, and
Contexts
There are two compatible but distinct spirits in which to approach semantic
paradoxes. On the one hand, we can take up the perspective of language
builders. On this approach, pathological sentences like the Liar impose
restrictions on how we can construct formal languages, much like physical
laws impose restrictions on the kinds of stable buildings that we can build.
We can use this material, but if we do, we can’t support a building of a
certain height; if we want to build to that height, we will need to use a
dierent material. Similarly with the Liar: You can have, for example, a
truth-predicate as part of your object language, but if you do, you have to
amend classical logic, restrict seemingly innocuous inferences involving the
truth predicate, or restrict your ability to name sentences at will. Or you
can banish the truth predicate from your object language, in which case you
can keep all of the classical logic and syntactic expressiveness that you want.
On this very general approach—which is more or less the way the Liar is
approached from the standpoint of formal logic—the challenge is to build
the most robust formal language as possible, given the looming threat of
semantic paradoxes.
There is another way to think about the Liar. We could take the per-
spective, not of language-builders, but rather as theorists of already existing
natural languages. For at least prima facie, English contains all of the re-
sources that make paradoxes inevitable. We shouldn’t, I think, follow Tarski
in concluding that English is just defective, and that ideal thinkers (on some
interpretation of ‘ideal’) should abandon it in favor of one of the sanitized
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languages constructed in the above spirit. Indeed, it’s not clear just how we’d
go about doing that. All of the reasoning that led Tarski to this conclusion
itself occurred in Polish. If Tarski can reason his way to dissatisfaction
with Polish using inference rules from Polish itself, then, by his own lights,
we need not throw away the baby in order to dispose of the bathwater. A
semantic theory of English that entails that every sentence is a theorem
should, for that very reason, be rejected. The corresponding metaphor for
this approach would be: We come across a perfectly stable building, but one
that, according to our current theories of physics and engineering, seems
unable to stand. Yet clearly it does. Our task is to figure our how it stands,
given what else we know.
In this chapter, I will be concerned with attempts by Burge, Glanzberg to
give contextualist analyses of the paradoxes in natural languages. Burge and
Glanzberg take dierent approaches: Burge thinks that the English truth-
predicate has a hidden indexical parameter, and he develops a Tarski-inspired
hierarchy to avoid inconsistency. Glanzberg rejects such a fragmentation,
arguing that indexical behavior just isn’t observed in ordinary uses of ‘true’
in English. He attempts to retain a unitary truth predicate by introducing
propositions as the fundamental bearers of truth, and positing context-
sensitivity in the domain of quantification over those propositions.
I argue that Glanzberg’s proposal is best understood as providing met-
alinguistic truth-conditions for our truth-talk in English, rather than as a
suggestion for modeling the inferences that we explicitly make about truth. I
work out, as Glanzberg does not, exactly how his proposal is to be assimilated
into the inferential system of English itself, and conclude that making this
explicit removes the most substantial dierences between his approach and
Burge’s. Glanzberg will have to fragment the truth predicate after all, at least,
whenever we actually reason using it. In a way, Glanzberg acknowledges
this, but he does not do so in a way that makes the relationship between
his approach and those like Burge’s perspicuous. Glanzberg’s proposal is
best understood as a way of motivating something like Burge’s approach,
rather than rejecting it. The only complaint about contextualist solutions
from which Glanzberg, but not Burge, is immune, is that it is ad hoc. I’ll
conclude by raising two very general worries for any context-hierarchical
interpretation of the English truth predicate: the arms-race problem, and
propositional attitudes toward contingently paradoxical sentences.
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2.1 A brief introduction to the Liar
I am not the first, nor will I be the last, to introduce the Liar from ground
zero. For this, I beg patience; it will be helpful to fix notation, and to focus
on the problem from the perspective of natural languages. Say, then, that
you’re taking a true/false test, and you come across the following question:
T/F: This sentence is false.
You scratch your head, wondering whether to circle T or F. You reason:
Suppose I circle T. For that sentence to be true is for it to get
the world right; it is to tell things like they are. So in circling
T, I am committing myself to whatever that sentence says. That
sentence says that that sentence is false. What’s false can’t be
true, so clearly I can’t circle T. So I should circle F. But if I circle
F, then I’m claiming that this sentence gets things wrong. Which
is just to say, it’s false. But that’s just what the sentence says! So
the sentence gets things right after all. Which is just to say, it’s
true.
At this point, you might refuse to circle anything, or you might circle both T
and F, or you might tear up the test. All of these responses have analogues in
the literature. Keep our test-taker’s dilemma in mind; the above will serve as
a canonical bit of locally intuitive but globally paradoxical English reasoning.
Here is the simplest formal language in which the test-taker’s predicament
can be modeled. Start out with a standard propositional language without
quantification LP :
At := Ai
ϕ := At | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ
Let’s fix a standard classical semantics for this language. A model M
consists of an interpretation function v : At → {0, 1}. The semantic values
for complex formulae are computed as follows:
JAiK = v(Ai)J¬ϕK = 1− JϕKJϕ ∨ ψK = max(JϕK , JψK)
9
Liars, Propositions, and Contexts
Jϕ ∧ ψK = min(JϕK , JψK)Jϕ→ ψK = max(1− JϕK , JψK)
This language, with these semantic clauses, is safe from the Liar in an
important sense: No restrictions onM are necessary. AnyM will result in
an interpretation that does not crash on complex formulae. This will not
remain the case for the richer languages we’ll consider.
To get the problem posed by the Liar into view, consider an enriched
language LP+, which adds to L only singular terms si and a monadic predicate
T (x):
At := Ai
t := si
ϕ := At | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | T (t)
A modelM for LP+ is a pair 〈v, ref 〉 of an interpretation function v : At →
{0, 1} and a naming function ref : t → ϕ for ϕ ws of LP+. The controversy
is what to say about the semantics and inferential behavior of T .
Maudlin (2004) distinguishes two ways to bring out the problem posed by
the Liar paradox: the semantic way, and the inferential way. The semantic
version of the paradox gets its bearings by asking directly: “What’s the
truth-value of l?” Our truth predicate seems to have the following meaning:
JT (t)K = Jref (t)K
This would validate an axiom schema in the object language:
T(pϕq) ≡ ϕ (T-Schema)
Here pϕq is a metalinguistic name for any term si of LP+ such that ref (si) = ϕ.
Recall that we did not impose any restrictions on ref . Therefore, here is
a perfectly possible assignment of names to sentences:
ref (s1) = ¬T (s1) (Liar)
10
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s1, that is, denotes the sentence ¬T (s1). Call any sentential name like this—
that is, any name l such that ref (l) = ¬T (l)—a Liar name (relative to
M).1
On the semantic understanding of the Liar paradox, we’ve already gen-
erated the paradox. Applying the semantic clause for the truth predicate to
a Liar name, we get:
JT (l)K = Jref (t)K = J¬T (l)K (2.1)
We run immediately into a problem: JT (l)K = J¬T (l)K = 1− JT (l)K. There-
fore, we cannot assign l a semantic value, at least against the backdrop of
the semantic framework we’ve formulated. If we assign it semantic value
1, we’re forced to assign it 0; and if we assign it 0, we’re forced to assign it
1. This is the semantic understanding of the paradox: we ask directly what
semantic value we should assign l, and run into a problem given a naive
semantics for the truth predicate.
The key point is that, on this approach, the problem is consistently to
assign l a truth value. The actual reasoning about which truth values it
should receive occurs in the metalanguage. We start by making observations
about the meaning of the word ‘true’, and then use these observations to
generate a semantic entry for ‘T’. Metalinguistic reasoning about whether
T (l) should be assigned semantic value 1 or 0 is what generates the paradox.
There’s a dierent way to present the problem posed by the Liar: what
Maudlin calls the inferential version. Instead of focusing on the semantics
of the English truth-predicate, we can look directly to the inferential structure
of the predicate as it’s used in English reasoning. For, when we want to
find out whether to believe something, we can engage in inferences from
other things that we believe, and we do so without necessarily engaging in
sophisticated metalinguistic reflections about the meanings of words. Indeed,
when we’re giving a semantic theory for some fragment of English, we often
take valid inferences as data that our theory should account for. What kind
of data do we have for the English truth predicate? The following two rules
have famously seemed constitutive of the meaning of the truth predicate:
1A slightly more fleshed out treatment of this way of generating self-reference is developed
in the appendix to Chapter 3. The thing to note here is that self-reference is enforced directly
by the model, not via any arithmetization of syntax. I’ll also employ corner quotes to refer
(metalinguistically) to the name of a formula—so, for example, T(pA1q) is shorthand for
the least T (si) such that ref (si) = A1.
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i T(pϕq)
j ϕ T-out i
and
i ϕ
j T(pϕq) T-in i
These are natural-deduction rules in the flavor of Fitch. T-out, for example,
says that anytime a sentence of the form T(pϕq) appears on line i, then ϕ
may be written on any line j > i citing i with T-out as the justification.2
Something in the ballpark of these inference rules must be valid. We can
see this simply by observing that we can’t ever assert,
(1) Grass is green, but ‘grass is green’ isn’t true.
or
(2) ‘Grass is green’ is true, but grass isn’t green.
Sentences of that form, it seems, cannot be true, at least when it is clear
that no shift in meaning or idiolect is involved. The incoherence of these
assertions doesn’t have anything in particular to do with grass or greenness,
so we have strong evidence that both of these rules are valid inferences in
English. Whatever semantics you cook up for the truth predicate, even ones
that incorporate truth-value gaps, should validate these rules.
But, remember, l := ¬T (l). Then we reason,
T (l) Hypothesis
¬T (l) T-out
¬T (l) Reductio
T (l) T-in
This proof models exactly the steps made in the informal reasoning of our
test-taker. We get a proof in the object language, from no premises, that l
2See Magnus et al. (2018) for exposition. Numbered lines and justification will be
omitted in suciently short proofs with suciently obvious steps.
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must be false, and true. We’ve proved a contradiction. Since there aren’t
any premises to haggle over, one of the rules must be wrong, or else l has
somehow to be ill-formed, or else the contradiction has to be illusory, or else
the contradiction must be true (and the logic non-classical).
On the semantic way of motivating the Liar, the problem was consistently
to assign l some truth value. Our reasoning about which truth values it could
or could not receive itself occurred in the metalanguage. On the inferential
understanding, on the other hand, the problem is to explain why a proof, in
the object language, that l is true (and therefore also false) is not valid. The
semantic version is concerned with giving a semantic theory of the truth
predicate; the inferential version is directly concerned, not with semantics,
but with the deductive system. Of course, these two ways of motivating the
paradox are intimately related. A semantics validate inference rules, and
obviously valid inference rules call out for a semantic theory that validates
them. The dierence is only with where to start: with the semantics, or with
the deductive system.
The inferential version of the Liar, Maudlin claims, is prima facie harder
to excise than the semantic version when it comes to natural languages.
For we can cook up sophisticated paradox-free semantics for the English
truth predicate all day, but it will be of no use if our semantics doesn’t
validate obviously valid English rules (or at least gives some insight into why
they’re not valid). It’s hard to motivate abandoning very intuitive rules of
inference, ones that, if you look about in the world at large, are commonly
used and accepted. Therefore, it is incumbent upon any solution to the Liar
paradox that it motivate abandoning one or another of these rules, in ways
that don’t make doing so seem like an ad hoc solution, cooked up solely for
the purpose of blocking semantic paradoxes. The holy grail would be to
find some linguistic evidence, from outside the fairly obscure context of the
paradoxes, that motivates a solution restricting these inference rules.
2.2 Intuitive responses
I will now leave behind these preliminary observations, although they will
become important later on. In this section, I’ll sketch the most intuitive
responses to the Liar, and examine their shortcomings. For, since my
question is not, “What’s the most powerful language that does not fall prey
to semantic paradoxes?”, but rather, “How does English work, such that
13
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Liar-type reasoning does not commit us to inconsistency?”, considerations
of intuitiveness take on extra weight. Out of the failure of these intuitive
responses will arise context-based approaches.
2.3 Banning self-reference
By far the most common response to the Liar one hears from non-experts is:
“What kind of sentence is ‘This sentence is false’? Proper sentences can’t refer
to themselves, they can only refer to things and perhaps to other sentences.”
Many have wrestled with the intuition that the Liar sentence is somehow
defective, and that the paradox must rely on some nefarious philosopher’s
trick. Perhaps the trick was that the philosopher constructed what only seems
to be a well-formed sentence, but which, due to illicit self-reference, actually
fails to be syntactically well-formed.
One problem with this response is that it just isn’t true of English. For
example, “This sentence has five words” is straightforwardly true. Perhaps
English just bans self-reference when semantic, rather than syntactic, predi-
cates are involved? Sadly, banning explicitly self-referential sentences when
semantic predicates are involved won’t help with blocking the paradox,
because of contingently paradoxical sentences. Indeed, contingently para-
doxical sentences are the real test-cases for a theory of the English semantic
predicate, because these sentences show that, not only can paradoxes arise
in artificially constructed contexts (like test-taking), but that they can arise,
albeit rarely, in the course of making responsible statements about the truth-
values of other utterances. And, we’ll see in Chapter 3, contingent types of
paradoxes in other domains will serve an important argumentative role.
2.3.1 Contingently paradoxical sentences (Kripke (1975))
Surely you can understand the sentence: “Don’t listen to your father; every-
thing he says is a lie.” And surely you also understand the sentence: “Listen
to your mother; she’s always right.” If you understand these sentences, you’re
in the mire. For (simplifying a bit by removing the quantifications) these
together have the form:
s1 : ¬T (s2)
s2 : T (s1)
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We’ll have the same semantic and inferential problems for this set of
sentences as arose for the simple Liar. If s1 is true, then s2 is false; but s2 just
said that s1 was true, so s2 would have to be true. Contradiction. On the
other hand, if s1 is false, then s2 is true; but s2 just said that s1 was true, so it
would follow that s1 is true after all , contradicting our supposition that s1 is
false.
Again, we can weasel our way out of semantic versions by assigning
both of these sentences some junk truth value (call it 12) rather than 0 or 1;
but there are corresponding deductive versions, modeling line-for-line this
informal reasoning, that seem to force us to give up some natural rules of
inference. In any case, this shows that, whatever is the real problem with self-
referential (sets of) sentences containing truth predicates, it’s not that they
aren’t proper sentences. Most of the time, both s1 and s2 are unproblematic;
it’s an empirical question whether s1 and s2 together give rise to paradox.
Whatever is wrong with them, they’re not syntactically ill-formed.
2.4 Failure to express a proposition
These contingently paradoxical sentences show that English has the syntac-
tical resources to construct sentences involving the semantic predicate that
can lead to paradox if circumstances are suciently unfavorable. But we
can try to recover a kernel of wisdom from the no-sentence approach, by
taking the following tack. First, what exactly are we believing if we accept l?
It seems clear that the extra-linguistic world stays exactly as it is whether or
not we assent to l. There’s no thought about the world that is at stake in l.
So perhaps l, though a genuine, syntactically well-formed sentence, fails to
express a truth-evaluable claim at all. For further motivation, compare the
Liar sentence to other infelicitous utterances:
(3) I promise that I won’t keep this promise.
(4) I command you not to obey this command.
We could try to motivate a similar paradox: Say that you keep the promise;
then it follows that you didn’t keep the promise, because you promised not
to keep it. If you don’t keep it, then you keep it after all. Do these reflections
suggest that our concepts of promising or commanding are incoherent? No:
They tells us that there is no such promise as (3), and no such command as
(4).
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Things might look better with contingent versions of these paradoxes.
For example:
(5) A: I command you to obey all of B’s commands.
B: I command you to disobey all of A’s commands.
As with the contingent Liar, it will be hard to say what it would be to obey
A’s command, once B utters their (prima facie) command. The no-command
response would have it that whether B’s utterance counts as a command
depends on what A has commanded.
This may strike one as odd. To know what kind of speech act B is making,
we have to know a lot about what the world entirely external to B is like.
Admittedly, this in itself may not be so weird. If one happens upon a theater
play and hears someone utter the words, “Help, Marjorie is dead!”, one may
not be aware whether this is a proper assertion and request, or just one of
the mock assertions and requests that one hears in the course of a theater
play.
But in cases like this, the dierence in type of speech act, though de-
pendent on the surrounding context, clearly trace back in some way to the
intentions and beliefs of the conversational participants. In (5), B intends
to be issuing a proper command, and nothing about this intention changes
depending on what A commands.
Still, there is some pull towards the idea that B’s “command” is somehow
defective, and therefore not a full-fledged command, because of what A
has commanded. We can see this by asking what B would say if they were
informed about what A has previously commanded. It would be odd for B
to stick by what they said earlier, or to complain that their command was
not followed, or to rejoice that it was followed, no matter what actions were
performed. This suggests that no full-fledged command was issued, despite
B’s intentions.
What would a similar no-proposition view look like in the case of the
Liar? On such a view, the Liar really amounts to the ‘claim’:
(6) The thought that this sentence expresses is false.
We can try the same sort of response: There is no such thought. Nothing
syntactic is wrong with (6); what’s wrong is that it fails to say anything. We
cannot believe it or disbelieve it, because it is not a believable.
One benefit of this approach is that it seems to unify two domains in
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which people have argued for truth-value gaps. Many have thought that
semantic paradoxes motivate truth-value gaps. But that hasn’t been the only
motivation: Frege held that cases of presupposition failure, like sentences
involving non-denoting names, actually have no truth value, because they
express no thought: they contain a term that does not denote (though it
may have a sense). Such sentences express only mock thoughts, just as stage
thunder merely appears to be thunder. On the no-proposition approach, the
Liar is equivalent to a sentence which presupposes the existence of a thought
for that sentence to express; like the case of empty names, this presupposition
is false, and therefore the sentence lacks a truth-value. The no-proposition
approach to the Liar would explain how these two motivations for truth-value
gaps are actually quite related.
A few notes on terminology. I’ll use ‘thought’ and ‘proposition’ more
or less interchangeably. I want to remain as agnostic as possible on what
these are, metaphysically speaking. I mean something like: ‘The content of
an utterance’ or ‘the truth-evaluable claim that an utterance makes’. This
is a fairly intuitive idea. If on Monday you say, “It’s raining today” and on
Tuesday you say “It rained yesterday,” these are just two dierent ways of
saying the exact same thing. The same empirical fact makes both of those
sentences true. These sentences therefore express the same proposition.3
The problem with the Liar, on the view I’m trying to motivate, is that it fails
to express any such proposition.
2.4.1 Problems for a straight no-proposition view
The above line is attractive as (6) is formulated. But we can push this
response in directions that undermine its initial plausibility. First, let’s make
a new Liar sentence:
(7) The sentence labeled (7) does not express a true proposition.
Let’s try to run the no-proposition line: “The problem with (7) is that it
doesn’t express a proposition.” But wait: If it doesn’t express any proposition,
doesn’t it follow that, in particular, it doesn’t express a true proposition? And
3This is too coarse a way of individuating propositions in general—it would, for example,
entail that there was just one mathematical proposition. But this commitment isn’t necessary
for what follows. The no-propositions views explored below don’t assume much about the
structure of propositions, and instead just ask about the prospects of a theory that deny
that the Liar expresses one.
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isn’t that exactly what (7) says? Someone advocating the no-proposition view
will have to maintain: “No. That’s what it would say, if it actually expressed
a proposition. But, on pain of paradox, it can’t. So really (7) doesn’t say
anything, even if it appears to say that it doesn’t express a true proposition.”
But this looks hopeless. Consider the following two statements side-by-
side:
(7): The sentence labeled (7) does not express a true proposition.
Theorist: The sentence labeled (7) does not express a true propo-
sition.
Each of the words in these sentences has the same meaning (there’s no
bank-bank type equivocation), and they’re put together in the same ways.
Yet, an advocate of the no-proposition approach will have to say, (7) does not
express a proposition, but the sentence uttered by the theorist does—indeed,
it expresses a true proposition.
This suggests a dierence between the self-refuting promise and the Liar
sentence. For, if we try similarly to rephrase (3): “This sentence does not
express a promise with the content that I won’t keep that promise”, there’s no
paradox: that sentence is simply true, because that sentence doesn’t amount
to a promise. If we rephrase it as “This sentence expresses a promise with
the content that I won’t keep that promise”, it’s just false: No it doesn’t,
because there is no such promise. With the Liar, things are harder.
We have two sentences with the same words in the same order, and no
obvious equivocation in meaning between words, and yet the sentences have
two dierent semantic values (none at all, or what we’re representing as 12 ,
and 1, respectively). This observation has led many to suspect that there
is some sort of context shift at play. It’s actually not uncommon in natural
language to find two tokens of the same sentence with dierent truth values.
The following two sentences,
(8) This car is loud.
This car isn’t loud.
can both be true if the referent of ‘this car’ or the meaning of ‘loud’ has
changed based on context. Similarly, perhaps (7) and the theorist’s diagnosis
of what’s wrong with (7) can unproblematically have dierent truth values.
Perhaps there has been a hidden context shift between them.
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2.5 Two kinds of context-based approaches
There’s a lot of intuitive plausibility in a no-proposition analysis of the English
semantic paradoxes. Of course, making such a view work will require telling
a story about what propositions are and how they relate to sentences. But
even if such a story can be told, the above line shows that any such view
must account for the dierence between (7) itself and the theorist’s diagnosis
of (7). Context is a natural place to look, for historically, context has been
introduced in semantics to explain how dierent utterances of the same
sentence can have dierent truth values on dierent occasions.
Those who have taken this line, however, have disagreed on the exact
nature of the context-sensitivity involved in the Liar. Burge (1979b) thinks
that the English truth predicate itself has a hidden indexical element, and
that that uses of it on particular occasions are indexed (at the level of syntax)
to particular levels on Tarski’s hierarchy. He thinks that once we analyze the
structure of our truth predicates in this way, we’ll see that we don’t need to
posit propositions to do any explanatory work after all.
Glanzberg (2004) rejects Burge’s approach, claiming that it implausibly
posits a wild proliferation of dierent truth predicates at the syntactic level.
Instead, he attempts to retain a single truth predicate by introducing proposi-
tions as the fundamental truth-bearers. When we say that a sentence is true,
what we mean is that the proposition it expresses is true. He then claims
that the problem with the Liar inference is that it hides context-sensitivity in
the domain of quantification over propositions. (His hierarchical analysis of
context is more Kripke-like than Burge’s Tarski-inspired approach, but that
dierence won’t much matter here.) I’ll briefly introduce the idea behind
Burge’s account, and then cite Glanzberg’s reasons for criticizing it. Then
I’ll argue that Glanzberg’s proposal, properly understood, does not escape
from fragmenting the English truth predicate for many practical purposes
(the ones where we reason about truth using T-in).
2.6 Indexical truth predicate (Burge)
Burge (1979b) gives what is probably the most well-known contextualist
analysis of semantic paradoxes. He reasons: Say that we take our initial proof
of l and ¬l to show that l must lack standard truth-conditions. (Whether
we want to analyze this as a failure to express a proposition is, for the
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moment, another matter.) Since l lacks standard truth conditions, it follows
in particular that l isn’t true; that is, the sentence ¬T (l) is true. But l :=
¬T (l). So l must be true after all. What we want, to prevent a contradiction,
is to explain the dierence between the reasoner’s derivation of l and l itself,
which look identical. Burge:
[This reasoning] seems to involve no change in the grammar or
linguistic meaning of the expressions involved. This suggests
that the shifts in evaluation should be explained in pragmatic
terms. Since there is a shift from saying that the relevant sentence
is not true to saying that the same sentence is true—a shift in
truth value without a change of meaning—there is an indexical
element at work. The indexicality is most plausibly attributed to
the truth predicate. (Burge (1979b), p. 179)
In rough outline, Burge proposes interpreting the truth predicate in l
itself as Ti for some i, and interpreting the reasoner’s derivation of l as
using Tj . There is no explicit contradiction in asserting ¬Ti(l) and Tj(l).
Burge then gives three dierent proposals for modeling the structure of our
truth predicate. All are Tarski-inspired hierarchies, where you start with
atomic, non-truth-involving sentences, and recursively construct increasingly
powerful truth predicates, each of which can include only the lower-level
ones in its extension. The main dierence that Tarski’s hierarchy posits
infinitely many increasingly rich metalanguages, each of which contains the
semantic predicate of the language below it. Burge’s proposal posits a single
indexically sensitive truth predicate in one language. So when we interpret
the word ‘true’ in English, we must assign it some value on this hierarchy.
So, Burge thinks, you can have an apparatus of propositions if you want, but
it needn’t be invoked to do any explanatory work in blocking the paradox.
2.7 Indexical domain of quantification over
propositions (Glanzberg)
Glanzberg agrees with Burge, for basically the same reasons, that there must
be a context-shift between l and the theorist’s diagnosis of what’s wrong
with l. But he rejects an approach that fragments the truth predicate. His
argument is worth quoting in its entirety—for, I will argue, his proposal does
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not avoid fragmenting the truth predicate that we actually reason with in
English. Glanzberg:
A more common idea [than mine] is to suppose that the truth
predicate itself contains a hidden indexical component. Let
me briefly note that I do not think this is a promising option.
It is a commonly voiced objection to it that we simply to not
intuitively see such an indexical element in our ordinary truth
predicate, expressed by the ordinary term ‘true’. I believe this
line of argument can be bolstered. If there were such a hidden
indexical, it would behave as other implicit parameters do. In the
case of a gradable adjective, for instance, we can see the hidden
comparison class at work when we bind the hidden variable, as
in:
Most species S have members that are small for S .
We see no such behavior with the truth predicate. (Glanzberg
(2004), p. 30)
Glanzberg’s idea is this. When we attribute truth or falsity to our sen-
tences, we’re really attributing truth or falsity to the thoughts (or propositions)
expressed by those sentences. So when we say “ ‘s’ is true”, what we really
mean is: “There is a true thought that ‘s’ expresses.” That is:
T (s) := (∃p)[Exp(s, p)&T (p)] (2.2)
Glanzberg then gives us some basic principles for reasoning about truth.
Those are:
Exp(pϕq, p)→ (T (p)↔ ϕ) (T-Exp)
(Exp(s, p)&Exp(s, q))→ p = q (U-Exp)
p = q → [T (p)↔ T (q)] (T-Id)
Then, Glanzberg generates the paradox thus. Our Liar sentence should
actually read:
l : ¬(∃p)[Exp(l, p)&T (p)]
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And we reason using the above rules. Informally, it goes like this: Suppose
l expresses a proposition p. If p is true, then p is false. If p is false, then p
is true. Hence, l does not express a proposition. But then, it follows that,
in particular, l doesn’t express a true proposition. But that’s just l. So l is
true. But to be true is to express a true proposition. Paradox. (His formal
proof requires all of his truth-rules, plus if-introduction, reductio, conjunction
introduction, and the standard rules involving the quantifiers.)4
How to block the paradox, according to Glanzberg? His proof has two
conclusions:
(A): ¬(∃p)Exp(l, p)
(B): l
Glanzberg refuses to consider giving up any of the rules of inference that
led to these results: “As both (A) and (B) are the results of sound proofs,
they must both be true.” But given that he has also rejected fragmenting
the truth predicate (and, presumably, the Exp relation), where is the context
sensitivity? Glanzberg:
I maintain we have to see a context shift between (A) and (B)
aecting l. We have a proof, based on solid principles, so its
conclusions had better be correct. If there is no context shift,
then we have a genuine contradiction, so there must be a context
shift. . . The only locus for context dependence [given that there
are no standard indexicals], is the domain of the quantifier ∃p.
(Glanzberg (2004), p. 34)
Glanzberg goes on to give a fairly sophisticated formal model of context,
which shows how (A) and (B) aren’t inconsistent after all. I won’t get into
the details, which are quite technical, but the basic idea is to interpret the
existential quantifier in (B) as ranging over strictly more propositions than
that of (A). So what we really have is something like:
(A): ¬(∃0p)Exp(l, p)
(B): l = (∃1p)[Exp(l, p)&T (p)]
4Glanzberg’s formal proof can be found on page 33 of his 2004.
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These are both true. The proposition that satisfies (B) simply isn’t in the
domain of ∃0, although it is in that of ∃1. When we asserted (A), we had to
‘step back’, and observe something like ‘that’s just what l says’. This ‘stepping
back’, says Glanzberg, expands the domain of truth-conditions available for
us to quantify over. And, of course, with continued iterations of the same
argument, we’ll get a sequence of seeming contradictions, which will, on
Glanzberg’s account, receive increasingly rich existential quantifiers. The
Liar sentence will come out true on the odd indices, and false on the even
indices. Glanzberg spends much of his paper developing a sophisticated
formal model of context that explains how asserting things like (A) can
continually expand the domain of truth conditions for sentences like (B).
But the exact structure of his formal model isn’t crucial for much of what
follows.
2.8 Whither T-out and T-in?
It’s not immediately clear how to understand Glanzberg’s diagnosis. He
claims to be specifically concerned with the paradox as it arises in natural
languages, but when he gets around to stating his version of it, the proof
involves propositions, expression relations, and quantification—none of
which elements obviously appears in our ordinary English reasoning about
truth. We can say, “The sentence that you uttered didn’t express a true
proposition in the context in which you uttered it”, but I doubt that anyone
unschooled in a fair amount of philosophy of language would put it that way.
We say simply, “That’s false!” or “Everything you’ve said about my supposed
aair with the countess is false.” The first has no quantification; and insofar
as there’s a quantifier in the second, it isn’t completely clear whether it ranges
over sentences or propositions.5 And no lexical item corresponding to ‘Exp’
appears in either.
5One way to get an intuitive handle on this question is to ask about intuitions involving
counting the objects of truth. If someone utters “John greeted Mary” and “Mary was greeted
by John”, and John indeed greeted Mary, how many true things did they say? Two answers
seem acceptable: one (namely the proposition that John greeted Mary), formulated in two
dierent ways, and two (the number of true sentences that they uttered). However, as the
conversation grows more complex and the distinct propositions get harder to count, it
becomes more natural to default to counting sentences. For example, in a conversation
involving morning stars and evening stars, where it’s less intuitively clear how to individuate
propositions, sentences seem like a natural fall-back.
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Now, it might be that the best way to analyze what we mean by such
utterances will involve quantifying over propositions and relating them to
sentences via something like ‘Exp’. But if this is what’s going on, it’s not going
on explicitly at the level of English syntax. It’s going on ‘under the hood’, so
to speak, in a metalanguage. Therefore, I submit that Glanzberg’s proposal
is most plausible when it’s understood as providing truth conditions for
our truth-talk in a metalanguage of English. He’s giving a truth-conditional
semantics for sentences involving the English truth-predicate.
I should note that I’m not entirely sure whether this aligns with
Glanzberg’s self-understanding. For one thing, the word ‘metalanguage’ does
not appear in his paper, save in a few endnotes. For another, T-Exp allows us
to go back and forth between sentences involving T, Exp, and propositions,
and regular English sentences without those elements. On the interpreta-
tion I’m advocating, this can seem like a category error: Glanzberg’s Liar
inference would go back and forth between sentences in a metalanguage and
sentences in the object language of which it’s a metalanguage. But I submit
that we must understand Glanzberg in this way, if his proposal is to have
any plausibility. His truth-rules are fairly baroque, and I can’t imagine that
anything like T-Exp has ever appeared explicitly in English reasoning. If it’s
a part of our reasoning at all, it must be doing its work under the hood. It
must be part of our semantic theory of the English truth predicate, not part
of a serious proposal for modeling the valid English-language arguments
that actually appear in the wild.
Thus, to revisit a distinction made above, Glanzberg is treating the
paradox in the semantical way, not the inferential way. Though he does
provide a ‘proof’, which suggests that he is concerned with rules of inference,
this proof does not model intuitive English reasoning (like that of our test-
taker). Furthermore, Glanzberg considers it beyond the pale to abandon
any of these jointly troublesome inference rules. He just wants to show that
they don’t commit us to inconsistency. His concern is with the semantics
of English, not directly with its deductive system.6 For these reasons, then,
we should understand his ‘proof’ as modeling reasoning that occurs in a
metalanguage. But then, it’s natural to ask: How exactly is Glanzberg’s
6It is debatable whether English even has a deductive system, in the sense of syntactically
specifiable rules that correspond to some well-defined notion of a formally valid argument.
For these purposes I assume that there are at least some arguments that are formally valid
in English, but this is not universally accepted. See, for instance, Quine (1951) and Russell
(2018) for skepticism on this front.
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proposal supposed to account for the inferences that we explicitly do make
regarding truth (exemplified by our test-taker)? If Glanzberg is right about
the semantics of our truth-talk, what does that imply for the deductive system
of the language that’s ultimately at issue?
As a first step toward answering this question, let’s make Glanzberg’s
proposal more explicitly geared toward this understanding of it. He argues
that we should give something like the following semantics for the English
truth-predicate as applied to sentences:
JT (s)K = 1 i (∃p)[Exp(s, p)&T (p)]
And recall that Glanzberg accepts all of his rules about truth. Clearly
these play a role analogous to that of T-out and T-in. Do Glanzberg’s rules
governing truth in the metalanguage validate T-out and T-in in its object
language? Recall,
Exp(pϕq, p)→ (T (p)↔ ϕ) (T-Exp)
(Exp(s, p)&Exp(s, q))→ p = q (U-Exp)
p = q → [T (p)↔ T (q)] (T-Id)
First, we can observe that T-out is straightforwardly valid: Suppose that
T(pϕq). That means that there’s a true proposition that pϕq expresses; and
by T-Exp, ϕ follows. So T-out is valid.
What about T-in? One tempting way to interpret T-Exp is as a way of
blocking T-in. We only get to invoke T-in if we already know that s expresses
a proposition. But Glanzberg seems to think that we can assert s truthfully
only if it expresses a proposition. (“The truth of l seems to require there to
be a proposition for l to express.” [Glanzberg (2004), p. 34]) If that’s so,
then an unrestricted version of T-in would be valid after all.
So, when it comes to the actual language that we all explicitly use and love,
Glanzberg needs to follow basically the same approach as Burge. He accepts
all of the inference rules that the test-taker used in his reasoning. He must
therefore think that we have true instances of T (l) and ¬T (l). The only way
for this to happen, by his lights, is for the truth predicate to shift extension
based on context. Its shift in extension, according to Glanzberg, is derivative
from an expansion of the domain of quantification over propositions in the
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metalanguage; but nonetheless, to avoid contradiction, its extension must so
shift. And so, the truth predicate in English, applied to sentences, must be
indexically sensitive after all.
To make it clear just how important it is that we keep an index on the
truth predicate in our actual reasoning about truth, consider Curry’s paradox.
Curry’s paradox is without a doubt the best semantic paradox. It shows
directly how an explosion principle follows from only the T-inferences, modus
ponens, and if-introduction. I’ll give it first in English, and then in Fitch-ese.
Consider the sentence c that reads, “If ‘c’ is true, then your
mother was a hamster”. Now, suppose that ‘c’ is true. ‘c’ just
says that, if it’s true, then your mother was a hamster, so it would
follow that your mother was a hamster. But we just derived “Your
mother was a hamster” from supposing " ‘c’ is true“, so surely, if
‘c’ is true, then your mother was a hamster. But that’s just what
‘c’ says! So ‘c’ is true. So your mother was a hamster.
In Fitch-ese: Consider the sentence, c := T (c) ⊃ ⊥. We can reason:
1 T (c) Hypothesis
2 T (c) ⊃ ⊥ T-out
3 ⊥ Modus Ponens
4 T (c) ⊃ ⊥ ⊃ Introduction
5 T (c) T-in
6 ⊥ Modus Ponens
How do we deal with Curry’s paradox, on Glanzberg’s analysis? Remem-
ber, Glanzberg rejects modifying or restricting classical logic out of hand,
and so he has to find a way to domesticate this reasoning without concluding
that there’s some context in which ⊥ holds—for surely there’s no context in
which your mother was a hamster.
But it’s fairly clear how Glanzberg’s analysis will go: (5) and (6) are
both true in the context of assertion, but nonetheless we cannot apply modus
ponens. For, when we invoked T-in, we ‘stepped back’ and observed, ‘That’s
just what’c’ says’. Thus, when we go to the Glanzbergian metalanguage, we’ll
find something like:
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5: ∃0p[Exp(c, p)&T (p)] ⊃ ⊥
6: ∃1p[Exp(c, p)&T (p)]
There is indeed a true proposition in the domain of ∃1 that c expresses; but
that proposition does not fall within the domain of ∃0. Thus the antecedent
of (5) is false, even though (6) is true.
The crucial point is that we must keep track of this when we reason
about the truth of our sentences. The only way to do this is to posit an
indexical parameter on the truth predicate in English whenever it’s applied to
sentences. T-out will still be straightforwardly valid, but when we invoke T-in,
we’ll need to make explicit what index we’re associating with T. For, T-in
is the inference rule that models the ‘stepping back’ move that Glanzberg
thinks is liable surreptitiously to shift the context. So if we don’t keep track
of this in our statement of T-in, we’ll have rules that lead, not only to outright
contradictions, but to explosion (in the sense that every sentence of the
language will end up being provable). Our actual statement of T-in has to
be:
ϕ
Ti(pϕq) For some contextually-dependent i.
The indexical parameter on the truth predicate will correspond to that on
the existential quantifier in the metalanguage. The English truth predicate,
applied, as it usually is, to sentences, can’t get exactly the analysis it got above,
for failing to specify its place on the hierarchy of context led directly to
Curry’s paradox. Applied to sentences, the truth predicate means something
like:
JTi(pϕq)K = 1 i (∃ip)[Exp(pϕq, p)&T (p)]
Therefore, when it comes to modeling the deductive system of English,
Glanzberg’s approach more or less matches Burge’s in spirit, if not in detail.
Glanzberg might provide a motivation for fragmenting the truth predicate
when we reason with it, and giving a more systematic underlying mechanism,
but he does not escape doing so.
Now, it’s not clear that this counts as a substantial objection to Glanzberg’s
project. He states at the beginning of his paper that his main motivation is
to avoid the suggestion that a broadly contextual-hierarchical solution to the
natural-language Liar is ad hoc. And he admits that what he calls ‘internal’
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semantic relations—roughly what I’ve called the truth-predicate applied to
English sentences—can shift in extension as context shifts.
However, I do wish to urge that the way he seems to conceive of his project
in relation to other context-based approaches is misleading. In assessing
the merits of his proposal, he says, “We do not start by positing a hierarchy
of truth relations, as some hierarchical approaches do. Nor do we posit an
index on the truth predicate (an approach I rejected)” (p. 78). As we’ve seen,
this isn’t quite right. It’s true that he doesn’t start by positing a hierarchy
of truth relations, but he does end up there after reflecting on expanded
domains of quantification. And his approach is only plausible if there is an
index on the truth predicate when applied to sentences, in at least those cases
in which T-in is invoked. Here are his remarks about the kind of indexicality
he finds in the English word ‘true’:
As it is driven by context dependence, the hierarchy I propose
does not posit a lexical ambiguity of the truth relation. Though
ultimately an internal truth relation is used in interpretation,
this no more indicates a lexical ambiguity of the truth relation
than [the denotation of ‘that’ changing based on context]. The
meaning of the truth relation remains constant, just as the mean-
ing of ‘that’ remains constant. But in both cases, when looking
across context shifts, we have to be careful to reconstruct the
right context-dependent value. (Glanzberg (2004), p. 79)
So, for Glanzberg, the merit of his approach lies in the fact that there’s
not an explicit lexical ambiguity; it’s not as though ‘true’ must be assigned
any number of unrelated predicates based on context. But this is basically
what Burge thinks he’s doing! Here’s Burge defending himself against charges
of ‘fragmenting’ one concept into many:
What of the univicality criticism of Tarski?. . . In natural language
there is a single indexical predicate. We represent this predicate
by the schematic predicate expression truei. This expression may
in particular contexts be filled out by any of an unlimited number
of numerical subscripts. Any one of the resulting predicates
(formally, there are infinitely many) may represent a particular
occurrence of ‘true’ in a context in which its application is fixed.
Thus the numerals substituted for ‘i’ mark not new predicate con-
stants, but contextual applications of the indexical ‘true’. . . .[In
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this sense,] ‘true’ has a single meaning. (Burge (1979b), p. 191,
my emphasis)
Both Burge and Glanzberg agree that there’s not an explicit lexical
ambiguity in the English ‘true’. But it is indexically sensitive, in the same
way as ‘that’ is indexically sensitive. When it comes to interpreting the
extension of the predicate ‘true’, applied, as it usually is, to sentences, Burge
and Glanzberg do not dier in their general approach (although the exact
structures of the hierarchies they construct do dier somewhat).
2.9 Two problems for this approach
So much for this interpretative point. What we really want to know is: How
plausible is this general approach? I’ll conclude by raising two worries
for the contextualist analysis. These worries are not about the motivation
for contextualism about truth; they are about the limitations contextualism
imposes on the thoughts we are able to express in English. Perhaps we should
accept these limitations as unavoidable. But a response that succeeded
equally in blocking the paradox and did not come with these limitations
would be preferable.
2.9.1 Arms-races
The arms-race problem is one that Burge addresses head-on, but Glanzberg
does not mention. The idea comes from Kripke’s contingently paradoxical
sentences. Suppose that you think that Jones is extremely unreliable, and
never says anything true. And Jones thinks that you are wise, and would
never say anything false. Leave aside for a moment the epistemic merits of
either of these claims. The question is: Can both you and Jones express the
thoughts that you want to express?
Let’s provide a contextualist analysis of both of your statements. Both
Burge and Glanzberg must interpret the ‘true’ and ‘false’ above as limited
in extension to a place on a hierarchy of some sort. Whenever we see the
word ‘true’ applied to English sentences (as it is in these examples), even
Glanzberg has to tell us what level on the context-hierarchy it corresponds
to. But which level should we pick? We have something that looks like:
You: s1 : (∀s)(JonesAsserts(s)→ ¬Ti(s))
Jones: s2 : (∀s)(YouAssert(s)→ Tj(s))
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On Burge’s proposal, either someone gets the short shrift, or else neither
of you can be interpreted as saying exactly what you clearly mean. For
on any of Burge’s constructions, we can never see anything of the form
Ti(p. . .Tj . . . q) if j ≥ i. Sentences such as these are syntactically ill-formed;
each Ti is specifically constructed to range over sentences with truth pred-
icates below i on the hierarchy. So if i = j above, then s1 says absolutely
nothing about s2, and vice-versa. If i > j, then s1 does assert the falsity of s2,
but s2 says absolutely nothing about s1. Burge thinks that the only plausible
thing to do here is to bite the bullet, and make i = j unless context obviously
dictates otherwise. And so s1 says nothing about s2, and s2 nothing about s1.
Perhaps it’s worth biting this bullet. But a bullet it remains.
Another thing to point out is that, when I don’t remember exactly how
many semantic predicates so-and-so has embedded within his utterances,
but I still want to express my disagreement, I’m under intense pressure to
pick as high an i as possible when I assert that everything he says is not
truei. Otherwise I leave open the possibility that I won’t have said something
about all of the utterances that I wanted to say something about. And as
time goes on, speakers sensitive to this will be under pressure to use higher
and higher indexes on the truth-predicate. Someone who wants to disagree
with me will have to use an i still higher than mine, and so on.
Of course, followers of Burge might claim that which i we select for
our interpretation of ‘true’ isn’t up to the speaker; it’s determined by other
contextual elements, like principles of interpretative charity, or whatever.
But in a way, this makes things worse. For then, to ensure that my intentions
to say something about all of so-and-so’s relevant utterances are satisfied,
I can opt to say something long-winded, embedding semantic predicates
within other semantic predicates. For example, if I assert: “For all s, if Jones
says s, then either s isn’t true, or it isn’t true that s is true, or it isn’t true that
it’s true that it’s true that s is true,” etc., then my statement simply can’t be
interpreted with a lower index on the truth predicate than there are disjuncts.
But surely I add nothing to my thought by doing this.
Does Glanzberg’s approach fare better than Burge’s? He won’t be subject
to exactly the same problem, because he isn’t in the business of recursively
constructing Tis based on which Tjs can go in its extension. But he’ll have
parallel problems. When we interpret your utterance and Jones’, we’ll have
something like:
s1 = Ti (∀s)(JonesAsserts(s)→ ¬(∃ip)[Exp(s, p)&T (p)])
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s2 = Ti (∀s)(SethAsserts(s)→ (∃jp)[Exp(s, p)&T (p)])
We must ask the same question we asked on Burge’s construction: Whose
existential quantifier ranges over more propositions? A principle of symmetry
like Burge’s might compel us to make i = j. But even so, when we reason
about whether we should believe s1, s2, or neither, we’re going to reason
ourselves into loops much like those in the regular Liar inference. Roughly,
your utterance will be true on (say) the even ∃i quantifiers, and Jones’ will be
true on the odd ∃i ones. This strikes me as unintuitive; if there are domains
of truth conditions that render s2 true, then you would not be content with
your s1; it would fail to be true in the sense in which you intended it. You
would derive no comfort from the fact that your utterance expressed a
true proposition on every even i on the metalinguistic quantification over
propositions. The right thing to say, it seems, is that you weren’t right at all,
not that you were right in every other context on an infinite hierarchy.
It should go without saying that you can’t get around this problem by
quantifying out the contextual parameter, saying, ‘There’s no context in
which Jones says something true!’ For then the contradiction reappears: As
long as Jones is clever enough to follow you in quantifying out the contextual
parameter, we’re back with the regular old contingent Liar, just a slightly
more complicated one.
Again, maybe there’s just no way for everyone to satisfy their intentions
when they turn out, due to extremely unfavorable circumstances, to lead
to paradox. But I would opt for a solution that didn’t include this counter-
intuitive result.
2.9.2 Contingent paradoxes and epistemic attitudes
Leaving aside arms-races, contingently paradoxical sentences present another
problem for contextualist solutions—this time one that aects Glanzberg’s
analysis more acutely than Burge’s. This problem isn’t that we can’t satisfy
our (perhaps perverse) intentions to talk about the truth-values of all the
sentences that other people have uttered. Instead, it revolves around trying
to make sense of our epistemic attitudes towards sentences that turn out to
be (contingently) paradoxical.
Let’s have a simple example. Disgusted by the weatherman’s recent
predictions, I wake up in the morning and declare, “The first sentence
uttered by the weatherman on the 10pm news will be false.” (Call this s3.) I
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then remain silent the rest of the day. Unfortunately, news of my prediction
travels wide, and the weatherman, a trickster, decides to open the 10pm
news by saying s4: “Everything that Ethan Jerzak said today was true.”
The structure of these contingently paradoxical sentences is familiar:
with classical inferences plus the standard truth rules, these two sentences
allow us to derive a contradiction from no premises. The contextualist
blocks the paradox by restricting the sentential truth-predicate to some Ti
on a hierarchy. The question I want to ask is: How should we analyze my
epistemic attitude toward s3? As it turns out, it does not express a unique
proposition; insofar as it expresses any proposition at all, it’s one on an
infinite series of merely seeming contradictions on an infinite contextual
hierarchy. So consider the question: “Did I believe s3?” Well, when I believe
a sentence, I’m believing the content of that sentence—that is, the proposition
expressed by that sentence, according to folks like Glanzberg. So on his
analysis, this question is actually ill-formed: My sentence doesn’t have a
determinate content, so we cannot sensibly ask, “Did I believe the proposition
expressed by s3?”
But this is extremely counter-intuitive. Surely I did believe a determinate
thought when I expressed s3: I believed neither more nor less than that the
weatherman would say something false. Glanzberg seems forced to fragment
what is one belief into a series of beliefs, none of which expresses the thought
that I wanted to express.
Of course, Glanzberg could say that s3 expressed a determinate thought
when I uttered it, but ceased to when the weatherman uttered his devious
utterance. But I’m not sure whether this fares much better. When, exactly,
do I go from believing a determinate proposition in believing s3 to failing
to? When the weatherman utters s4? When I finally get around to watching
the 10pm news on my Tivo at 11pm? Wherever the line is drawn, the result
is weird. Our worries about contextualism as an ad hoc solution to the
paradoxes are not yet quelled.
Therefore, Glanzberg owes us an analysis of these contingently para-
doxical sentences and the kinds of epistemic attitudes that we can have
toward them, before his proposal becomes compelling as a solution to the
semantic paradoxes for natural language. A virtue of Burge’s paper is that
he deals with these contingently paradoxical sentences head-on; Glanzberg’s
proposal, as it is given in his 2001 and 2004, suers from failing to do this.
He discusses Liar-type reasoning only as it arises in the fairly artificially-
constructed l. But we don’t have a truth predicate in English so that we can
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assert weird, explicitly self-referential sentences like l. We have it precisely to
talk about the truth-values of other utterances. These contingent paradoxes
are therefore the true test-cases for theories of the English truth predicate,
particularly as it interacts with the deductive system. Glanzberg should treat
them as such.
2.10 Upshot
Introducing propositions allows the contextualist to respect the sense in
which ‘true’ seems to have a single meaning: as applied to propositions,
there’s no indexicality in the word ‘true’. Trouble is, the word ‘true’ in
English can also be applied to utterances of sentences, and therefore the
truth predicate that we actually reason with will be fragmented. In particular,
contextualism makes T-in, taken literally, invalid; we only get the inference
from s to Ti(psq) for some contextually dependent i. This makes much of
our reasoning about truth inferentially impotent: as we’ve seen, proving that
a sentence is truei is a far cry from proving that a sentence is true.
Truth plays a more pervasive role than merely as applied to utterances
of sentences. As we’ll see in what follows, truth is intimately connected to
our reasoning about knowledge and belief. Paradoxes structurally similar
to the Liar can be formulated involving these notions, too, and it’s less
clear that a contextualist approach will be applicable in those cases. When
these propositional attitudes are combined with self reference, I’ll argue,
contextualist solutions become less promising, and ones that abandon certain
aspects of classical logic fare better.
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Non-Classical Knowledge
3.1 The Knower paradox
The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what
we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one
of three plausible and widely-held ideas: that knowledge is factive (FACT),
that we can know that knowledge is factive (KFACT), and that we can
use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak
single-premise closure principles (SPC).
In what follows, I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic
principles, is the culprit. The plan: I draw out the structural similarities
between the Knower and more familiar semantic paradoxes like the Liar.
I extend one popular non-classical treatment of the Liar paradox to the
Knower paradox, showing that all of these principles can be saved with
conservative and philosophically motivated emendations to classical logic.
Finally, I evaluate the resulting theory for plausibility, for knowledge of both
mathematical and natural language claims. I consider and respond to two
objections to my approach that arise in the mathematical context. The
first objection is that the indirect nature of sentential reference via Gödel
coding renders the formulation of (KFACT) needed to generate the paradox
implausible. The second objection is that the way I construct my non-classical
theory happens to take a stand on a complex question in the philosophy of
mathematics known as Gödel’s disjunction, and thus is attractive only to
those antecedently disposed to that view. Finally I evaluate my proposal in
the context of natural language knowledge attributions. Here, things are more
promising: my proposal fits nicely with our intuitions about knowledge and
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reasoning, and the counterpart of the objection for mathematical knowledge
concerning sentential reference does not get o the ground.
3.1.1 Background: a brief history of the Liar
It’s natural to think of the Liar paradox as a foil for our intuitive concept
of truth. The story goes something like this: Take any theory expressive
enough to represent the primitive recursive functions. Such a theory has the
resources to arithmetize its syntax, allowing for the expression of predicates of
sentences in the language. Add a predicate, T , whose intended interpretation
is that T(pϕq) holds just in case the sentence ϕ—the sentence, that is, whose
Gödel number is pϕq—is true. The Liar paradox shows that, whatever your
theory of truth, it must not validate all instances of the axiom schema
T(pϕq) ≡ ϕ , (Convention-T)
for then disaster follows. The diagonalization lemma guarantees us some
sentence l such that it’s provable that l ≡ ¬T(plq). As is well known, triviality
follows: contradictions, and hence all sentences, are theorems of the resulting
theory.
Usually when adding an axiom to a consistent, well-motivated theory
leads to contradiction, the natural response is to recommend against adding
it. Though the T-schema seems intuitively like a non-negotiable part of any
theory of truth, the Liar paradox shows that intuition to be unsalvagable.
The task for theorists of truth is therefore to find the most respectable way to
weaken Convention-T. The battle lines are drawn between the two directions
of the bi-conditional:1
T(pϕq)→ ϕ ; (T-out)
ϕ→ T(pϕq) . (T-in)
According to this response, theorists of truth essentially have the job of
deciding which of T-out and T-in to throw away. Gap theorists reject T-in,
1Sometimes I will speak of the rules of inference (rather than axioms) T-out and T-in,
which are exactly what you would expect: A rule of inference from T(ppq) to p and vice-
versa. Classically (or more generally in any logic with modus ponens and if-introduction)
the unrestricted validity of these rules is equivalent to that of the schemas, but in the
non-classical theories I’ll be working with later on they come apart. When I mean the rule,
I’ll write it in bold; otherwise I mean the axiom.
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and countenance the possibility of sentences with semantic value 1 which
fail to be true. Glut theorists reject T-out, and countenance the converse
possibility. Still other theories (like the revision theory) countenance some
subtle mixture of these possibilities. But whatever the theory, fiddling with
the T-schema seems initially unavoidable.
But only initially. Recent work on the semantic paradoxes (by, for ex-
ample, Priest (1987), Maudlin (2004), and Field (2008)) has expanded the
number of weapons in our arsenal for battling the semantic paradoxes, by
weakening the background logic. The Liar allows us to derive contradictions
when we add T-out and T-in to classical first-order logic. But classical logic
was not handed down to us on stone tablets; why ought inferences like reductio
be beyond rational reproach, while such obviously valid inferences as that
from T(ppq) to p fall by the wayside? For no a priori reason, many have
concluded. When we build theories for bits of language, we do so holistically,
and no part of the theory, not even classical logic, is immune from rational
revision. Thus, the initial story looks undermotivated as an inescapable
consequence of the Liar. Perhaps we need not reject Convention-T and
accept a revisionary and second-rate truth-predicate; perhaps we were simply
wrong about the underlying logic in which to theorize about notions like
truth.
Now, there’s prima facie reason to expect a unified treatment for all
paradoxes which involve Liar-like self-reference. It would be odd to take a
truth-value-gap approach for the Liar, but a glut approach to Berry’s paradox,
and an emendation to classical logic for Curry’s paradox. Whenever you’ve
got a sentential predicate governed by intuitive but badly behaved axioms
which jointly lead to contradiction, you should expect to block the derivation
in more or less the same way that you blocked the Liar—absent, that is, some
particular reason to think that the nature of the property represented by the
predicate in question warrants a dierent approach. With this (very!) brief
history of the Liar in view, let’s consider a paradox with a quite dierent
genealogy.
3.1.2 The Knower
The Knower paradox was discovered as a special case of the surprise exam
paradox in Kaplan andMontague (1960).2 Here’s a standard way to present it.
2I’ll be concerned here with the more purified forms of the paradox that have developed
in the literature after Kaplan and Montague (1960). The way it arises out of the surprise
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One of the things we talk about in English is knowledge. We epistemologists
want to investigate its nature, and one of the ways to do that is to describe
its structural properties. How should we proceed?
The most well-known way of formalizing our thought and talk about
knowledge is with a sentential operator, as in modal logic. Syntactically, for
every sentence ϕ, we add to the language a new sentence Kϕ, which says that
ϕ is known. This approach has proved extremely productive in formalizing
many aspects of knowledge. However, sentential operators are not expressive
enough to capture all of the ways we express knowledge attributions. We can
refer to the objects of knowledge indirectly, as in: “John didn’t know the first
thing he said yesterday." We can also quantify over the objects of knowledge,
as in: “Anything that Sally knows, John knows too."
A standard sentential operator is not expressive enough to capture uses
like these. In the first case, there is no particular sentence ϕ to put ‘K ’ in front
of; what follows ‘K ’ is a noun phrase. While for some modeling purposes
one may simply insert the actual sentence ϕ which John said, that won’t
have the same general truth conditions, for John might well have uttered a
dierent sentence. Similarly for the quantified attributions: no finite number
of sentences appended to the knowledge operator and then conjoined could
have the same truth conditions as “Anything that Sally knows, John knows
too," for Sally can always come to know something new. To capture the
full expressive power of our thought and talk about knowledge, we need a
knowledge predicate, that takes terms (which refer to sentences) as arguments.3
That way we can express the whole range of knowledge attributions that
English allows. So, let Kα(pϕq) hold just in case rational agent α knows the
sentence ϕ. We’ll be concerned here only with a single agent, and so leave
o the subscript.4
exam paradox is by interpreting the teacher’s announcement that there will be a surprise
exam sometime next week as implicitly self-referential, along the following lines: “Either
there will be an exam sometime next week such that you won’t have known it would occur
on the morning it occurs, or else you can’t know the very sentence I’m uttering right now."
Subsequent discussions of the Knower paradox have focused on the isolated second disjunct.
3There are modal logics that allow for propositional quantification intended to capture
uses like these. But as Stern (2014) points out, it is possible to force self-reference even with
operators, by introducing fixed-point/diagonalization axioms. Thus attempts to avoid the
paradoxes by restricting to operators don’t get to the heart of the matter. Any non ad-hoc
way of representing these kinds of knowledge attributions end up being paradox-prone, one
way or another.
4For simplicity, we restrict here to sentences ϕ whose meaning does not depend on
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What kinds of axioms and inference rules govern the behavior of this
predicate? These seem like a good start:
K(pϕq) ⊃ ϕ, (FACT)
K [pK(pϕq) ⊃ ϕq], (KFACT)
i K(pϕq)
j ϕ
. . . . . . (This subproof can use nothing derived from premises;
k ψ only the rules and axioms of theory X .)
k + 1 K(pψq) SPCX , i, j -k
(SPC)
(FACT) is a central part of our concept of knowledge, to be abandoned only
as an absolute last resort. Since all instances of (FACT) hold necessarily,
there shouldn’t be any trouble imagining an agent suciently schooled in
epistemology who comes to know any particular instance of (FACT). Thus it
shouldn’t be impossible to imagine a rational agent described by (KFACT).
(SPC) requires some explanation. It formalizes the idea that α can extend
her knowledge by impeccable reasoning by some sound theory X . Since we’ll
be comparing dierent theories for the purposes of this paper, we allow X
to be variously permissive, with greater permissiveness resulting in stronger
closure principles. For example, sometimes we might only require closure
under propositional logic; we’d then let X = PL. Other times we might want
the full resources of Peano arithmetic, and so let X = PA, or the full resources
of PA with the addition of the factivity axiom (FACT): X = PA + (FACT ).
The important thing is that under no circumstances are premises, or later
steps which depend on premises, allowed in these closure subproofs. Only
the rules and axioms from theory X are allowed. Our starting point will be
to let X = PA, and that’s what I’ll refer to with unsubscripted uses of (SPC).
(SPC) is one of the weakest closure principles that you can cook up.
Single-premise derivability in PA is a very strong relation, and though it’s
easy to imagine (SPC) failing because of an agent’s limited computational
context. Otherwise we’d need a more complicated knowledge relation—something like, α
knows ϕ as uttered at c.
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powers, it’s hard to imagine that this is anything other than a contingent
computational limitation. Nothing in the nature of knowledge itself should
prevent me from knowing a PA-consequence of any particular sentence which
I know. It’s worth noting that one popular kind of argument against closure,
of the risk-aggregation lottery (Kyburg (1961)) or preface (Makinson (1965))
variety, does not aect single-premise closure.5
The problem with these three axioms is that they are (classically) in-
consistent (Kaplan and Montague (1960)). The culprit is a self-referential
sentence reminiscent of the Liar. The diagonalization theorem does its work,
giving us a sentence g such that the following is PA-derivable:
g ≡ ¬K(pgq) (Knower sentence)
Here’s how to derive a contradiction using the Knower sentence using
(FACT), (KFACT), and (SPC). Remember that g ≡ ¬K(pgq) is derivable
from no premises in PA, and is therefore admissible as a derived axiom for
the purposes of (SPC). Let (FACTg) be the instance of (FACT ) instantiated
with the Knower sentence g , and similarly for (KFACTg); what follows is a
proof of ⊥, using (SPC).6
5What I’m calling single-premise closure is not the principle, sometimes identified in
discussions of skepticism as such, that [K(ppq) ∧ K(pp ⊃ qq)] ⊃ K(pqq). This is strictly
stronger than what is needed to get the Knower paradox going, at least on the standard
idealizing assumption of logical omniscience.
6⊥ can stand for any arbitrary absurdity. For concreteness, let ⊥ be true i 0 = 1.
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1 K(pgq) ⊃ g (FACTg)
2 K(pK(pgq) ⊃ gq) (KFACTg)
3 K(pgq) ⊃ g
4 g ≡ ¬K(pgq) Diagonalization
5 K(pgq)
6 g Modus ponens, 3,5
7 ¬K(pgq) Modus ponens, 4, 6
8 ¬K(pgq) Reductio, 5-7
9 g Modus ponens, 4, 8
10 K(pgq) SPC , 2, 3-9
11 g Modus ponens, 1, 10
12 g ≡ ¬K(pgq) Diagonalization
13 ¬K(pgq) Modus ponens, 11, 12
14 ⊥ ⊥-intro, 10, 13
Thus ⊥ is derivable in classical PA from {(FACTg), (KFACTg)}, and (SPC).
This result seems to doom principles (FACT)-(KFACT)-(SPC), showing
that they cannot hold even of perfectly rational subjects. Either knowledge
isn’t always factive, or there are sentences for which you are barred in
principle from knowing the corresponding instance of the factivity schema,
or else knowledge is not closed under single-premise derivability in weak
theories. Nobody seriously considers abandoning (FACT), so the literature
on the Knower has been, so far, a back-and-forth between (KFACT) and
(SPC). Maitzen (1998) argues for abandoning closure; Cross (2001) responds
with a defense of closure and some reasons to give up (KFACT). Uzquiano
(2004) rebutts Cross, suggesting that closure might be the culprit after all.7
The aim of this paper is to try out a dierent tack. It’s clear that the
7An exception to this dialectic is Sainsbury (1995), who briefly discusses the possibility
that the sentence, rather than the epistemic axioms, might be at fault. But he does not
develop this thought very far there.
40
Non-Classical Knowledge
Knower is a paradox of the same basic kind as the Liar. We’ve got a
sentential predicate governed by axioms that do not play well together when
self-referential sentences are formulatable. Indeed, the knowledge axioms
overlap with the problematic truth axioms: T-out has exactly the same form
as (FACT), and (KFACT)-(SPC) together play basically the role of T-in,
allowing us to derive sentences involving the problematic predicate from
sentences without it. Given these structural similarities between the way the
paradoxes get going, we should expect them both to stem from a common
root. And a common root calls out for a common solution.
As discussed in the introduction, there is a wider array of options at our
disposal for dealing with the Liar paradox than merely rejecting T-out or
T-in. Whereas (KFACT)-(SPC) have marked the only disputed territory for
solving the Knower, the Liar has inspired revisions to propositional logic
itself. It would be a waste not to avail ourselves of these proposals in our
search for a solution to the Knower; after all, if the best background logic
in which to add a truth predicate blocks the Knower paradox even while
(FACT)-(KFACT)-(SPC) or close analogues are all accepted, then we needn’t
spend time haggling over which to reject. The general lesson is simply that
the literature on the Knower has overlooked live options for dealing with
the paradox. I wish to put those options properly on the table.
I won’t be concerned with all possible ways to use non-classical logics
to defeat semantic paradoxes. Instead, I’ll sketch one popular non-classical
theory, and add the modal ingredients necessary to formulate a knowledge
predicate in that theory. The paradox is indeed blocked; the philosophical
question is whether the benefits of this approach outweigh its costs. I argue
that in natural languages, the benefits do outweigh the costs, but that in the
context of specifically mathematical knowledge, the question depends on
unresolved issues about our ability in-principle abilities to know mathematical
truths.
3.2 A solution, outlined
The theory of truth that I’ll take as my starting point was developed in its
essentials by Saul Kripke, and refined by Hartry Field. In this section, I’ll
give a fairly informal sketch of how his construction works. (Appendix A
contains a detailed construction.) This theory has two elements: Kripke’s
truth predicate, and a novel conditional called the Field conditional. I show
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how to construct a knowledge predicate out of a modal operator for necessity
and the truth predicate we get from Field’s theory, roughly along the lines
Halbach and Welch [2009] take for a metaphysical necessity predicate and
Caie (2012) for a belief predicate. I’ll show that, in this construction, all of
the ingredients that led to paradox in classical logic can peacefully coexist.
3.2.1 Kripke’s truth predicate
Kripke’s idea is to enrich an arbitrary classical modelM, which is completely
silent about which sentences go into the extension of the truth predicate,
into a souped up modelM+ that matchesM where the truth predicate isn’t
involved, but that gets the extension of the truth predicate right—that is,
M+ assigns a sentence to the extension of the truth predicate just in case
M+ assigns that sentence semantic value 1.8
The Liar paradox shows that such a fully deflationary truth predicate
cannot exist in classical theories. Kripke therefore makes use of the strong
Kleene connectives in a theory with three semantic values: 0, 12 , and 1. The
definitions of the sentential connectives are as follows:
JpK = 1 if v(p) = 1; 0 otherwiseJφ ∧ ψK = min{JφK , JψK}Jφ ∨ ψK = max{JφK , JψK}J¬φK = 1− JφK
ϕ ⊃ ψ := ¬ϕ ∨ ψ
Note that these definitions give us exactly the classical Boolean connectives
in the special case where all the semantic values of the constituent sentences
are 0 or 1. This is important, for this feature allows this theory to vindi-
cate particular instances of classical reasoning when there’s no danger of
paradoxical indeterminacy.
The logic K3 is what we get by taking 1 as the designated semantic
value: an argument is valid just in case all models which assign the premises
8It’s important not to confuse “having semantic value 1” with “being true”. The former
is a metalinguistic notion, while the latter is our way of representing truth in the object
language under scrutiny. One task for theorists of truth is to get these two notions to line up
extensionally as much as possible. Also, note that the semantic theory for this non-classical
language is given in a fully classical metalanguage. See Field (2008) for a discussion of how
embarrassing this should be.
42
Non-Classical Knowledge
semantic value 1 also assign the conclusion semantic value 1.9 As usual,
valid sentences are those that follow from no premises.
A notable thing about K3 is that there are no valid axiom schemas
involving these connectives. That’s because, for any of the connectives, if all
of the constituents have semantic value 12 , the whole sentence has value
1
2 .
So whereas in classical logic, you can swap axioms for inference rules, in K3
there are tons of valid inference rules, but no axioms.
The classical rules that are not valid in K3 are those which allow us to exit
Fitchean sub-derivations: reductio and if-introduction. This is unsurprising,
for it is these rules from which axioms can be derived from no premises in
classical logic. Crucially for my treatment of the Knower paradox, reductio
is not a valid rule of inference. If the sentence we suppose for contradiction
entails ⊥, that could be because it has value 0, or because it has value 12 ;
and in the latter case its negation will not have value 1, but will instead have
value 12 . Similarly with (material) conditional introduction: we can suppose
the Liar sentence, and validly derive the Liar sentence, but T(plq) ⊃ T(plq)
has semantic value 12 , not 1.
We build the souped up Kripkean modelM+ in stages corresponding to
temporary quasi-extensions for the truth predicate. The first quasi-extension
T0 is the empty set.10 The first temporary Kripke modelM+0 uses T0 as
its extension for the truth predicate, matchingM on the non-T -involving
sentences, and assigning all sentences involving the truth predicate semantic
value 12 . The next quasi-extension T1 includes all of the sentences that the
first temporary modelM+0 assigned value 1.M+1 uses T1 as its extension
for the truth predicate, matching M+0 on all non-T -involving sentences,
but assigning semantic value 1, in addition, to T(psq) for every s thatM+0
assigned semantic value 1, and semantic value 0 to T(psq) for every s that
M+0 assigned semantic value 0.
You repeat this process throughout the ordinals, taking the union of
all the previous quasi-extensions at limits. Eventually this process finds a
9Graham Priest’s logic of paradox, LP, uses the same semantics, but lets both 1 and
1
2 be designated values. See Field (2008), p. 79 for a complete presentation of K3 and the
relationship between it, LP, and classical logic. K3 reduces to classical logic if you add
φ ∨ ¬φ as an axiom schema.
10This gives us what’s called the minimal fixed point. You can put tame self-referential
sentences in here, if you want, to get larger fixed points. For example, no contradiction
arises from supposing that the so-called ‘truth-teller’ sentence—“This sentence is true"–is
in T0.
43
Non-Classical Knowledge
fixed point, such that iterating the process another time does not add any
sentences to the extension of the truth predicate.11 The honor of Final
Extension T+ is given to this fixed point. The souped up modelM+ uses
this extension for the truth predicate: the semantic value of T(pϕq) inM+
is 1 if ϕ ∈ T+; 0 if ¬ϕ ∈ T+; and 12 otherwise. The Liar sentence l is one
sentence such that neither it nor its negation ends up in the fixed point; it
therefore receives semantic value 12 . (The details of this construction are
first worked out in Kripke (1975), and you can find a more succinct and
cleaned-up presentation in Field (2008), §3.1. Appendix A also includes
most of the details.)
This minimal fixed point construction, or some variant of it, constitutes
the heart of many popular resolutions to the Liar paradox. It corresponds
nicely to the idea that sentences like the Liar don’t inherit their truth or
falsity from the world in the right way. In order to tell whether l is true,
we have to look at what l says; but what l says involves reference to l’s
truth-value. There’s a vicious cycle of semantic dependence for sentences
like this. The fixed-point construction of the truth predicate seems to explain
this intuition: l never ends up in the minimal fixed point precisely because
its truth isn’t inherited in the right way from truth-free atomic sentences.
Atomic sentences not involving semantic vocabulary are ultimately where
language hooks up with the world, and the semantic value of the Liar never
traces back to that of any atomic sentence. It is, so to speak, a frictionless
spinning in the semantic void.
T-out and T-in are valid rules of inference on this construction. Why?
T-out is easy: If T(psq) has semantic value 1 at the fixed point level, that
means that s was assigned to some quasi-extension of T , and we are careful
to set up the quasi-extensions so that only sentences with semantic value
1 ever get admitted. To prove that T-in is valid, we just need to observe
two things: First, we never lose any sentences as we go up the ladder of
quasi-extensions; second, the final interpretation of T ’s extension is a fixed
point of the inductive procedure. Thus if s has value 1 at the fixed point
level, it will be assigned to the extension of T at the next quasi-extension.
But the ultimate interpretation of T ’s extension was a fixed point, so we
needn’t wait until the next level: T(psq) will already be in the fixed point. So
11The argument for this is a pretty simple brute-force one about size. This process
continues through the ordinals, and you cannot keep adding sentences at every stage,
because there are more ordinals than there are sentences of the language.
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T-in is valid.
Nevertheless, not all instances of the T-schema, as formulated with the
material conditional, hold. Why not? One such instance is:
T(plq) ≡ l
When l is the Liar sentence, this does not have semantic value 1; according
to the strong Kleene connectives, it receives the same semantic value as its
constituents, namely 12 .
3.2.2 Field’s conditional
Kripke’s procedure gets the extension of the truth predicate right, but all is not
entirely well. The main shortcoming of his approach is that it’s surprisingly
hard to get a decent conditional out of the ingredients he gives us. The
standard definition of the material conditional in terms of negation and
disjunction is unacceptably weak in K3, failing to validate even such trivialities
as ϕ ⊃ ϕ. The obvious ways to add a stronger but still properly truth-
functional conditional reinvite paradox (see Field (2008), Ch. 4). Halbach
and Welch [2009] investigate how to add modality to Kripke’s theory, but
without a better conditional, the Knower paradox remains unsolved; there
are no valid axiom schemas within the basic K3 framework, and therefore
(FACT) and (KFACT) couldn’t be salvaged without doing something extra.
Field’s insight—and the second main ingredient of his theory—is to
give the conditional itself a revision-style semantics, greatly improving the
conditional while still circumventing the possibility of unforeseen paradoxes.
He formulates T-out and T-in in terms of this new, souped up conditional;
I’ll do the same with (FACT) and (KFACT) in a modal context, to generate
a consistent, untyped knowledge predicate which validates these axioms
unrestrictedly.
Again, the details of how to enrich Field’s construction with modality
are in Appendix A of this paper. It’s nearly impossible to say what Field’s
conditional means informally—harder even than Kripke’s truth predicate.
The basic move is to splice together a fixed-point construction for the truth
predicate, and a revision procedure for the conditional. You start out with the
same base modelM, where the extension for the truth predicate is empty
and every sentence whose main connective is → gets assigned semantic
value 12 . Then, you build an entire Kripke fixed-point model to help with the
truth predicate, yieldingM+. That leaves the semantic values of sentences
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involving → untouched. After that, you’re in a position to define the first
temporary Field model M1, whose only work is to start fixing the right
semantic values for→: a sentence of the form ϕ→ ψ gets semantic value 1
inM1 just in case, inM+, the semantic value of ϕ is less than or equal to
that of ψ; otherwise it gets 0.
After you’ve finished building the first temporary Field modelM1, you
build an entirely new Kripke fixed-point model usingM1 as the base, to
getM+1 . Then you proceed as before to define the next temporary Field
modelM2: A formula of the form ϕ→ ψ gets semantic value 1 inM2 just
in case, inM+1 , the semantic value of ϕ is less than or equal to that of ψ;
otherwise it gets 0. And so on. At limit stages, formulas of the form ϕ→ ψ
get semantic value 1 if the semantic value of ϕ is less than or equal to that
of ψ at all previous stages; 0 if the semantic value of ϕ is greater than that
of ψ at all previous stages; and 12 if it fluctuates.
As before, you travel through the ordinals with this recipe in hand, splicing
together temporary Kripke models (to chip away at T ) with temporary Field
models (to chip away at→). A theorem proved in Field (2008), called the
Fundamental Theorem, guarantees that this process eventually reaches some
‘nice’ stage η at which, according toM+η , all the sentences have the ‘right’
semantic values, in a sense made precise in Appendix A. Models like this
form the heart of Field’s theory of truth; the semantic consequence relation
for the theory is defined relative to the class of models with this property.
This theory does better than the standard non-classical Kripke theory.
While the basic non-classical Kripkean framework can validate the rules
T-out and T-in but not the axioms T-out and T-in, Field’s theory validates
all four, formulated with this special conditional. This makes it a good place
to start when trying to validate other classically dangerous axioms involving
a conditional, like (FACT) and (KFACT). That should be enough of a sketch
of Field’s theory of truth to get along with; here, our primary concern is
not with the technical details but rather with its application to the Knower
paradox.
3.2.3 The non-classical Knower
If we want to investigate non-classical solutions to the Knower along the lines
of Kripke/Field style solutions to the Liar, we have two options. On the one
hand, we could keep knowledge as a basic predicate of sentences, conjuring
up a new fixed-point style construction so that semantically ungrounded
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sentences like g never end up in its extension. Or we could be more parsi-
monious, and use a combination of a standard knowledge-operator with a
Kripke style truth predicate to get a knowledge predicate, using the already
developed fixed point construction.
In what follows, I use a truth predicate in conjunction with an epistemic
operator to define a knowledge predicate. While it might be somewhat
unnatural to interpret the knowledge predicate by combining operators
and truth, splitting up the predicate into an epistemic operator and a truth
predicate has a practical advantage: epistemic operators and truth predicates
are already well-explored phenomena. Combining them is a more familiar
starting point than scratch.12
The most natural way to do this is to say that you know a sentence s just
in case you know that it is true:13
K(psq) := 2T(psq)
The generalization of Field’s construction to include modality is straightfor-
ward. The only syntax that we need to add is ‘2’. Semantically, we start
o with slightly fancier base modelsM. We’ll need each model to come
with a non-empty set W of worlds, and a relation R between worlds. Since
we eventually want 2 to build us a knowledge predicate, and knowledge is
factive, we’ll require that the relation R be reflexive. (That is all that we’ll
require, which means that the base models are governed by the modal logic
T.)14 An interpretation function v sends predicate-world pairs to subsets of
12This issue is discussed at length in Halbach and Welch [2009] for metaphysical necessity,
where it is shown that the most natural way to construct a necessity predicate from scratch
is equivalent, via a translation function, to combining an operator with truth in the ways
described below. So if, in your heart of hearts, you prefer a primitive knowledge predicate
instead of a combination, you could take what follows as a mere consistency proof of (FACT)-
(KFACT)-(SPC), without making any assumptions about whether combining operators with
truth is really the right way to go on some more fundamental level.
13The other, slightly less natural translation would be:
K(psq) := T(p2sq)
In what follows, nothing important hangs on this dierence. Indeed, in the theory developed
in Appendix A, these two formulations are equivalent. So in what follows I’ll stick with the
first, more natural construction.
14I do not assume that other epistemic principles, like for example Kϕ→ KKϕ, shouldn’t
be part of our epistemic theory. I exclude principles like this here because they don’t play
any role in the Knower paradox.
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the domain, and names to elements of the domain. Finally, µ is a standard
variable assignment function which takes variables to elements of the domain.
Thus formulas are assigned semantic values relative to a modelM, world w,
and variable assignment function µ. The semantic clause for 2 is exactly
what you would expect, in the generalized K3 context:J2ϕKM,w,µ = min{JϕKM,v,µ : wRv}
That’s basically all you need to do to enrich Field’s language with modality.
The procedure for building a Kripke fixed-point (for the truth predicate) and
then a Field fixed-point (for the conditional) is basically untouched—the only
dierence is that the extension of the truth predicate is relative to worlds,
since dierent formulas are true in dierent worlds. Similarly the fixed-point
construction for the conditional fixes semantic values for → world-by-world.
An inference is valid on this fancier construction just in case every world of
every souped up Field model that assigns semantic value 1 to the premises
also assigns semantic value 1 to the conclusion. A sentence is valid if the
inference from ∅ to it is valid. The logic of this consequence relation includes
(at least) all the rules of K3, plus all of the axioms that govern the Field
conditional. It also includes some axioms that mix the conditional, the truth
predicate, and the box operator; some of these are exactly the axioms of
interest in this paper, and are discussed below. Call the deductive system for
this semantic consequence relation K3FT (‘K3’ for K3, ‘F’ for Field, and ‘T’
because this logic extends the modal system T in bivalent settings).
The upshot: The following three propositions are the key results, at least
as far as the Knower paradox is concerned, for this construction:
Proposition 3.2.1. All instances of the following schema are valid:
2T(pϕq)→ ϕ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.2.2. All instances of the following schema are valid:
2T(p2T(pϕq)→ ϕq).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.2.3. The following rule is valid:
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2T(pϕq)
ϕ
. . .
ψ (Only axioms and rules of K3FT.)
2T(pψq) ClosureK3FT .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that, on our interpretation of the knowledge predicate as a combina-
tion of the box operator and the truth predicate, these amount almost exactly
to the ingredients that led to paradox in classical logic. Almost, because we
use a dierent X here for SPCX . I can’t exactly validate full SPCPA, because PA
as such is formulated within a classical background logic which permits un-
restricted reductio and if-introduction, even when the vocabulary involved in
such proofs extends beyond pure arithmetic. However, the theory preserves
the spirit of, and fundamental intuition behind, SPCPA, which is that correct
mathematical reasoning is a sure means to extend mathematical knowledge.
All sentences formulated purely in the language of PA (we stipulate) have
semantic value 1 or 0, and, as noted above, in such contexts K3 reduces to
classical logic. So non-classicality is only in play for sentences—dangerous,
possibly ungrounded sentences—involving 2 and T . Thus any use of SPCPA
to expand knowledge of purely arithmetic truths goes through on SPCK3FT ;
the only instances disallowed are ones which illicitly sneak a reductio or
if-introduction subproof involving modal or semantic vocabulary into an
SPC subproof—moves which aren’t at all motivated by the intuitions behind
SPCPA. Such moves simply don’t preserve semantic value 1 on the theory
on oer; where there’s semantic or modal vocabulary involved, there’s the
possibility of Liar-like ungroundedness, in which case rules like reductio
aren’t sound.
So, interpreted in this way, Proposition 4.1 is the factivity schema, 4.2 is
the knowledge-of-factivity schema, and SPCK3FT is the closure rule. Those
were the three ingredients that went into deriving the Knower paradox; prima
facie one of these had to be given up to avoid contradiction. Does the Knower
paradox, then, show that Field’s construction (plus modality) doesn’t work,
since it validates all three of these principles?
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No. ⊥ is not a consequence of (FACT), (KFACT), and (SPC). I’ll give
the model-theoretic justification for this in a moment, first let’s see exactly
where the above proof fails. It fails at the reductio step:
5 K(pgq)
6 g Modus ponens, 3,5
7 ¬K(pgq) Modus ponens, 4, 6
8 ¬K(pgq) Reductio, 5-7 (not valid in K3!)
In the closure subproof, we used the fact that g entails ¬g to derive ¬g .
But reductio is not a valid rule of inference on this construction. There are
sentences (like the Liar and Knower) that entail contradictions, but have
semantic value 12 in all worlds of all models. The negation of a sentence with
semantic value 12 likewise has semantic value
1
2 . So this particular proof is
fallacious.
But perhaps we are not being clever enough. How do we know that
there’s not some new proof of ⊥ in K3FT using the Knower sentence? Here
is how we know: We defined (see Appendix A for details) an explicit model-
theoretic construction, and the proof system K3FT is sound on it. Since
⊥ gets assigned semantic value 1 in none these models, no proof system
that is sound on this class of models can possibly contain a proof of ⊥. Of
course, it takes some doing to show that the proof system is sound on this
class of models; a small part of this work—the part crucial for the Knower
paradox—is undertaken in the proofs of Propositions 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 in
Appendix A. Proving soundness for the more bread-and-butter rules and
axioms is straightforward. The point is: we’ve built explicit models, and the
proof system is sound on them. Thus there is no proof of ⊥ from (FACT),
(KFACT), and (SPCK3FT ) in K3FT, despite the fact that it permits Liar and
Knower sentences.
The take-home point is this: The assumption, hitherto unquestioned
in the Knower literature, that either (FACT), (KFACT), or (SPC) must be
rejected (or else sentences like the Knower banished from the language) in
order to steer clear of paradox is false. There is another option on the table:
Use the already-developed Kripke construction for the truth predicate, along
with Field’s conditional, and formulate a knowledge predicate in terms of
a box operator and the truth predicate. If you set things up this way, you
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will validate the natural reformulations of (FACT)–(KFACT)–(SPC), without
ever being able to prove ⊥ from them.
3.2.4 Evaluating this approach
Is this a resolution of the Knower paradox? It’s tempting to say that it is. After
all, I’ve shown that there is a perfectly consistent epistemic logic according
to which knowledge, represented as an unrestricted, untyped predicate, is
factive, it’s known that knowledge is factive, and single-premise closure holds.
Those are the three principles that the Knower paradox was supposed to
have shown jointly inconsistent. What more could one expect of a resolution
to a paradox?
This comes, of course, at a cost: We had to retreat to a background
logic less powerful than classical logic, and use a special conditional to
formulate the epistemic axioms. Is this a cost worth bearing? As in the case
of the straightforward Liar, this approach should be evaluated holistically.
What matters is which package, considered as a whole, provides a better
model of our epistemic and inferential practices. Should we accept surprising
limits on what we can know? Or should we weaken the rules of reductio
and if-introduction, holding that they are sometimes unsound when the
sentences they involve are semantically ungrounded? Discussions of this
general question exist in Maudlin (2004), Field (2008), Bacon (2013), and
(from the paraconsistent angle) in Priest (1987). Instead of rehearsing the
general discussion about the payos of classical vs. non-classical logics for
dealing with semantic paradoxes, I’ll focus here on the novel issues that arise
by formulating the paradoxes in terms of intentional notions like knowledge,
as opposed to extensional notions like truth.
I argue for a somewhat surprising conclusion: that, unlike in the case of
the extensional paradoxes of truth, intensional paradoxes like the Knower
raise novel issues concerning the mechanisms of sentential reference. Dier-
ent philosophical issues arise whether we formulate the paradox using direct
sentential reference in natural languages, or using indirect Gödel coding
in formal arithmetic/syntactic theories. These dierences aect strength of
the case for the non-classical approach developed above. In the natural lan-
guage context, the epistemic principles are harder to abandon, and classical
logic easier to abandon, than in the mathematical context. So ultimately, I
argue, my construction has the definite edge in natural language settings. In
51
Non-Classical Knowledge
mathematical settings, the jury remains out, and depends on complex issues
in the philosophy of mathematics.
3.3 Mathematical knowledge
Standardly, semantic paradoxes like the Liar and the Knower arise against the
background of syntactic/arithmetic theories. The object language under study
has arithmetic vocabulary governed by mathematical axioms, and it is to this
background theory that we add a predicate representing knowledge. The
epistemic predicate introduced in such a context most naturally represents
knowledge with specifically mathematical content.
In this section, I’ll evaluate my solution from the mathematical perspec-
tive. First I argue that the intensionality of sentential reference via Gödel
coding gives reason to doubt (FACT) is really a conceptual truth, thus call-
ing (KFACT) into question for actual mathematical knowledge. I then ask
whether the case for (KFACT) is stronger for ideal mathematical knowledge,
or “absolute knowability" (as Koellner (2016) calls it). There, I show that
my construction takes a stand on a complex issue in the philosophy of math-
ematics known as Gödel’s disjunction. Thus I don’t have a definitive case
for my construction in the mathematical context. For such a case, I turn to
natural languages, where the complications of indirect sentential reference
via Gödel coding can be avoided.
3.3.1 Is (KFACT) plausible for mathematical knowledge?
In the literature on the Knower paradox, (KFACT) is generally motivated
in the following way. The factivity of knowledge seems like a fundamental
part of our concept of knowledge. It’s a conceptual necessity if ever there
was one. Thus, we should be able to come to know any instance of (FACT)
simply by reflecting on this conceptual necessity. For surely, the thought
goes, if there’s anything we ought to be able to know, it’s conceptual truths!
Thus Uzquiano:
A little reflection on (FACTg) should convince any sophisticated
epistemic subject that it is true. Hence we have every reason to
think that (KFACTg) is true. (Uzquiano (2004), my labeling of
sentences)
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However, in this section, I want to present some reasons for doubting that the
formulation of (FACT) needed to generate the Knower paradox really does
express a simple conceptual truth about knowledge.15 This correspondingly
gives us reason to doubt the plausibility of (KFACT), at least when ‘K’
represents the mathematical knowledge of actual agents. The crux of my
argument is the very indirect kind of sentential reference that results from
Gödel numbering, and the implications of this indirect sentential reference
for knowledge attributions.
Recall that the first step in motivating the Knower paradox is to switch
from a knowledge operator to a more expressive knowledge predicate. A
knowledge predicate is needed to model straightforward indirect/quantified
attributions of knowledge, but it also leads to paradoxical sentences like the
Knower sentence. Now, when we made this move, we went from straight-
forwardly using sentences in knowledge attributions, to referring to them via
some sort of referential mechanism. And in the context of mathematics, the
kind of reference involved is very indirect. Mathematical languages like that
of PA don’t talk about their sentences directly—PA itself just talks about
numbers. Instead, sentential reference is achieved by the indirect means of
Gödel coding, which systematically assigns sentences to numbers.
The kind of sentential reference that results is by nature highly indirect,
as as Halbach and Visser [2014a] and [2014b] have illustrated at length.
They’ve examined three “sources of intensionality” in this kind of sentential
reference, of which the one most relevant here is the first: the choice of
coding.16 Which numbers denote which sentences depends on the choice of
coding scheme. And this choice is a highly arbitrary and contingent matter.
Halbach and Visser are interested in the implications of these sources of
intensionality only for purely mathematical properties like truth and theory-
relative provability. What’s the upshot for the Knower paradox, where the
15Cross (2001) and [2004] also doubt that (FACT) is a conceptual necessity, but he does
so only as the result of a modus tollens argument, and doesn’t give an explanation for why
it fails to be a conceptual necessity in terms of the intensionality of Gödel numbering.
16The other sources of intensionality are these. Source 2: Even relative to a fixed coding,
there are multiple ways to formalize what it is for an arithmetic formula ϕ(x) to express
a property P of sentences. Source 3: Even fixing both the coding and the formalization
of property-expression, there are multiple ways to formalize the notion of a self-referential
sentence, depending on the particulars of the diagonalization proof. These other sources
also matter for knowledge, for they make a dierence to truth: relative to dierent particular
diagonalization proofs, “the" sentence that asserts its own provability may be either provable,
contingent, or refutable.
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intended interpretation of ‘K ’ is “is known"? The key point here is that
every source of intensionality is a source of potential ignorance. It seems
intuitively very hard to deny that we can know that knowledge is factive.
However, when a knowledge predicate applies to sentences indirectly via
Gödel coding, it’s not clear that this general thought is faithfully expressed
by all the instances of K(pK(pϕq)→ ϕq). Intentional notions like knowledge
and belief are generally highly sensitive to the way in which terms refer. I
may fail to know that Superman is Clark Kent, even if Superman and Clark
Kent are necessarily identical. By the same token, I may fail to know that a
sentential term pϕq denotes ϕ, even if p·q is a computable coding function.
And plausibly, I need to know what the term pϕq denotes, if I’m to know
principles of semantic ascent and decent involving it.
To illustrate, consider (KFACT) in the context of straightforward senten-
tial reference by definite description in natural languages. Let “Mary came to
the party last night" be the first sentence uttered by John yesterday. Then an
instance of (KFACT), using the non-rigid term “the first sentence uttered by
John yesterday”, would be: “I know that, if I know the first sentence uttered
by John yesterday, then Mary came to the party last night". This can easily
be false, if I fail to know what sentence was the first sentence uttered by John
yesterday.
In this context, pgq is a metalinguistic name; corner quotes do not appear
in the object language of PA plus the knowledge predicate (LPA+K). Literally,
g is just some formula in LPA+K , and pgq is some numeral (which numeral it
is depends on the coding). So in the actual object language, (FACT) will
really look something like:
K(587)→ ∃x(x = 0) (3.1)
Well, probably with a much larger number on the left and a much more
complicated mathematical formula on the right. But that will be its form: if
you know the sentence coded 587, then 〈some formula in LPA+K〉. Now, this
will certainly be true, because of how we set up the coding. We’re interpreting
K from a perspective external to the agent herself, giving a sideways-on
account of the sentences which she knows. But, crucially, it says what it does
partly because of facts about how we chose to set up the coding.
(KFACT), then, has the form:
K(3832) (3.2)
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where 3832 decodes (relative to the coding scheme we chose) to (3.1). So
when we flesh out (KFACT) literally in LPA+K , it no longer looks like the tru-
ism it misleadingly seemed like with metalinguistic corner quotes. (KFACT)
was supposed to say that you know that knowledge is factive. That is, it’s
supposed to say that you know that whatever you know is true. This is
plausibly a necessary truth that we should put into our theory of knowledge.
But to know (FACT) as it’s actually given in LPA+K , you’d have to know
something else; you’d have to know that 587 decodes to ∃x(x = 0). If there
are live epistemic possibilities for you that a dierent coding system was used,
you wouldn’t know this, because you aren’t sure which numerals decode to
which sentences. For all you know, 587 could have denoted ¬0 = 0! Thus to
know (FACT) as formalized, you have to do more than simply reflect on the
concept of knowledge; you yourself have to walk through the (possibly very
long) proof in PA that, relative to the chosen coding scheme,
PA ` K(587)→ ∃x(x = 0). (3.3)
Now, it’s not clear that there’s any in principle bar to your doing this; after all,
the coding function is computable. But the point is, (FACT) isn’t the merely
conceptual truth about knowledge it once looked like. There are substantial
mathematical facts about how the sentences of PA are being referred to via
p·q involved.17 If there’s any plausibility to (KFACT), then, it isn’t when ‘K’
is interpreted as actual mathematical knowledge of any particular agents,
who don’t concern themselves with reckoning out the exact denotations
of long numerals relative to particular coding schemes. Instead, it’s only
plausible when ‘K’ is interpreted as some kind of highly idealized notion of
in-principle knowability for an ideal mathematical reasoner, for whom such
patience is not wanting. It’s to this conception of ‘K’ that I now turn.
17Note the contrast to an operator representation of knowledge. The modal principle
K(Kϕ→ ϕ) (3.4)
does not suer from the same problem. Here ϕ is being used twice, not used once and
mentioned once (as in (KFACT)). So (3.4) asserts no particular metalinguistic knowledge,
while (KFACT) presupposes that the agent knows metalinguistic facts about what sentence
the term pgq decodes to.
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3.3.2 Is (KFACT) plausible for the ideal/absolute knowability of mathematical
truths?
As we saw in the previous section, it takes more than mere reflection on
the nature of knowledge to know instances of (FACT). It also requires some
mathematical reasoning—in particular, actually walking through proofs of
things like (3.3), which may involve a substantial amount of mathematical
work. Thus ascribing (KFACT) to actual agents is highly implausible; there’s
no guarantee that such agents will have performed the specific proofs cor-
responding to (3.3) under the relevant coding scheme. However, since the
coding function is computable, there’s hope that this limitation is merely a
contingent fact about actual agents. Maybe when ‘K’ represents mathemat-
ical knowability in principle, (KFACT) becomes more plausible. Thus the
question: how far do the limits of our in-principle mathematical knowledge
extend? Do we have reason to think that they extend far enough to include
the instances of (KFACT) necessary to generate the Knower paradox?
The question about the in-principle limits of our mathematical knowledge
goes back at least to Gödel’s philosophical reflections on his incompleteness
theorems. Koellner (2016) provides the the most extensive contemporary
exposition, and I partly follow his dialectic here. The motivating thought is
this. The incompleteness theorems show that mathematical theories strong
enough to encode their syntax will inevitably have certain “blind spots”.
PA, for example, cannot prove that it is consistent, on pain of inconsistency.
However, many have thought that we can know that PA is consistent, for
we have an intended model of it in mind (zero, followed by its successor,
followed by its successor. . . ). We know that theories with non-trivial models
aren’t inconsistent. So we can know Con(PA), even if PA itself can’t prove it.
Our in-principle mathematical knowledge extends, in a sense, beyond what
PA can prove.
Thus the question: Can in-principle mathematical knowability be cap-
tured by any finitely axiomatizable theory, perhaps one stronger than PA? Let
F be an arbitrary finitely axiomatizable theory containing PA in LPA+K , let K
be the set of sentences in this language ideally knowable by us, and let T be
the set of true sentences in this language. We restrict to theories F which are
themselves absolutely knowable and assume that what’s absolutely knowable
is true, which automatically yields the following relationship between these
sets:
F ⊆ K ⊆ T (3.5)
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Now, we know from the incompleteness theorems that F ( T—there are
true sentences of LPA+K that aren’t contained in F. Thus we know that at
least one of these inclusions is improper: either F ( K, or K ( T. This
is the core of Gödel’s disjunction. If F ( K for every F, this means that
our in-principle ability to know mathematical facts can’t be captured by any
finitely axiomatizable theory. If there is an F which coincides with K, then
K ( T. In this case, mathematical truth transcends our ability to come to
know it—which entails a version of mathematical realism, on which at least
some mathematical truths hold independently of us and our ability to prove
them. Thus Gödel describes the disjunction in the following way:
Either mathematics is incompletable in this sense, that its evident
axioms can never be comprised by a finite rule, that is to say,
the human mind (even within the realm of pure mathematics)
infinitely surpasses the power of any finite machine, or else there
exist absolutely unsolvable diophantine problems. (Gödel (1995))
Koellner (2016) shows how to formalize and then prove this disjunction
given very plausible assumptions. Gödel himself believed the first disjunct,
as reported in conversation:
If one could clear up the intensional paradoxes somehow, one
would get a clear proof that mind is not [a] machine. (Reported
in Wang (1997), p. 187)
The Knower paradox is exactly kind of intensional paradox which Gödel
thought stood in the way of proving the first disjunct. Penrose (1994) has
famously attempted to provide a proof of the first disjunct, although his proof
has been widely criticized (for example by Chalmers (1995) and Shapiro
(2003)), and Koellner (2016) gives convincing reasons for doubting that such
a proof is possible. In particular, relative to the same formal theories in which
one can prove the disjunction itself, each disjunct is provably independent.
I by no means attempt to settle this issue here. Instead, I’ll be content to
situate my proposal with respect to the disjunction. I’ll show that my proposal
is much friendlier to the F ( K disjunct. For those who insist on recursively
enumerable in-principle knowability, then, I turn to natural languages. There,
I argue, the Knower paradox arises in much more straightforward ways that
bypass the subtle issues that arise in the mathematical setting.
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The way I’ve justified the (non-classical!) consistency of (FACT),
(KFACT), and (SPC) is to construct models (see Appendix) which validate
them without validating ⊥. Now, as sketched above, these models use a basic
possible-worlds framework as a starting point for modeling epistemic agents.
As is well-known, such a framework yields a highly idealized conception of
epistemic agents. Since mathematical truths are necessary, they are true in
every world of every model. Thus these models are ones on which absolute
knowability includes every mathematical truth, and thus the set of ideally
knowable sentences that results is definitely not recursively enumerable.
Those who follow Gödel in being comfortable with this disjunct won’t have a
problem with this, and thus, for such people, my non-classical construction
has definite value.
What about those who are committed to the other disjunct (K ( T),
holding a conception of absolute knowability that is recursively enumerable?18
Of course, while the particular possible-worlds models I’ve constructed
happen to validate the F ( K disjunct, this doesn’t show that this disjunct
follows (non-classically) from (FACT), (KFACT), and (SPC). It might be
possible to construct non-classical models validating the other disjunct—
maybe ones using impossible worlds (a standard move to deal with the
problem of mathematical omniscience in a possible worlds framework).
However, I’ll conclude this section by oering an independent reason for
doubting that a construction validating (KFACT) and the K ( T exists. I’ll
show why those committed to this disjunct have reason to be independently
suspicious of (KFACT).
Let us suppose that we disagree with Gödel, and hold that there must be
some finitely axiomatizable theory F such that F = K, and assume that every
instance of (KFACT) holds. It seems that there is a tension with Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem lurking. Gödel’s second incompleteness the-
orem shows that no recursively enumerable mathematical theory containing
PA can prove its own consistency. Thus,
F 0 ¬ProvF(p0=1q) (3.6)
however, as an instance of (KFACT),
K(pK(p0 = 1q) ⊃ 0 = 1q) (3.7)
18Uzquiano (2004) explicitly commits himself to this, but he does not engage there with
the literature on Gödel’s disjunction.
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thus, because F = K,
F ` K(p0 = 1q) ⊃ 0 = 1. (3.8)
But we can’t have
F ` ProvF(p0 = 1q) ⊃ 0 = 1, (3.9)
because that would contradict (3.6) by the fact that F ` ¬0 = 1 and a simple
application of modus tollens. However this doesn’t quite refute (KFACT),
because I may not know that F aligns with what I know: We’d get an actual
inconsistency by adding K(pProvF(pϕq) ⊃ K(pϕq)q), which combined with
(3.8) would entail (3.9).19 Nonetheless, this might cause one to cast suspicion
on (KFACT), for it denies that our in-principle knowledge has the kind of
“blind spot” we know all recursively enumerable theories to have. So once
the Knower paradox appears, (KFACT) immediately looks like the natural
culprit, not classical logic. After all, if no Turing machine rigged up to
compute the validities of some mathematical theory can spit out the sentence
which says that that theory is consistent, why should I expect to be able to
know, not only that my knowledge is consistent, but that it is factive?
This only scratches the surface of the subtleties involved in Gödel’s
disjunction. However, I won’t belabor this point further. Instead, I’ll switch
gears, and argue that a much simpler and more definitive case for my non-
classical approach can be made in the context of knowledge attributions in
natural languages—one that sidesteps these subtleties.
3.4 The solution, evaluated: natural language
The philosophical landscape looks quite dierent in the context of natu-
ral language. Natural languages like English don’t require anything fancy
like a theory of syntax or Gödel coding to talk about their own sentences.
19As Koellner (2016) shows, this marks a dierence between knowing that some Turing
machine represents the set of sentences knowable by you, and its being knowable which
Turing machine that is (relative to some enumeration of them). Koellner shows that it is
provably inconsistent for someone to know which Turing machine represents the set of
sentences knowable by him, but not inconsistent for someone to know that some Turing
machine does.
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While mathematical theories can simulate self-reference via coding and di-
agonalization, natural languages can do it straightforwardly and directly
with demonstratives (‘this very sentence...’), definite descriptions (‘the first
sentence uttered by John last Tuesday...’), and straightforward quantifica-
tional devices (‘most sentences John said at the party...’). This, I’ll argue
in this section, is enough to sidestep the concerns of indirect sentential
reference and ideal mathematical knowledge, and to make a case for my
non-classical solution that doesn’t depend on taking any particular stand on
Gödel’s disjunction.
Consider a straightforward, empirical version of the Knower paradox:
(*) You don’t know the first starred sentence on the page you’re
reading.
Do you know this sentence, or don’t you? You seem to know the following
things:
(A) If you know (*), then (*) is true. (Knowledge is factive)
(B) (*) is true if and only if you don’t know (*). (Plain fact about what (*)
says)
This enough to cause disaster in classical logic, by natural language reasoning
analogous to the formal proof of ⊥. (A) and (B) straightforwardly entail in
classical logic (using reductio) that you don’t know (*). Thus if you know
the conjunction of (A) and (B), (SPC) says that can use this reasoning to
come to know that you don’t know (*). But this entails, together with your
knowledge of (B), that you can also come to know that (*) is true. But then
you are in the terrible position of not knowing (*), but knowing that (*) is
true.
It might be tempting to call this impossible and deem the result a paradox,
perhaps by invoking some principle like:
K(T(pϕq))↔ K(ϕ) (3.10)
There’s some intuitive pull to the idea that to know that a sentence is true
just is to know what it says. But this would be a mistake. It’s not impossible
to know that a sentence is true without knowing that sentence. This principle
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fails when you don’t know what the sentence in question says. Say that I
overhear a trusted scientist talking about some subject I don’t understand.
Maybe she says something like:
(Q) Quarks are spin-1/2 particles.
If I trust her, I can plausibly come to know that (Q) is a true sentence. But I
don’t have any idea what (Q) means. So it would be wrong to attribute to me
knowledge that quarks are spin-1/2 particles. To know that presupposes that
I have some general idea what quarks are, and what it means for something
to be a spin-1/2 particle. When she utters (Q), I don’t have a clear enough
sense of what possibilities are being ruled out to be said to know the content
of what she’s said, even if I’m certain that it’s true, whatever it means.
This is even clearer when truth is attributed to an utterance by referring
to it in non-quotational ways. Say that I have a scrupulous friend John who
is well known never to say untrue things, and to say at least one thing every
day. I can be generally aware of his trustworthiness and loquacity, and so
know:
(F) The first thing that John said this morning is true (whatever
that was).
Now, say that the first thing John said this morning after waking up was:
(G) Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939.
I may not have any idea exactly when Germany invaded Poland, so I may
not know (G). But this doesn’t stand in the way of my knowing (F), even
though (G) was the first thing that John said this morning. I don’t have to
know exactly what John said in order to know that, whatever it was, it was
true. Therefore, where S(x) is the predicate abbreviating “x was the first
sentence John said this morning", we have a definitely true instance of:
K(pT ( ιxS(x))q) ∧ ¬K( ιxS(x)) (3.11)
So it’s not always the case that knowing that a certain sentence is true goes
hand in hand with knowing that sentence.
Could that be what’s going on in this natural language Knower paradox?
This response would have it that my epistemic situation with respect to (*)
is to be described:
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K(pT (∗)q) ∧ ¬K(∗) (3.12)
Here, though, (3.12) is not a plausible description of my epistemic situation.
For while I can know that a certain sentence is true without knowing the
sentence, I can’t be in that position while simultaneously understanding
all the terms involved in the sentence and knowing their denotations in
context. (3.11) is true because I don’t know what sentence John uttered after
awakening. I can know that “Quarks are spin-1/2 particles" is true without
knowing that quarks are spin-1/2 particles if I don’t know the meanings of
the constituent terms well enough to know which proposition that sentence
expresses.
With (*), however, I know both the meanings and the denotations (relative
to the context in which I read it) of all the terms involved. I know full well
what page I’m currently reading, and I know what a starred sentence is. I
know what sentence is the first starred sentence. And I know the meanings
of all the terms involved—the negation sign, and the knowledge predicate.
The explanation for why (3.11) could be true doesn’t hold with (3.12). It’s
not plausible that I could know that (*) is true while failing to know it, given
that I know what all the constituents of (*) mean and what sentence the
definite description “the first starred sentence on the page you’re reading"
refers to.
Thus, (3.12) is false in this context, and we have a genuine epistemic
paradox. Sentences like (*) generate genuine contradictions, assuming the
factivity of knowledge, knowledge of that factivity, and single premise closure.
Thus something has to give. Those who stand by classical logic must deny
us some very basic knowledge—like our knowledge that we are factive with
respect to (*), or knowledge that (*) is true if and only if I don’t know it.
Some very unpalatable bullets must be bit.
In the system I’ve presented, (3.12) is not simply derivable from those
knowledge attributions. Embedded in the derivation of ¬K(∗) is a reductio
step, and and on my system reductio isn’t valid. You can easily deduce its
negation from it, and vice versa, the hallmark of indeterminate sentences.
So, on my view, your state of knowledge is indeterminate with respect to (*).
This is plausible; badly behaved, semantically ungrounded sentences like (*)
entail everything, and so do their negations; thus we should accept neither
them nor their negations, and we certainly shouldn’t reason classically with
them.
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The key here is that at no point is any reference made to idealized
knowledge with mathematical content. Everything in the natural language
versions of the Knower paradox can be put at the straightforward level of
knowledge. Here, in order to know the all important principles of semantic
ascent and descent, we don’t need to imagine agents who have worked
through the diagonalization theorem themselves, relative to a theory of
syntax and method of diagonalization. Instead, we just need to think of
agents who have looked at the page, and taken note of what starred sentences
are written on it. They need perform a very small number of classical steps
to arrive at contradictions. Thus the natural language knower paradox is
really a paradox about knowledge proper, not about idealized knowability.
You, the reader, can work competently through every literal reasoning step
involved; no part of it involves a promissory ellipsis standing for a long
diaganalization proof relative to a particular coding scheme, method of
representing sentential predicates, and method of diagonalization. So, given
the availability of directly referential terms in English like ‘this’, the sources
of intensionality that were present in mathematical versions of the Knower
paradox are avoidable.
A simplified model of how direct, natural language self-reference might
work is provided in Appendix B. It’s simplified in that it only accounts for
rigid ways of referring to sentences, like (plausibly) ‘this’. A more realistic
model accommodating non-rigid terms is beyond the scope of this project,
since I’m interested mainly in demonstrating the consistency of (FACT)–
(KFACT)–(SPC).
3.5 Concluding thoughts: robustness, new paradoxes
There are now two broad options on the table for solving the Knower
paradox. On the classical approach, the only one hitherto present in the
Knower literature, we have to decide between abandoning (KFACT), and
thereby implausibly limiting what agents can know, and abandoning (SPC),
placing unduly strict limits on the deductive powers of agents. On my view,
we can keep (FACT), (KFACT), and (SPC), at the cost of abandoning the
validity of two rules of inference: unrestricted if-introduction, and unrestricted
reductio.20 How can we decide? This might be a pretty hard decision to make,
20And, it’s worth again noting, since K3 reduces to classical when the semantic values of
sentences are 0 or 1, everyday reasoning using these rules involving exclusively sentences
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if only principles concerning knowledge were at stake. But the implications
are broader; principles concerning truth are also at play in the same decision.
After all, anyone willing to abandon classical logic to hang on to T-out and
T-in ought also be willing to use the theory for which she abandoned it to talk
about knowledge, given the tight conceptual connections between knowledge
and truth.
If we remain wedded to classical logic, we thereby get ourselves mired
in two unsavory debates. The first unsavory debate is whether we should
keep T-out, or T-in. Self-referential sentences involving a truth predicate in a
classical setting seem to show that, despite all we thought we knew about how
truth works, truth cannot actually work that way. Either there are instances
in which p has semantic value 1 but T(ppq) doesn’t, or vice-versa. Thus we
need a revisionary concept of truth in order to prevent the paradox. The
unsavory battle is about which way we should revise it.
By the same token, there is a dierent battle that we need to involve
ourselves in if we hang onto classical logic in the case of knowledge. That
battle is the one that has already started to take place in the literature on
the Knower paradox. Are some instances of knowledge non-factive? Is it
necessarily the case that there will be some sentences for which you cannot
know the corresponding instance of the factivity schema? Are there sentences
validly derivable from things that you know that you cannot know on this
basis? In classical settings, we have to come down one way or another on
this unsavory debate. We need to create the best second-rate knowledge
predicate that we can, given the looming threat of paradoxes.
And the trouble does not stop there. Every time you have something that
looks like a predicate of sentences obeying interesting structural principles,
you must be on guard against paradoxes of self-reference. Indeed, nothing in
the formal theory really hangs on using2T(ppq) to translate “p is known." We
might have used the modal operator to represent alethic necessity instead.
“Is necessary" seems, after all, to be a predicate. We can say things like
“Some sentences are necessary, whereas others are only contingent." Thus,
if we stick with classical logic, we’ll have to make exactly the same choice
for alethic necessity regarding (FACT), (KFACT), and (SPC) as we made
for the Knower. Which is it? Some sentences are necessary but not true?
It’s not in general necessary that necessary sentences are true? There are
counterexamples to the principle that, if you can derive a sentence from a
without semantic/epistemic vocabulary go through on my theory.
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necessary sentence, then the derived sentence is necessary? I’d rather not
decide.
Thus, to hang onto the classical inferences unrestrictedly, we need to
have at least two distasteful debates, at the end of which we will accept
in our theory at least two predicates with a less robust structure than we
thought we had every reason to expect. It doesn’t much matter, for these
high-level purposes, which revisionary predicates ought to be accepted, if we
come down on the side of classical logic; it matters for my purposes only
that these two independent and dicult decisions must be made, if we insist
on sticking with a classical logic.
The appeal of the non-classical approach is that both of these unsavory
battles can be avoided. The ability to avoid both of these battles in a single go
strikes me as good evidence for this kind of approach. With fairly conservative
emendations to classical logic, we can keep our first-rate knowledge predicate
and our first-rate truth predicate, without losing any classical reasoning in
bivalent contexts. Therefore, let’s do that, I say—at least until someone
comes along with a defense of classical logic persuasive enough to force us
to have these battles out.
Appendix A
I’ll follow the basic tack taken by Caie (2012) for combining a modal language
with a Kripke-style truth predicate and a Field-style conditional. We want
a first-order modal language with a special predicate, T , and a special
connective,→. We’ll think of the box operator as representing knowledge
attributions—a departure from Caie, who is more concerned with paradoxes
about belief. Apart from the truth-predicate and conditional, our language
will have a standard-issue syntax, and for simplicity, all predicates will be
one-place. We’ll have no use for equality.
Start out with a countable stock of constants ni and a countable stock of
variables xi. The syntax is generated as follows:
t := ni | xi
ϕ := Pi(tj) | ¬ϕ | (ϕ∨ϕ) | (ϕ∧ϕ) | 2ϕ | ∀xiϕ | T (ti) | (ϕ→
ϕ).
Models for the fragment of this language without the truth predicate or
the special conditional are basically standard-issue. A base modelM for
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this fragment is a quadruple 〈D,W ,R, v〉. D is a non-empty set of objects,
W a non-empty set of worlds, R a reflexive relation between worlds, and v
an interpretation function that sends every predicate-world pair 〈P ,w〉 to
subsets of D and every name ni to an element of D. We stipulate that the
domain includes all well-formed formulas of the language—sentences, after
all, are objects too!—and a given name is assigned to the same object in
all worlds within a given model (names are rigid). A variable assignment
function µ is a function from variables xi to elements of D. Finally, there
is a term-interpretation function [·]M,µ, relative to a model and variable
assignment (but not to a world, because names are rigid!):
[ni]M,µ = v(ni) for constants ni ;
[xi]M,µ = µ(xi) for variables xi .
If you are wondering how to get self-referential sentences like the Liar
and Knower out of these ingredients, see Appendix B. What’s crucial for
our purposes is that we can consider classes of models with some constant
ni such that [ni]M,µ is the sentence ¬K(ni). The Knower sentence is then
the sentence K(ni). An equally paradoxical sentence in such models is the
wide-scope negation version more analogous to the Liar: the wide-scope
negation knower sentence is just ¬K(ni). The upshot: No classical theory
can allow models with such assignments as these. The non-classical theory
developed below, on the other hand, has no problem accommodating such
models.
The semantics for the fragment of the language without the truth-
predicate or the Field conditional is exactly what you would expect:
JP(ti)KM,w,µ = 1 if [ti]M,µ ∈ v(w,P), 0 otherwise;Jφ ∧ ψKM,w,µ = min{JφKM,w,µ,JψKM,w,µ};Jφ ∨ ψKM,w,µ = max{JφKM,w,µ,JψKM,w,µ};J¬φKM,w,µ = 1− JφKM,w,µ;J2ϕKM,w,µ = min{JϕKM,v,µ : wRv};J∀xiϕKM,w,µ = min{JϕKM,w,µ′ : µ′ =xi µ }, where µ′ =xi µ just in
case µ agrees with µ′ except possibly on what it assigns xi.
A formula has a semantic value x tout court just in case all variable assignment
functions assign it semantic value x. For sentences this condition is not hard
to meet, since no change in variable assignment function can alter the
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semantic value. Nothing interesting happens with the quantifiers, so in what
follows I’ll leave out the variable assignment when talking about the semantic
values of closed sentences. Similarly, when it’s obvious from context that only
names, and not variables, are involved, I’ll leave the variable assignment
function o of the term interpretation function.
The above is a typical first-order modal model. Things are dierent only
when the special predicate T and the special connective→ enter the picture.
Sentences involving these elements are not guaranteed to have semantic
value 0 or 1. We’ll enrich a classical model M in two stages—the first
stage gives semantic values to sentences involving T , the second stage gives
semantic values to sentences involving →.
First, we must enrich a given model M to a model M+ that assigns
semantic values to T -involving sentences, by means of a series of models
M+α . All of these models will assign all formulas whose main connective
is → semantic value 12 . The interpretation for T relative to a world w is a
Kripke-Feferman fixed point construction. Since some sentences involving T
receive semantic value 12 , we must define both an extension T
w+ and an anti-
extension for T w− for T at w. We do this by means of a series of temporary
extensions T w+α and anti-extensions T
w−
α . The final extension consists of all
sentences of the language that are true (relative to the model and world);
the anti-extension consists of all non-sentences, plus each sentence whose
negation is true. The semantics forM+α is the same as that forM, except
for the following clause:
JT (ti)KM+α ,w,µ = 1 i [ti]M+α ,µ ∈ T w+α ;JT (ti)KM+α ,w,µ = 0 i [ti]M+α ,µ ∈ T w−α ;JT (ti)KM+α ,w,µ = 12 otherwise.
Let T w+0 = ∅, and let T w+α+1 be the set of sentences ϕ such that JϕKM+α ,w =
1. Similarly let T w−0 be the empty set, and let T
w−
α+1 be the set of sentences ϕ
such that JϕKM+α ,w = 0, as well as all non-sentences. At a limit ordinal λ,
T w+λ is the set of sentences ϕ such that, for some β < λ, JT (ti)KM+β ,w = 1
(0 for T w−λ ).
The key result for this kind of construction is the
Fixed Point Theorem: For some least ordinal σ, the set of
sentences ϕ such that JϕKM+σ ,w = 1 is equal to T w+σ .
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See Field (2008) or the technical appendix of Caie (2012) for a sketch of
the proof. M+ is simplyM+σ for this least ordinal σ. It remains only to
say what to do with sentences involving→. The idea is to build a new kind
of fixed-point semantics for the conditional, using a series of things called
Field models. A Field modelMα starts with the assignments provided by
M+. Its only real work is to assign semantic values to sentences with → as
the main connective. On top of each Field modelMα we construct a new
Kripke fixed-point modelM+α to reclaim the right extension for T , now that
some →-involving sentences have just had their semantic values corrected.
The following inductive procedure determines semantic values, for all
base modelsM, worlds w, and variable assignment µ:
Base Field ModelM0:
For all formulas ϕ,
• JϕKM0,w,µ =JϕKM+,w,µ.
Remember that this means that, for formulas of the form ϕ→ ψ,
• Jϕ→ ψKM0,w,µ = 12 .
For each non-limit ordinal α > 0:
For formulas ϕ not of the form ϕ→ ψ,
• JϕKMα,w,µ =JϕKM+α−1,w,µ.
For formulas of the form ϕ→ ψ,
• Jϕ→ ψKMα,w,µ = 1 i JϕKM+α−1,w,µ ≤JψKM+α−1,w,µ;
• Jϕ→ ψKMα,w,µ = 0 i JϕKM+α−1,w,µ >JψKM+α−1,w,µ.
For a limit ordinal λ:
For formulas ϕ not of the form ϕ→ ψ,
• JϕKMλ,w,µ = x i there is some ordinal β < λ such that for
all σ such that β ≤ σ < λ, JϕKM+σ ,w,µ = x;
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• JϕKMλ,w,µ = 12 otherwise.
For formulas of the form ϕ→ ψ,
• Jϕ→ ψKMλ,w,µ = 1 i there is some ordinal β < λ such that
for all σ such that β ≤ σ < λ, JϕKM+σ ,w,µ ≤JψKM+σ ,w,µ;
• Jϕ→ ψKMλ,w,µ = 0 i there is some ordinal β < λ such that
for all σ such that β ≤ σ < λ, JϕKM+σ ,w,µ >JψKM+σ ,w,µ;
• Jϕ→ ψKMλ,w,µ = 12 otherwise.21
Various formulas will eventually ‘stabilize’ at some semantic value or
other (relative to a base model, world, and variable assignment function),
in the sense that they retain that value for all subsequent Field models with
that world and that variable assignment function. If a formula stabilizes at
x, then it has Final Semantic Value x. If it does not stabilize, then it has
Final Semantic Value 12 . Following Field, call this Final Semantic Value of
a formula relative to a base model M, world w in WM, and assignment
function µ, |||ϕ|||M,w,µ. The following theorem is the final piece in the puzzle:
Though various formulas may stabilize at dierent points in the inductive
procedure, there are always future points at which all stabilizing formulas
will have stabilized at their Final Semantic Value, and all non-stabilizing
formulas have their rightful semantic value 12 . Field calls this the
Fundamental Theorem: For all ordinals σ there’s some ordi-
nal η > σ such that, for every formula ϕ, variable assignment
function µ, and world w, if |||ϕ|||M,w,µ = x then JϕKM+η ,w,µ = x.
Field calls these ordinals “acceptable.” Validity within the class of ac-
ceptable Field models (i.e. a Field model Mα for an acceptable ordinal α)
is pretty much what you would expect. For the class M of all acceptable
Field models and sentences ϕ and ψ, ϕ |=M ψ just in case, for everyM∈M
and w ∈ WM , if |||ϕ|||M,w = 1 then |||ψ|||M,w = 1. With this definition of
21The limit ordinal definition trivially covers the non-limit-ordinal definition too, but it’s
more perspicuous to think about the two cases separately, because the two cases result in
dierent kinds of behavior. Roughly speaking, for badly-behaved sentences involving →
(like the Curry sentence, discussed below), the non-limit ordinals result in the semantic
value of the sentence oscillating between 1 and 0 at successive steps, and at a limit ordinal,
they find a temporary respite from this oscillation at 12 .
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validity, the Fundamental Theorem guarantees that the corresponding logic
remains K3 and not something weird: all individual Kripke-plus-Field models
have a K3 logic, and the formulas are all together stabilized at the acceptable
Kripke-plus-Field models.
The full logic for the conditional (excluding interesting mixes of modal
principles with the conditional) is found in Field (2003), p. 292. The impor-
tant results for our purposes are simply these: In bivalent contexts (i.e. those
for which excluded middle ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ holds), → and ⊃ are equivalent. Modus
ponens is valid for→ unrestrictedly.
The main classical rule that is not valid is if-introduction: It may be
that ϕ |=M ψ, but ϕ → ψ does not have Final Semantic Value 1 for some
worlds and models. This is actually good news: the addition of classical
if-introduction into a logic that has the unrestricted T-schema and modus
ponens renders the theory inconsistent, because of Curry’s paradox, a Liar-
like paradox of self-reference that centers on the sentence c := T(pcq)→ ⊥.
On this construction, T(pcq)→ ⊥ |=M ⊥. Why? T(pcq)→ ⊥ |=M T(pcq)
because T-in is valid, and T(pcq),T(pcq)→ ⊥ |=M ⊥ because modus ponens
is valid. Nonetheless, (T(pcq) → ⊥) → ⊥ has Final Semantic Value 12 :
the consequent stabilizes at semantic value 0, but the antecedent does not
stabilize. The antecedent is just the Curry sentence. At some stages in
the Field construction, this will have semantic value 1; at the next stage
the main → therefore gets semantic value 0. But at subsequent stages the
conditional in the Curry sentence gets semantic value 0, which gives the
main → semantic value 1. This oscillation continues ad innitum, so the
whole sentence receives Final Semantic Value 12 .
22
Finally, here are the proofs of propositions 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3:
Proposition 4.1. All instances of the following schema are valid:
2T(pϕq)→ ϕ.
Proof. At a world w, 2T(pϕq) has the minimum semantic value of T(pϕq)
at all worlds accessible from w, and the relation R is reflexive. Therefore
the minimum semantic value for T(pϕq) at all worlds accessible from w
22See Field (2008), §4.1 for a more involved discussion of Curry’s paradox. I’ll just note
that this is enough to guarantee that the Field conditional is not truth functional: Some
1
2 → 12 sentences, for example T(plq)→ T(plq), have semantic value 1, whereas others, like
T(plq)→ T(pcq), have semantic value 12 .
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cannot be strictly greater than that of T(pϕq) in w. But at any world in an
acceptable Kripke-plus-Field model, T(pϕq) has the semantic value of ϕ.
Therefore the semantic value of 2T(pϕq) is less than or equal to that of ϕ for
all Kripke-plus-Field models. Therefore the semantic value of 2T(pϕq)→ ϕ
stabilizes at 1 for all worlds and models. Thus |=M K(pϕq)→ ϕ.
Proposition 4.2. All instances of the following schema are valid:
2T(p2T(pϕq)→ ϕq).
Proof. As we saw in the text, Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.3 together
entail each instance of this axiom.
Proposition 4.3. The following rule is valid:
2T(pϕq)
ϕ
. . .
ψ (Only axioms and rules of K3FT.)
2T(pψq) ClosureK3FT .
Proof. Suppose that 2T(pϕq) has semantic value 1 at some arbitrary world
w in some arbitrary Field modelM, and suppose ϕ `K3FT ψ. Since (exercise
to the reader!) the rest of K3FT is sound on M, it follows that ϕ |=M ψ. We
just need to show that 2T(pψq) has semantic value 1 at w inM. ϕ |=M ψ
holds just in case, for all models and worlds, if ϕ has Final Semantic Value
1, so does ψ. 2T(pϕq) has value 1 just in case all accessible worlds from w
give T(pϕq) semantic value 1. Since T-out and T-in are both valid on Field’s
construction, if T(pϕq) has semantic value 1 at w inM, so does ϕ. But since
ϕ |=M ψ, all worlds that give ϕ semantic value 1 also give ψ semantic value
1, and all worlds that give ψ semantic value 1 also give T(pψq) semantic
value 1. Therefore, in all worlds accessible from w, T(pψq) has semantic
value 1. So the minimum semantic value of T(pψq) at all worlds accessible
from w is 1; but that means that 2T(pψq) has semantic value 1 at w. This
holds for all worlds and models, so this rule is valid: For all models and
71
Non-Classical Knowledge
worlds, if 2T(pϕq) has semantic value 1 and ϕ `K3FT ψ, then 2T(pψq) also
has semantic value 1.23
Appendix B
You may have been wondering about how exactly to get self-referential
sentences like the Liar and Knower out of these ingredients. Self-reference
can be achieved in one of two ways: the cheap way, and the honest way. The
honest way is to put a bit of arithmetic into this theory. Field makes an
“important observation" in §1.1 of Field (2008), according to which the results
of the diagonalization theorem hold even in theories whose logic is weaker
than classical, provided only that classical logic holds for the arithmetic
portion of the language, standard quantifier reasoning is allowed, and the
logic of the bi-conditional is minimally reasonable.24 It would be a routine
matter to plop enough arithmetic into the theory above to profit from the
results of the diagonalization lemma, even with a weaker logic. But I won’t
be honest for these purposes.
Instead, I’ll achieve self-reference in the cheap way. The cheap way is to
focus directly on which terms denote which sentences in the models. The Liar
sentence, for example, would exist in any model where a name ni denoted
the sentence ¬T (ni). A name ni is a Liar name in modelM just in case
[ni]M = ¬T (ni). ¬T (ni) is the Liar sentence.
We interpret the corner quotes dierently when we’re smuggling self-
reference in on the cheap. When we earned our self-reference via the diago-
nalization lemma in PA, pϕq was a metalinguistic name that stood for the
Gödel number of the formula ϕ. Here, pϕq is still a metalinguistic name, but
it stands, not for a Gödel number, but rather for the name ni that denotes
the formula ϕ. Since we want p·q always to be well-defined, we saddle our
models with the following restriction: Fix a particular enumeration of the
23Also K(pϕ→ ψq),K(pϕq) |=M K(pψq) for similar reasons. However, the inference
from ϕ ` ψ to K(pϕq)→ K(pψq) is not valid—but only for Curry-paradox-related reasons
concerning conditional introduction. Generally, multi-premise logical closure is valid on
this construction: ϕ1, . . . , ϕn `K3FT ψ entails K(pϕ1q), . . . ,K(pϕnq) `K3FT K(pψq).
24“Minimally reasonable" means: A ↔ A and ∃x[x = t ∧ C(x)] ↔ C(t) are theorems,
and if A ↔ B is a theorem then substituting A for B preserves theorem-hood. The Field
conditional validates both of these requirements. Of course, even to state these conditions,
we’d need to add equality to our language, which hitherto I, following Wittgenstein, have
eschewed.
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names. We insist that, in every model, every sentence has exactly one name,
and that each sentence gets the same name in every world of every model.25
Since there are countably many names, and countably many sentences, we
have enough names to go around.26
Classical theories with a sentential truth predicate that satisfies the se-
mantic equivalence of ϕ and T(pϕq) cannot admit Liar names into models,
on pain of inconsistency. That is, if the semantics winds up obeying
JT(pϕq)KM,w = JϕKM,w , T-equiv
then there can be no modelM in which [ni]M = ¬T (ni). If it did, then
J¬T (ni)KM,w = 1− JT (ni)KM,w Semantics of ¬;
= 1− J[ni]MKM,w By T-equiv;
= 1− J¬T (ni)KM,w By what ni denotes.
Thus the Liar cannot consistently be assigned a semantic value: if it’s 0, it’s
1, and vice-versa. So even classical theories without the arithmetic needed
for the diagonalization lemma must nonetheless place ad-hoc restrictions
on which names can denote which objects. With enough arithmetic in hand,
self-reference (though of a slightly dierent sort, relying on the provability of
certain biconditionals rather than focusing directly on which terms denote
which sentences) becomes unavoidable even by stipulation.
The Knower sentence is a slightly fancier Liar-like sentence. A name ni is
a Knower name in modelM just in case [ni]M,w = ¬2T (ni). The Knower
25These assumptions are wildly unrealistic, and mostly introduced for simplicity.
26This dierence in our interpretation of the corner quotes will change what the actual
proofs in the object language look like, once the corner quotes are interpreted. When we’re
doing Gödel numbering, the crucial lines in the proof where self-reference gets its bearings
is in the provable biconditionals: l ≡ ¬T(plq), where the l in question is actually some
complicated arithmetic formula, and plq is some natural number. When we’re smuggling in
self-reference on the cheap, these biconditionals will have the form of mere propositional
tautologies: l is really just ¬T (ni) where ni is a Liar name, and since p·q just takes a
formula to its name, the right hand side of the equivalence is also ¬T (ni). The force of
self-reference comes not from these biconditionals, which are tautologies, but rather from
the T-schema. The instantiation of T-out for the Liar sentence, for example, will have the
form: T (ni) ⊃ ¬T (ni). Thus, with either way of achieving self-reference, the proofs written
with the metalinguistic corner quotes look exactly the same; but when you interpret the
corner quotes and look at the honest-to-God object-language forms of the proof, they look a
bit dierent.
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sentence (with narrow-scope negation) is then 2T (ni). This sentence “says”
that its own negation is known. The same kind of reasoning shows that
classical models satisfying the semantic equivalence of T(pϕq) with ϕ cannot
admit Knower names:
J2T (ni)KM,w = Min{JT (ni)KM,w′ : wRw′}
≤ JT (ni)KM,w Because wRw;
= J[ni]MKM,w By T-equiv;
= J¬2T (ni)KM,w By what ni denotes;
= 1− J2T (ni)KM,w Semantics of ¬.
Thus J2T (ni)KM,w must be 0, since if it’s 1 then 1 ≤ 1 − 1. SoJ¬2T (ni)KM,w = 1. That means that there is some w′ accessible from
w at which J¬T (ni)KM,w′ = 1. Now, since w was arbitrary in the above
reasoning, the same argument as above shows that J¬2T (ni)KM,w′ = 1. But:
J¬2T (ni)KM,w′ = J[ni]MKM,w′ Because of what ni denotes;
= JT (ni)KM,w′ By T-equiv.
So at w′, T (ni) must be assigned semantic value 1. But w′ was introduced
precisely to witness w’s accessibility to a ¬T (ni) world, which would require
T (ni) to be assigned semantic value 0 at w′. Thus no classical models
satisfying T-equiv can include Knower names.
This argument also shows that the wide-scope negation Knower sentence
used by Maitzen (1998) cannot appear in classical models. That sentence
uses the same ni as above, but is the very sentence that ni denotes: ¬2T (ni).
The above argument shows that Knower-names are forbidden from classi-
cal models; therefore, the wide-scope and narrow-scope negation Knower
sentences are equally forbidden.
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Paradoxical Desires
4.1 The paradox
There’s almost nothing you can’t want. A glass of Bordeaux, a degree in
astrophysics, world peace . . . You name it, and there’s probably someone,
somewhere, who wants it.
It often happens that our desires involve other people’s desires. Jennifer
Aniston doesn’t just want her deadbeat boyfriend in the 2006 classic The
Break Up to do the dishes; she wants him to want to do the dishes. Conversely,
our desires can involve a blind kind of reference to others’ desires. I may
not particularly care where we go to dinner, but care very much about the
enjoyment of my more opinionated dining comrades. Thus I might want
simply to go wherever my comrades most want to go. Similarly a parent
might want to get their daughter whatever she most wants for her birthday,
without having any idea what that is. Desire-directed desires such as these
abound.
That isn’t to say that they can’t get us into trouble. Imagine that my
dining comrades turn out to be as unopinionated about where to dine as I
am. Then we might end up in the following sort of situation:
My strongest desire: That we dine wherever my dining com-
rades most want to dine.
My comrades’ strongest desire: That we dine wherever I most
want to dine.
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In this case, we’ve got a problem on our hands: What I want depends on what
my comrades want, and vice-versa, and we’re stuck. It will be completely
unclear where we should dine until some of us change our desires. (My
colleagues and I often languish indecisively in such states.)
We are well-advised to avoid desires such as these when they aren’t
supplemented by other, more basic desires. They are the cause of many
indecisive wallowings among domestic partners, friends, and colleagues. But
the situation can get far worse than indecisive strife; desire-directed desires
can lead to outright paradox.
Here, it seems, is a perfectly possible pair of desires that could be had by
two acquaintances, Mal (think ‘malevolent’) and Ben (think ‘benevolent’):
Mal’s strongest desire: That Ben doesn’t get whatever he most
strongly desires.
Ben’s strongest desire: That Mal gets whatever she most
strongly desires.
Cases like this surely occur less frequently than the cooperative predicament.
We require Mal to harbor a particular kind of ill-will towards Ben, who in
turn has nothing but benevolent desires towards Mal. We cannot expect
Ben to endure such treatment. But endure it he might. Perhaps Ben is a
religious man, albeit a hedonistic one, whose life purpose is to bring about
the satisfaction of others’ desires. Perhaps Mal is a misanthrope, who wants
all benevolent men such as Ben to have their sanctimoniously benevolent
desires frustrated. Whatever we say about this case, it represents a prima
facie possible pair of desires. Mal and Ben might have existed.
Those familiar with the Liar paradox (especially the contingent versions
presented in Kripke (1975)) will have presaged a paradox. And indeed, one
looms. The problem in the case of cooperative desires was that nothing
would happen. In order to know what I want, we have to figure out what
my dining comrades want; but in order to know what they want, we have to
figure out what I want. And so nothing gets done. A regrettable outcome,
but a perfectly coherent one.
In the case of desires like Mal’s and Ben’s, however, we risk encountering
far bigger game: true contradictions. When you desire something, it seems,
one of two things can happen. You either eventually get what you want, or
you fail to. So we can ask in this situation: whose strongest desire is satisfied
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here? Mal’s? Ben’s? Both? Neither? A bit of reasoning shows that none of
these answers makes any sense.
Here’s the proof. Suppose that Mal gets what she most strongly desires.
That just means that Ben doesn’t get what he most strongly desires. But Ben
simply desired that Mal’s strongest desire be satisfied. Since Ben doesn’t
get what he most desires, neither can Mal. But we supposed that Mal does
eventually get what she most strongly desires. Thus this assumption must be
false; it must be that Mal doesn’t eventually have her strongest desire satisfied.
However, this hypothesis is no better! Mal most strongly desires Ben’s
strongest desire to be frustrated; so if she doesn’t get what she desires, that
can only be because Ben gets what he desires. But since Ben just wants Mal to
get what she desires, the satisfaction of Ben’s desire requires the satisfaction
of Mal’s. Thus, supposing that Mal’s strongest desire is frustrated, we can
prove that it’s satisfied. Contradiction.
Here’s another way to see the contradiction: Because of what Mal wants,
Mal’s desire is satisfied if and only if Ben’s isn’t (m ↔ ¬b). But because
of what Ben wants, Ben’s desire is satisfied if and only if Mal’s is (b ↔ m).
Therefore Ben’s desire is satisfied if and only if it isn’t satisfied (b ↔ ¬b), a
classical contradiction.
It’s important to point out that this is a putative contradiction in our
description of the world, not merely in the contents of Mal’s and Ben’s desires.
It’s a common idea that I can have incompatible desires: I might want to
drink a third glass of wine (because it will taste pleasant), and simultaneously
want not to drink it (so as to avoid subsequent hangovers).1 But this case is
dierent: the contradiction concerns whose desire is, in fact, satisfied. Mal’s
and Ben’s desires are each perfectly internally coherent, in the sense that
there is a possible state of the world in which each (individually) is satisfied.
Mal’s strongest desire would be satisfied, for example, in a world in which
Ben most strongly desired a beer and failed to get a beer. But in our world,
in which Mal and Ben have the desires ascribed above, a plain contradiction
follows from any classical way of saying whose strongest desire is satisfied.
4.2 Responses
What does this paradox show? Two responses naturally suggest themselves:
1See Phillips-Brown (2017) for more on these internally inconsistent desire attributions.
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Response 1: Deny the possibility of the case. We could hold that
the case presents merely prima facie possible pairs of desires; actu-
ally this description misrepresents the underlying psychological
reality.
Response 2: Accept the possibility of the case, but try to block
the reasoning that leads to contradiction.
Response 2 comes in two kinds:
Response 2a: Deny a principle of desire satisfaction, particularly
the principle that, if S most strongly desires that p, then that S ’s
strongest desire is satisfied if and only if p.
Response 2b: Deny a logical principle—most naturally, either
bivalence or non-contradiction.
In what follows, I’ll argue that Response 1 and 2a aren’t right, and so
some version of Response 2b must be. I conclude by drawing out some
consequences. In particular, cases like this undermine the assumption,
prevalent in the literature on the Liar paradox, that paradoxes of self-reference
(broadly construed) pose a problem peculiar to language, and in particular
for the expressive power of the truth predicate. If cases like the one I’ve
described are possible, then structurally identical paradoxes arise at the
level of thought itself, regardless of the expressive resources of the language
in which we express those thoughts. This, I’ll argue, provides a new reason
for adopting a broadly non-classical approach to semantic paradoxes more
generally, because solutions that hold onto classical logic by denying the
T-schema are not applicable to these non-linguistic versions. But first: can
cases like this even arise?
4.3 Denying the case
The above proof purports to show that the arrangement of the world puta-
tively described above, though seemingly possible, cannot obtain. Mal and
Ben can’t mutually desire what they seem to desire.
It’s one thing simply to stipulate this; it’s another to explain why it is so.
What, beyond a non-explanatory inconsistency proof, explains why Mal and
Ben can’t have the desires that they seem for all the world to have?
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A proponent of Response 1 has a choice to make here. She can deny the
possibility of desires like Mal’s and Ben’s intrinsically, or relationally. The
intrinsic version of Response 1 denies that anyone can ever have desires of the
forms that Mal’s and Ben’s seem to have, regardless of who else desires what.
The relational version allows that we can sometimes have desires like those,
but holds that when certain global features of the world obtain (features
concerning who else desires what), we can no longer have those desires. I’ll
argue that each of these broad kinds of approach faces insuperable problems,
and that neither satisfactorily explains why the Mal/Ben case can’t obtain.
4.4 Intrinsic case-denying
According to the intrinsic version of Response 1, we can just never have
desires like Mal’s and Ben’s, regardless of which desires other people happen
to have. Indeed, to fully block the possibility of paradoxes like the one
above, we’d have to ensure that we never really have desires whose content
inextricably involves the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of others’ desires.
Other, more complicated paradoxes loom, and pretty much any local, desire-
satisfaction-involving kind of desire can be turned into a paradoxical one
with enough case-rejiggering.
The challenge for this way of responding is to oer some story about
why we can’t have desires like these, even in innocuous cases. As motivated
above, desire-involving desires are commonly attributed in everyday life. So
someone who wanted to deny these desires intrinsically would have to give
a theory of content that provided some satisfactory error theory for these
attributions.
What are the prospects for such a theory? Not good, I think. In recent
literature on propositional attitudes and mental content, there are two broad
ways that people have theorised about beliefs and desires, and what sorts
of contents those states have. On some views, like those of Geach (1957),
Sellars and Chisholm (1957), Dummett (1974), Davidson (1975), Fodor
(1975), and Field (1978), propositional attitudes are essentially language-like
in nature. Believing a proposition is standing in a relation to a sentence
in what’s sometimes called a ‘language of thought’, and this language has
many of the features (compositionality, for example) that we associate with
ordinary natural languages.
According to an alternate picture, most prominently advocated by Lewis
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(1979) and Stalnaker (1984), beliefs and desires aren’t linguistic in structure.
Instead, these states are conceived of pragmatically, as fundamentally tied
less to the assertion of sentences than to the explanation and prediction
of rational action. On many views of this kind, propositions are modeled
as something less fine-grained than sentences—sets of possible worlds, or
centered worlds, or something like that—together with some sort of story
about how relations of believing and desiring to these sorts of things can
play a role in the explanatory, folk-psychological theory that is their home.
On neither of these ways of thinking about content is there any good
reason to think that desires like Mal’s and Ben’s can’t arise intrinsically.
On the language of thought picture, to have a belief or desire is to stand
in a certain kind of relation to some sentence-like object. Which sentences
in the language of thought can I believe or desire? Any one, proponents of
this view generally think, that can be understood or asserted by the person
doing the believing or desiring. Now, we can definitely have some thoughts
about other peoples’ desires. There’s no motivation for thinking that we
can’t believe that someone’s given desire is satisfied or not. We definitely have
the concept of desire. But given that we posses this concept, denying the
existence of desire-involving desires seems just as unmotivated as denying
the existence of truth-predicate-involving sentences. Since we can entertain
some sentences in the language of thought which involve the notion of desire,
what prevents us from ever standing in the relation of desiring to them?
Denying that we can desire things about desires would be an ad-hoc
and unmotivated constraint from the language of thought perspective. Why,
beyond the fact that it can lead to Mal/Ben-like situations, did we evolve such
that certain language-of-thought sentences can go in the belief-box but never
in the desire-box? If anything, desire seems less constrained than belief,
not more. The language-of-thought proponent who wanted to deny the case
intrinsically would need to cook up some sort of story about why we are
forbidden from desiring certain language-of-thought sentences that we can
certainly believe, and I can’t see a promising way to work it out.
Indeed, Whittle (2017) has shown an impossibility result in this vicinity.
He’s shown that if propositions are structured, as the language-of-thought
theorist insists, then self-referential (and hence paradoxical) propositions are
unavoidable. He shows how a propositional version of the diagonalization
lemma can be proved with very minimal assumptions about how propositions
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would have to be structured, if they are structured at all.2 So the only real
hope for denying the existence of paradoxical contents (of which the Mal/Ben
case is a contingent version) lies with an unstructured theory of content.
On broadly Stalnakerian views, there’s no commitment to the idea that
propositions have a sentence-like structure that corresponds in any straightfor-
ward way to that of the sentences we assert. Instead, thoughts are conceived
of as those things the attribution of which can explain why rational agents
act in certain ways. So we might attribute to someone a desire to stay dry
and a belief that it’s raining as part of an explanation as to why they grabbed
an umbrella on the way out the door. It’s this role that desire/belief attribu-
tions are supposed to serve, and they are given only as much structure as
required to serve that role. Since it’s hard to see how, for example, a belief
in p ∧ q could contribute anything dierent to a rational agent’s actions than
a belief in q ∧ p, many have thought that this structure will be something less
fine-grained than that of sentences.
This picture is more promising than the language-of-thought one for
denying the existence of desire-involving desires, for this view connects the
states of believing and desiring less tightly to language. While we can pretty
clearly form sentences about someone’s desiring something, and about that
desire’s being satisfied or unsatisfied, the Stalnakerian doesn’t assume that
this maps in any isomorphic way to the structure of thought. Instead, thought
has only the amount of structure required to explain rational action.
Can non-structured theories make a plausible case for denying desire-
involving desires? I don’t think they can. Even on Stalnaker’s own terms,
we cannot get away with forbidding these kinds of desires. The reason is
that complicated enough profiles of rational, desire-directed actions can
necessitate these kinds of attributions. Mal might be acting in ways that make
the attribution of Ben-desire-involving desires explanatorily indispensable.
Imagine that you observe Mal exhibiting the following behavior. Whenever
she sees Ben reaching for something, she swats it away. Whenever Ben
applies for a job, Mal destroys the application. Whenever Ben says that he
wants something, Mal does everything in her power to prevent its being
brought about. In all the nearby counterfactual situations in which Ben has
certain desires, Mal is lurking, trying to frustrate them.
2The diagonalization lemma is the tool used to generate analogues of self-referential
sentences in suciently rich mathematical languages. See Boolos, Burgess, and Jerey
(2007) for details.
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If that’s how Mal is behaving, there doesn’t seem to be any way to describe
her state of mind other than with a Ben-desire-involving desire. Say that, in
the actual world, Ben happens to desire ice cream. In this world, it’s true
that Mal desires that Ben not have ice cream. But just to say this misses out
on an important counterfactually robust feature of Mal’s mental state. In a
nearby situation in which Ben starts wanting macaroons instead, the theorist
who attributed to Mal a desire that Ben not have ice cream won’t make as
good of predictions as those who attributed to Mal a desire that Ben not
get what he most strongly desires. So, even on a Stalnakerian picture, we
shouldn’t think that desire-satisfaction-involving desires never occur. The
only hope for denying the Mal/Ben case is to say that something goes wrong,
not with Mal’s desire on its own or Ben’s desire on its own, but rather with
the paradoxical relation in which they happen to stand.
4.5 Relational case-denying
What about the relational version of Response 1? According to this kind of
view, it’s possible for Ben to have his desire, and it’s possible for Mal to have
her desire. But what’s not possible is for Mal and Ben to have these desires
together. Let’s fix Mal’s desire, and say that, initially, their desires are these:
Mal’s strongest desire: That Ben doesn’t get what Ben most
strongly desires.
Ben’s strongest desire: That Monika get the job she applied
for.
The relational proponent of Response 1 need not deny that this is a perfectly
possible situation. The result is that Mal winds up with a desire that (given
what Ben desires) is satisfied just in case Monika does not get the job she
applied for.
Now suppose that, in this situation, Ben forgets all about Monika, and
reflects upon his positive feelings towards Mal. ‘What a fine person Mal is!’
Ben thinks; ‘I really just hope that she gets whatever it is she most wants.’
The question for the relational case-denier is, what should we say about
what happens to Mal? The answer, in any case, is going to be strange.
Either Ben’s forming this desire immediately robs Mal of her previous desire,
without changing anything about her, or it prevents Ben from getting into
82
Paradoxical Desires
the state of desire he’d otherwise have gotten into if Mal’s strongest desire
had simply been to drink a nice glass of wine. (Or both.)
Is any of these options plausible? Any of these options involves a com-
mitment to a pretty radical kind of content externalism—too radical, I think,
to stomach. Since Putnam (1981) it’s been a commonly held idea that which
propositions I believe and desire supervenes on more than my own internal
psychological state; it depends partly on features of the world. So here on
Earth, I have beliefs and desires involving H2O, but on Twin Earth that
exact same internal psychological state would put me into belief and desire
relations to XYZ instead. In a similar vein, Burge (1979a) argues that the
content of my beliefs about arthritis is fixed by more than just my own private
understanding of how arthritis works; instead, some such facts (like whether
it can occur in my thigh) are fixed by relevant experts. So my belief that I
have arthritis in my thigh is false, even though it might be true according to
my own internal conceptual scheme.
According to the relational case-denier, something similar is happening
here. A single intrinsic psychological state can, depending on the rest of the
world, put Mal into dierent desiderative states. If Ben has normal desires, it
puts Mal into a Ben-desire-involving desiderative state; if Ben is in the state
described in the original case, this psychological state puts Mal into. . . well,
some other kind of state. (It would be a burden on this kind of theorist to
say exactly what Mal’s desiderative state is in this case.)
Though externalism about mental content is popular these days—indeed,
I count myself as an externalist, largely for Putnam-Burge style reasons—I
don’t think we should be happy with this kind of externalism. Why not?
Well, the traditional defenders of content externalism do not simply assert
that content supervenes widely, and leave things at that. All such cases come
together with a very natural explanation for why and how our beliefs/desires
can dier in content without our diering in intrinsic psychological state.
In the case of Twin Earth, Putnam doesn’t simply assert that the content of
water-like beliefs diers; he gives an account that explains why this is so, and
why it makes sense to use a notion of content that behaves that way. The
reason why I can’t have thoughts about XYZ, but can have thoughts about
H2O, is that I’ve never been in the right kind of causal contact with XYZ to
have thoughts about it. It’s this causal story of how representational states
get their content that explains the wide supervenience in Twin Earth cases.
Similarly for Burge. We have a notion of content that allows for deference
to experts because we live in a social community that benefits from a division
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of intellectual labor regarding the understanding of various phenomena.
Doctors get paid to know about arthritis and where it can occur, and I defer
to them conceptually because they know about the phenomenon in question
better than I do. Their expertise, and my deference to it, naturally explains
why and how content supervenes widely in the way that it does.
It’s really hard to see what a similar kind of explanation would look like
in the Mal/Ben case. Mal and Ben appear to have all the concepts necessary
to entertain the thoughts they seem to be entertaining. They are perfectly
acquainted with each other, and both of them have the concept of desire.
Both of them know what it is for a desire to be satisfied or not. So they
have all of the concepts and acquaintances with the right objects in order to
have the thoughts/desires they seem to have. The only reason to think that
they can’t have those desires in this global case is that they are (classically)
mutually inconsistent; we have as yet no theory that explains why the content
of our desires can depend on the whims of other people in this particular
way. And, unlike in the case of H2O and XYZ, we have no good story about
how even to describe Mal’s and Ben’s desiderative states instead.
So it’s better to allow that Ben and Mal can have these desires, mutually,
in this case. That only leaves the pesky little problem of the paradox. What’s
going on, if we seem to have a proof that this situation, which we have no
good independent reason to think can’t arise, can’t arise?
4.6 Denying a principle of desire-satisfaction
The only hope for retaining classical logic while holding onto the possibility
of the Mal/Ben case lies in denying a non-logical principle that goes into the
derivation of a contradiction. Let us therefore look more closely at how this
contradiction was derived.
One way was via the biconditionals m ↔ ¬b and b ↔ m. These bicon-
ditionals each have intuitive plausibility, even in the paradoxical case. But
this intuitive plausibility can be bolstered; they are derivable from seemingly
incontrovertible principles relating desires to their conditions of satisfaction.
The thought is that Mal’s state of desire gives rise to, and indeed is charac-
terised by, the first biconditional. What Mal wants is for Ben’s desire to be
frustrated; to give her what she wants is just to frustrate Ben’s desire, and to
fail to give her what she wants is just to satisfy Ben’s desire. So her desire is
satisfied just in case Ben’s isn’t. Lying behind this thought is a principle of
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desire satisfaction:
Desire satisfaction schema (DSS): If S desires that p, then S ’s
desire that p is satisfied if and only if p.
The relevant instance is:
If Mal desires that Ben’s strongest desire be frustrated, then her
desire that Ben’s strongest desire be frustrated is satisfied if and
only if Ben’s strongest desire is frustrated.
This principle suces to generate, in classical logic applied to the Mal/Ben
case, the biconditional m ↔ ¬b. For Mal’s strongest desire is that Ben’s
strongest desire fail to obtain. Thus, by (DSS), it is satisfied if and only if
Ben’s strongest desire is frustrated.
(DSS) has intuitive plausibility. But there is good reason to doubt that
it is always true. Desire reports are generally thought to contain normality
presuppositions as part of their meaning. So, imagine that John wants to
drink a beer, and you give him a poisoned beer. He drinks it and dies. Here,
it seems like it’s true that John drinks a beer; and it’s true that John desired
to drink a beer; but plausibly, John does not get what he wants.
You might wonder if this has something to do with the indefinite article:
John’s real desire is to get a [normal, non-poisoned] beer. But this behavior
seems to persist even without indefinite articles. Suppose John forms a desire
to drink this beer in front of him, not knowing that his enemies have poisoned
it. (DSS) commits us to:
John’s desire to drink this beer is satisfied i John drinks this
beer.
Here, intuitions may not be as clear. It seems like there is some sense in
which, if John drinks this beer, his desire is satisfied. It’s just not satisfied in
the way he wanted it to be satisfied—the normal, refreshing, non-poisoned
way. This way of describing things seems relatively natural, and it does not
involve denying (DSS). John’s desire to drink this beer is satisfied, just not
how he would have liked.
But there is another temptation to say that John doesn’t actually get what
he wants. After all, drinking the poisoned beer is really bad for John; if John
knew that the beer were poisoned, he would immediately renounce his desire
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for it, and would have no inclination to drink it. So it’s odd to say that he
gets what he wants in spite of his untimely and undesired demise.3
I feel the pull of both intuitions. Thus, I won’t rely on (DSS) in my
argument against this way of blocking the paradox. For the desire satisfaction
principle restricted to strongest desires is much more plausible. That principle
says:
Strongest desire satisfaction schema (SDSS): If S most
strongly desires that p, then S ’s strongest desire that p is sat-
isfied if and only if p.
This schema is not subject to the objections to the fully general (DSS).
If John claims most strongly to desire a beer, receives a poisoned one, and
protests that he didn’t get what he wanted, it would be reasonable to retort
that he must not have most strongly desired a beer after all.4 His subsequent
protestation shows that he had another, logically stronger desire all along:
a desire for a non-poisoned beer. Desires may be the sorts of things that
can fail to be satisfied, even while their content comes true. It may, after all,
come true in deviant ways—ways inconsistent with stronger desires that the
agent has. But strongest desires aren’t like that. Dissatisfaction with deviant
ways of satisfying them merely show that they weren’t actually strongest
desires after all.
Perhaps there are lingering doubts about this. Perhaps even logically
strongest desires have deviant ways of failing to be satisfied, such that it
could make sense to say that someone most strongly desired p, and p was
indeed the case, but they failed to get what they most strongly desired. Even
if so, related paradoxes loom for which such a response wouldn’t apply. For
3The kind of desire report at play behind this intuition is what I’ve called the advisory
kind in Chapter 5. Attributers of such desire reports can help themselves to some of their
information (of which the desirer herself may be ignorant) in working out what would put
the desirer into preferred states, and attribute the desire on that basis. (Said of someone
with no knowledge of the MTA: ‘Sally is heading to Harlem? She doesn’t know it, but she
wants to take the A train’.) The paradox here is better understood as involving the more
familiar predictive kind of desire attribution, because it should be no surprise that advisory
uses are radically externalist.
4There’s an ambiguity here in the phrase ‘strongest desire’ that hasn’t mattered much
until now. On one reading, it means a desire that is strongest in terms of content; that is, a
desire whose content entails that of all the agent’s other desires. On another reading, it
means something like ‘most psychologically salient/forceful desire’, which may fail to be
logically strongest. It’s the former reading we need for these purposes.
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nothing in the derivation of the contradiction depends very much on the
notions of desire and satisfaction in particular. We could have formulated the
paradox in terms of closely related attitudes and relations, such as seeming
desire, or desires seemingly being satisfied, or seeming desires seemingly
being satisfied, etc. The weaker these attitudes and relations get, the less
plausible becomes the story of why the analogue of (SDSS) should fail; but
the formal derivation of the paradox isn’t aected thereby.5
(SDSS), applied to the Mal/Ben case, is all that we need to generate the
biconditionals m↔ ¬b and b ↔ m. And classical logic is all that is needed
to generate contradictions (and triviality) from these biconditionals.
I’ll argue that certain principles of classical logic are indeed the root
of the paradox, and that giving them up yields a unied solution to all
paradoxes with this structure. I’ll start making this case by drawing out
analogies and disanalogies to the more traditional Liar paradox.
4.7 Non-classical thought
Readers familiar with semantic paradoxes will recall Kripke (1975)’s contin-
gent paradoxes of self-reference. Mal’s and Ben’s desires are reminiscent of
the following pair of sentences:
The sentence just below this one isn’t true.
The sentence just above this one is true.
Is the upper sentence true, or not? If it’s true, then the sentence below it
isn’t, which means that it can’t be true either. Thus it must not be true. But
then the sentence below it is true, in which case the upper sentence must be
5The situation here is similar to revenge versions of Prior’s paradox discussed by Prior
(1961), Bacon, Hawthorne, and Uzquiano (2016), Bacon and Uzquiano (2018), and Bacon
(forthcoming). Our desire paradox, suitably formulated in a language with propositional
quantifiers and a propositional definite description operator, can be seen as a contingent
version of Prior’s paradox. The contingency makes particularly vivid the costs of classical
propositional logic in this context, for, unlike intrinsically paradoxical versions (in which,
say, you believe that all of your beliefs are false or desire that all your desires be frustrated),
there doesn’t seem to be anything particularly irrational or unrealistic about Mal’s and
Ben’s desires considered individually. See also Caie (2012) for similar paradoxes involving
belief, where he argues that the rational response to paradoxes like the Liar is to adopt
indeterminate states of belief, according to which you neither believe nor fail to believe the
Liar sentence.
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true after all. The reasoning that leads to paradox is similar to that at play
in our desire paradox.
The matter of the paradoxes, however, is quite dierent. Self-referential
sentences, like the Liar and Curry sentences, have been said to give rise
to semantic paradoxes. It’s commonly thought that these paradoxes stem,
at bottom, from languages too expressive for their own good. Here, for
example, is Ramsey explaining why we need to keep an object-language
truth predicate at the cost of facing paradoxes:
We get statements from which we cannot in ordinary language
eliminate the words ‘true’ or ‘false’. Thus if I say ‘He is always
right’, I mean that the propositions he asserts are always true,
and there does not seem to be any way of expressing this without
using the word ‘true’. (Ramsey 1927, my emphasis)
And here is Field explaining his view of the dialectic concerning para-
doxes and classical logic:
There is little reason to doubt the correctness of classical logic
as applied to our most serious discourse, e.g. our most serious
physical theories. But the semantic paradoxes arise because truth
talk gives rise to some anomalous applications (e.g. “viciously
self-referential” ones), and it’s rash to assume that classical logic
continues to be appropriate to these applications. (Field 2016,
my emphasis)
Common to both of these passages is what I’ll call a linguistic diagnosis
of these paradoxes. Paradoxes arise, according to this diagnosis, because
we want to express certain things (like infinite conjunctions—see Picollo
and Schindler (2017)) that we cannot express in a finite way without a truth
predicate that behaves disquotationally. This need for expressive power yields
a tool that is, in some sense, too powerful for classical logic. The lesson
is that a naïve truth predicate and classical connectives are two expressive
tools that cannot be combined without triviality. It’s because of the way we
need to talk that paradoxes of self-reference arise.
The traditional menu of solutions developed in response is similarly
informed by this linguistic conception of how the paradoxes get going. Their
lesson, according to orthodoxy, is something like this: When developing a
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formal language, you have to be careful to avoid certain natural combinations
of expressive tools that, when combined, yield triviality. Either you must
avoid saddling a language with its own truth predicate (as Tarski and Russell
urge). Or, if you do insist on having an object-language truth predicate,
you’ve got to weaken it in some unnatural way—either by having sentences
with semantic value 1 that aren’t true, or by having sentences with semantic
value 0 that are true. Or you’ve got to weaken the logic to something less
powerful than classical logic. Perhaps Kleene’s K3; perhaps Priest’s Logic of
Paradox; perhaps something else. The point is, these paradoxes are thought
to have something fundamentally to do with language and expressive power.
Thus the label ‘semantic’.
Our desire paradox, despite involving structurally similar reasoning,
doesn’t have anything to do with language in particular. It doesn’t make
use of any particularly semantic properties like truth or falsity. Instead, it’s
just about people getting what they want, or failing to. Of course, we use
language to talk about people getting what they want; but when we do so,
we aren’t talking about language, as we’re obviously doing when we attribute
truth or falsity to sentences as in the traditional semantic paradoxes.
Indeed, the ability of Mal and Ben to speak any particular language is
inessential to the paradox. Mal and Ben needn’t have any thoughts about
which sentences in which languages are true or false in order to desire what
they desire. Each just needs to have attitudes about the other’s desires,
regardless of which language they are expressed in. Regardless, indeed, of
whether they are expressed in any language.
To make the point particularly strongly, it may even be possible—although
I do not stake much on this claim—for suciently sophisticated non-linguistic
creatures to get themselves into desiderative situations similar to Mal’s and
Ben’s. Desires are things that pretty much any sentient being can have. Horses
desire to roam free, tigers to hunt their prey, antelope to flee their predators,
all without speaking a language to communicate these desires. These non-
linguistic creatures also have the capacity to form other-directed desires:
A mother fox might desire the satisfaction of her ospring’s desires, or a
malicious cat the frustration of his owner’s.6 Thus we might as well imagine
that Mal and Ben are two cats, who cannot speak but can be respectively
malicious and benevolent. If that’s right, it would make a particularly strong
case that paradoxes with a Liar-like structure arise at the level of thought
6I have met such cats.
89
Paradoxical Desires
itself.
We know from the literature on contingent Liar sentences that the way to
solve those paradoxes isn’t to deny the existence of the problematic sentences.
Paradoxical sentences can clearly be formulated in natural language, and a
minimal amount of mathematics make them unavoidable in formal ones. I’ve
argued above that this is so for paradoxical propositions as well: we should
not deal with the problems they raise by denying that they exist. Instead we
have to deal with them by modifying something else in our theories.
What kind of modification should that be? I’ll conclude by suggesting that
this paradox gives us a new abductive reason to prefer broadly non-classical
treatments.
Solutions to the semantic paradoxes come in two flavours: those that
keep classical logic, and those that revise some part of it. Those that keep
classical logic must deny one of the T-Schemas:
T(psq)→ s (T-out)
s → T(psq) (T-in)
The ability to retain these intuitive schemas unrestrictedly has long
been touted (for example by Priest (1987) and Field (2008)) as a mark in
favour of non-classical approaches. Most of the work that goes into classical
approaches, therefore, is concerned with retaining something as close to
these schemas as possible without reinviting paradox.
The non-logical (SDSS) is the clear analogue to the T-schema. Recall
that this principle says:
Strongest desire satisfaction schema (SDSS): If S most
strongly desires that p, then S ’s strongest desire that p is sat-
isfied if and only if p.
Defenders of classical logic will point to this principle as the culprit in the
desire case, just as they point to the T-schema as the culprit in the Liar
paradox.
However, the T-Schema and (SDSS) are about dierent things. The T-
schema relates syntactic objects (sentences) to their truth conditions; (SDSS)
relates desires to their satisfaction conditions. This makes a dierence.
For example, shifts in facts about meaning/conventions can change which
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sentences are true, but they cannot change what I desire (unless I desire
something about meanings or conventions).
To see this, let us grant that ‘Beer is red’ is false, and that I currently
desire red wine, though not beer. Consider the following counterfactuals:
1. If ‘beer’ had meant what ‘red wine’ means, ‘Beer is red’ would be true.
2. If ‘beer’ had meant what ‘red wine’ means, I would want a beer.
Plausibly, (1) is true, while (2) is false. Shifting the meaning of ‘beer’
changes the truth conditions of sentences, but not the satisfaction conditions
of my wine-related desires. Thus, (SDSS) and the T-Schema are not just
trivial notational variations. They have substantively dierent content, and
dierent modal profiles. That means that anyone who wants to block the
desire paradox by denying (SDSS) does not get that move for free, by re-
telling whatever story she told to deny the T-Schema. A dierent kind of
story would have to be told in favour of giving up each one.
A non-classical approach, on the other hand, can solve the Liar paradox
and the desire paradox by abandoning the exact same principles. Both para-
complete and paraconsistent approaches are possible. I’ll conclude by briefly
sketching a paracomplete story along the lines of Field (2008), not because
I think it’s inevitable, but because I favour it over paraconsistent approaches
for a broad class of intensional semantic paradoxes (for example the Knower
paradox—see Jerzak (2019) for a more involved technical exposition). I
won’t delve into the technical details here; instead, I’ll show how it can yield
an attractive package of results in the Mal/Ben case.
In a nutshell, a theory of this kind holds that it’s indeterminate who
gets what they want in the Mal/Ben case. The claim that Mal gets what
she wants falls into a truth-value gap, as does its negation. The claims
that Mal gets what she wants if and only if Ben doesn’t, and that Ben gets
what he wants if and only if Mal does, are true.7 The classical argument
from those biconditionals to explosion fails at the negation-introduction
step: indeterminate claims are not such that we can suppose them, derive
a contradiction, and infer their negations. When possibly indeterminate
sentences/propositions are involved, we must be careful not to reason as if
they have classical truth values.
7These biconditionals have to be formulated with a more complicated, non-truth func-
tional conditional, instead of the material conditional. But this conditional collapses into
the material conditional in bivalent contexts, so not much is lost by this.
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This theory denies only two classical rules of inference, both involving
suppositional reasoning: negation-introduction, and if-introduction.8 A
unifying virtue of this theory, in our context, is that it attributes the error in
reasoning in the Liar paradox, and in the desire paradox, to the exact same
steps—in this case, the negation-introduction step. Classical theories, on the
other hand, must attribute the error to two dierent kinds of satisfaction/truth
principles—indeed, both of which enjoy immense intuitive support. Thus
the classical theorist sees disunity where we ought to have expected unity.
The ability to solve two structurally similar paradoxes in the exact same
move is a mark in favour of non-classical approaches.
Such a theory still comes with a certain kind of external supervenience—
but only of the familiar kind involving truth value (rather than content).
Facts about whether my desires are satisfied can have non-classical semantic
values, and that will supervene on more than just my local situation. For
instance, Mal’s strongest desire would have a classical truth value if Ben’s
strongest desire were for a beer, and becomes indeterminate the moment
Ben forms the desire ascribed above. However, we should sleep easier with
this kind of externalism than with the radical externalism that the relational
case-denier must espouse. It’s a common idea that our beliefs and desires
go from true to false, or from satisfied to unsatisfied, according to the whims
of the world. On this paracomplete view, they can go from determinately
satisfied/unsatisfied to indeterminate just as easily. However, facts about
what I desire are more well-behaved. They may supervene widely, but only
for the tractable, familiar reasons explored by Burge and Putnam.
This is a more attractive package of views, I think, than the classical
alternatives. It all amounts to a new consideration in favour of non-classical
approaches to paradoxes in the family of the Liar. Not only must classical
approaches invalidate extremely plausible inferential principles involving
truth (T-out and T-in), they must also either forbid certain seemingly possible
combinations of desires, or else the independently plausible (SDSS). The
non-classical approach I outlined solves both sentential and non-sentential
kinds of paradoxes in the exact same move. This is a new mark in its favour.
However, the argument for this upshot relied on denying radical exter-
nalism. As we’ll see in the next chapter, there are reasons to believe that
desire reports in natural language can be radically externalist in the way I’ve
denied here. It’s to those arguments that I turn in the next chapter.
8Negation-introduction: ϕ ` ⊥ =⇒ ` ¬ϕ; if-introduction: ϕ ` ψ =⇒ ` ϕ→ ψ.
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Chapter 5
Two Ways to Want?
5.0.1 In vino veritas
Too often have I suered the misfortune of being directed to bring wine to a
dinner party. Not beer, or whisky, both drinks whose quality I’d be quite a
bit more competent to judge, but specifically wine. With the aid of my visual
system I can usually distinguish the red stu from the white stu; that just
about exhausts my ability to make discriminations.
What I want is the best wine for the occasion, which I understand to be
that which will bring the most joy to my more gustatorily advanced dining
comrades. I only care about my comrades’ taste; all wines taste fine to
me. There I stand, in the grocery store, having whittled the options down
to two. There’s a Zinfandel from Sonoma Valley, and a Sauvignon Blanc
from New Zealand. Unbeknownst to me, the Zinfandel would bring my
dinner companions the most joy; they find the Sauvignon Blanc’s grassiness
oppressive. You, a maximally informed observer of the situation, are looking
at me in my predicament. A natural way for you to describe the situation—
which I will refer to as in vino veritas—is with (1):
(1) He doesn’t know it, but he wants the Zinfandel.
(2), however, rings false:
(2) #He doesn’t know it, but he believes that the Zinfandel is the wine to
get.
After all, if I believed that the Zinfandel were the wine to get, there would
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be no predicament—I’d simply get it, my comrades would savor it, and all
would be well.
Suppose further that my dining companions change their taste, now find-
ing the Sauvignon Blanc’s grassiness pleasant and the Zinfandel’s fruitiness
overwhelming. (3) would then be the right thing to say:
(3) He doesn’t know it, but he wants the Sauvignon Blanc.
Something strange has happened. Without changing anything about me—
I’ve just been standing there dumbfounded all along—my desires seem to
have changed. I went from wanting the Zinfandel to wanting the Sauvignon
Blanc, without any corresponding change in my underlying psychological
state.1
This contrasts with belief. Nothing about my beliefs has changed here.
All along, I believe that whichever wine I buy should align with my comrade’s
preferences. What wine would make that true changes, but the content of my
beliefs don’t.2 My beliefs about what’s best to get are compatible with any
situations in which the wine-to-get lines up with the wine-they-want. They in
themselves mark no distinction between the Zinfandel and the Sauvignon
Blanc. My desires, however, attributed in (1) and (3), seems to have a kind
of sensitivity to the wider world that my beliefs do not. In situations where
my comrades actually want the Zinfandel, whether I know it or not, there’s a
sense in which I want that too; and in situations where they actually want
the Sauvignon Blanc, so, in some sense, do I.
You might resist these data.3 Perhaps (1) and (3) aren’t really true.
1This kind of case was brought to my attention by Callard (2017), although she is
concerned there not to give a particularly realistic semantics for natural language desire
attributions, but rather to argue on behalf of Socrates that we can never truly desire things
that are (in fact) bad. This kind of use is also mentioned in Davis (1984), and in Rooryck
(2017).
2Belief attributions sometimes bear de re readings, with behavior superficially similar
to that of advisory desire attributions. If Susan has a general belief that all Minnesotans
are nice, but no particular beliefs about some Minnesotan (Fred) whom she’s never met or
heard of, I could reasonably say, “Susan thinks Fred is nice". However, this phenomenon is
more limited with ‘believes’ than with ‘wants’. If Susan had met Fred, and, not knowing
that he was Minnesotan, formed the definite opinion that there is nothing nice about Fred,
such a de re belief report would be inappropriate. (1), on the other hand, is appropriate
even if I’m erroneously convinced that my friends prefer the Sauvignon Blanc.
3Empirical work remains to determine how cross-linguistically robust these advisory uses
are. Informal surveys suggest that it is harder, if not impossible, to hear in (for example)
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Perhaps all I ever really wanted all along mirrored my beliefs about what’s
best to get; the content of my desire was, less determinately, to get some
wine or other that pleases my comrades. Someone pressing this line would
insist that the correct way for you, the better-informed observer, to describe
the situation would be:
(4) He doesn’t want the Zinfandel. (Not yet anyway. But he will once he
learns that it’s the wine that his dinner companions prefer.)
I don’t find (4) a horribly unnatural thing to say. But it’s no more natural than
(1). And (1) and (4) seem inconsistent. This suggests that we’re attributing
desires in two dierent ways. In (1), information beyond my ken helps
determine what I want. In (4), what I want more or less coincides with what
I believe to be good.4
(1) and (4) are typical examples of two dierent uses we make of ‘wants’.
One use is to predict and explain how agents act, roughly along the lines of
belief-desire folk psychology. If I know that someone wants A, and believes
that doing B will result in her getting A, and nothing stands in her way of
doing B, I’ll usually predict that she’ll do B. The use of ‘wants’ in (1) clearly
isn’t this notion; if all you’re allowed to do is observe, not to advise, you
won’t predict that I’ll toddle o to the party with the Zinfandel in hand.
Indeed, if you knew that I falsely believed my dinner companions to prefer
the Sauvignon Blanc, you’d make exactly the opposite prediction. Let’s call
this the predictive use. On the predictive use, (1) is false and (4) is true.
But there’s definitely another sense in which, if I buy the Sauvignon Blanc,
I won’t have bought what I really wanted all along. Indeed, I’d readily admit
as much once my error becomes known to me. Say that I, falsely believing
German, Spanish, and French. An anonymous reviewer helpfully pointed out that the
‘wants’ in English originally meant lacks, as in “the soup wants salt". Only later did the
psychological use develop. It could be this evolutionary history that explains why English
is unique here, if it turns out to be. The discussions of desire in Socratic dialogues like
the Meno, Gorgias, and Republic suggest that such a reading was also available in ancient
Greek, but I won’t press this point. The interesting thing for our purposes is that there is
an attitude verb in some language that exhibits the kind of information-sensitivity more
commonly associated with modals.
4I say “more or less” in light of Lewis (1988)’s argument against such an identification.
(Although see Bradley and Stefánsson (2016) for a counterargument.) The important point
for these purposes, as will become clear in what follows, isn’t the identification of desire with
belief, but rather the identification of the information to which desire reports are sensitive
with the desirer’s own beliefs.
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the Sauvignon Blanc to be preferred by my comrades, buy it and bring it to
the party. It would be natural for me to express my regret with:
(5) Ach! That wasn’t the wine that I wanted!
Or say that you, the maximally informed observer, break your silence to
dispense advice. You’d say:
(6) Return that Sauvignon Blanc! That’s not what you wanted, your
comrades hate it. What you really wanted to buy was the Zinfandel.
It would be odd for me to retort:
(7) ?You’re wrong! I really did want to buy the Sauvignon Blanc. I bought
exactly what I wanted. But I’ve changed my mind, and now I want
the Zinfandel.
It would be much more natural to retract my previous claim about what I
desired, saying something like:
(8) Oh! You’re right, I guess I didn’t want the Sauvignon Blanc after all.
Thanks for telling me.
Situations like these, where better-informed agents oer advice to worse-
informed ones, are where we most often find the use of ‘wants’ that I’m
interested in. We ask the subway worker which train we want to get on, given
where we’re going; a good sommelier tells you what wine you want, instead
of sitting back and laughing at you while you select the Chardonnay you
erroneously think will go nicely with your ribeye. This use of ‘wants’ isn’t the
predictive one. In telling you what you want, better-informed advisers like
the subway-worker and the sommelier are making use of their information,
not restricting themselves to yours. I’ll call this the advisory use, since it
figures most prominently in situations of advice.
In what follows, I take it as evident that we attribute desires in this
advisory sense, and not just in fringe circumstances. Injunctions like, “Figure
out what you really want, before you do anything you’ll regret!" sound
extremely natural, as do doubtful self-attributions, as in, “I think I want the
9am flight, but I won’t know for sure until I know when the meeting is."
Similar injunctions involving “believes” sound very weird. It’s easier to be
ignorant about what you want than about what you believe, and theories of
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attitude verbs shouldn’t disallow that.
The plan is this. I rehearse two popular theories of desire attributions:
Heim’s restricted modal account and Levinson’s decision-theoretic one, show-
ing that both of them, being engineered with predictive uses in mind, don’t
predict advisory uses. I then present data concerning the interaction of
desire reports with conditionals, where Heim’s and Levinson’s theories also
founder. I develop a lexical ambiguity response, which posits a separate
semantic entry for “wants” corresponding roughly to Socrates’ apparent view:
that we want what’s good according to an omniscient state of information. I
give two reasons for dissatisfaction with this response, and develop a better
one according to which desire reports express information-neutral proposi-
tions. I compare “wants” to “ought”, arguing that the former functions as
a precisification of the latter. I take up the relationship between advisory
and predictive uses, and develop a view according to which predictive uses,
where they dier from advisory ones, are literally false; their apparent felicity
is explained by free indirect discourse. If this view is right, then there are
only apparently two dierent ways to want. Finally I sketch an account of
the purpose of desire attributions that explains why it made sense for them
to evolve this way.
5.1 Existing proposals
5.1.1 Warm-up: the naïve semantics
Here’s a flat-footed first pass at modeling desire attributions. Agents have, at
bottom, preferences concerning outcomes, and what they want is a function
of those preferences. To say that an agent wants ϕ is just to say that the
outcomes she most prefers are ones in which ϕ holds.
A well-known problem for this approach, discussed in Stalnaker (1984)
p. 89, is that it predicts that I want whatever follows from, or is presupposed
by, what I want. Say, for example, that John is sick, and would very much
prefer not to be. It’s true to say,
(9) John wants to get better.
But on the naïve semantics, this entails
(10) John wants now to be sick.
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since every world in which John gets better is a world in which John is now
sick. Therefore if “John gets better" is true throughout the worlds John
considers best, “John is now sick” must also be true there. So if John wants
to get better, he wants to be sick now. We’d expect him to protest this
consequence, and our theory of desire attributions should not contradict
him in this.
5.1.2 Stalnaker and Heim
This example shows that what we want isn’t just a matter of what’s going on
in the worlds we most prefer. It also depends on which options are live in
the situation we find ourselves in. John never wanted to be sick, but given
that he is, he wants to get better. Thus what we want depends, in addition
to basic preferences on outcomes, on a state of information—a state, that is,
that includes certain options as live and rules out others as dead. It’s our
preferences regarding live options that factor into the truth conditions of
a propositional desire report. Worlds in which John never got sick are not
live options, so his preferences regarding them, strong though they might
be, don’t factor into characterizing his state of desire with respect to getting
better.
How exactly does a state of information combine with basic preferences
to yield desire attributions? A natural thought, first outlined by Stalnaker, is
that I want ϕ if, throughout the live worlds in the relevant state of information,
my basic preferences render nearby ϕ worlds better than nearby ¬ϕ worlds.
The question then becomes: which information is relevant? Hitherto the
literature on desire attributions has implicitly assumed an answer to this
question: The body of information that’s relevant is that which characterizes
the desirer’s own beliefs. Stalnaker:
Wanting something is preferring it to certain relevant alterna-
tives, the relevant alternatives being those possibilities that the
agent believes will be realized if he does not get what he wants.
(Stalnaker (1984), 89)
Heim (1992), who fleshes out Stalnaker’s idea formally, makes the same
assumption. Some notation:
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• wx : a preorder on worlds, so that w1 x,w w2 just in case agent x in w
weakly prefers w1 to w2 (wx for strong preference). For sets W1, W2 of
worlds, W1 wx W2 := ∀w1 ∈W1,∀w2 ∈W2,w1 wx w2;
• Bwx : The set of worlds compatible with x’s beliefs in w;
• Minw(ϕ): The set of most similar worlds to w in which ϕ holds.
With these resources in hand, Heim proposes the following semantics:5
Jx wants ϕKw = 1 i ∀w′ ∈ Bwx ,Minw′(ϕ) wx Minw′(¬ϕ).
Neither Stalnaker’s idea nor Heim’s formalization of it was engineered with
cases like (1) in mind. This is easy to see just by sketching a model faithful
to the structure of in vino veritas and showing that Heim’s semantics does
not churn out (1). An explicit model of the case and a derivation of Heim’s
truth conditions relative to it are sketched in the appendix.
Intuitively, though, it’s easy to see why Heim’s semantics doesn’t produce
(1). In the in vino veritas case, I have no beliefs about which wine my
comrades prefer. Thus, while my basic preferences render worlds where my
selection aligns with my comrades’ tastes better than those where it doesn’t,
my beliefs do nothing to single out the Zinfandel. So it’s not the case that,
throughout all worlds compatible with my beliefs, nearby I-buy-the-Zinfandel
worlds are preferred by me to nearby I-buy-the-Sauvignon Blanc worlds.
There are counterexamples among the non-actual worlds, which my beliefs
do not rule out, where my comrades prefer the Sauvignon Blanc. Thus
Heim’s semantics misses true readings in situations like in vino veritas.
5.1.3 Decision-theoretic accounts
Levinson (2003) also complains that Heim’s semantics fails to validate
intuitively true desire attributions. But his cases are quite dierent in spirit
from mine, and motivate a dierent kind of theory from Heim’s. Since
I want a semantics that handles both kinds of cases (and, as we’ll see in
§III, combinations of them), it’s instructive to consider his examples and
5Heim actually casts her proposal in the framework of dynamic semantics; I’ve re-
formulated her view in a static setting, since the dynamic framework is motivated by
considerations, orthogonal to the present ones, about the projection of presuppositions in
attitude ascriptions.
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the decision-theoretic semantics he cooks up to accommodate them. I’ll
then show that his semantics doesn’t help with the in vino veritas case, and
consider ways to improve on it.
Levinson’s case against Stalnaker and Heim involves insurance. Most of
us, he observes, want to buy insurance sometimes. Even though it’s pretty
unlikely that our houses will burn down, it would be such a calamity if they
did, that many of us want to be safe rather than sorry. But this poses a
problem for Heim. For consider two worlds where my house doesn’t burn
down, but which dier as to whether I bought insurance. On the whole, do I
prefer the one where I bought insurance, or the one where I didn’t? I, for
one, prefer the world where I hold onto my cash, instead of shelling out for
an as-it-happens useless insurance policy.6 But loads of the worlds consistent
with my beliefs are worlds where my house won’t burn down irrespective of
whether I buy insurance. Therefore, I don’t meet Heim’s requirement that
all of my belief-worlds render nearby “I buy insurance" worlds better than “I
don’t buy insurance” worlds.
To figure out whether someone wants to buy a particular insurance plan,
we need information more fine-grained than anything on oer in Heim’s
semantics. Full beliefs and qualitative preferences aren’t enough; we need
to know just how likely she judges it to be that her house will burn down,
how bad it would be for her if it did, and what the plan costs. These are
quantitative, not qualitative matters.
Thankfully we have a quantitative theory of rational action at our disposal:
Levinson’s account avails itself of decision theory and its resources.7 Let’s
upgrade Heim’s less fine-grained ingredients accordingly:
• Upgrade wx , a mere preorder on worlds, to an evaluation function
6Büring (2003) defends Heim against Levinson by arguing that those who buy insurance
do prefer worlds in which they buy unused plans, because as long as they don’t know that the
plan will be useless, they primitively value the peace of mind that insurance brings in such
worlds. This is, of course, a formal possibility; but Büring then owes us a new substantive
account of preference, and I have trouble seeing how it could account for all insurance-style
cases. There are gamblers and actuaries who make claim to make bets dispassionately, in
the sense that they are perfectly psychologically at ease gambling and losing so long as
the gamble was rational given their utilities and credences. That is, they explicitly claim
not to primitively value peace of mind. It’s hard to see how Büring could account for such
cases, whatever substantive account of preference he gives. See Lassiter (2011) for further
arguments in favor of a more fine-grained probabilistic framework.
7His account follows Goble (1996)’s decision-theoretic theory of deontic modals.
100
Two Ways to Want?
gwx : W → R, defined such that gwx (w1) ≥ gwx (w2) just in case agent x in
w (weakly) prefers w1 to w2.
• Upgrade the state of information, previously identified with the set
of worlds Bwx , to what Yalcin (2012c) calls a sharp information state
iwx = 〈Swx ,Prwx 〉:8
◦ Swx ⊆W is the set of live epistemic possibilities for x in w;
◦ Prwx : A probability function on W such that Prwx (Swx ) = 1.
• Shorthand: Prwx (w′ | [ϕ]): x’s credence in w that w′ is the actual world
conditional on [ϕ] = {w : JϕKw = 1}.
Levinson proposes a semantics which says that you want ϕ just in case,
relative to your credences and utilities, ϕ yields higher expected utility than
¬ϕ.9 Formally,
Jx wants ϕKw = 1 i EUx,w(ϕ) > EUx,w(¬ϕ)
i
∑
w′∈Swx
gwx (w′)Prwx (w′ | [ϕ])
>
∑
w′∈Swx
gwx (w′)Prwx (w′ | [¬ϕ]).
Levinson sketches an explicit model of the insurance case, and shows how
his semantics predicts that ‘you want to buy insurance’ is true relative to it.
Intuitively, while my full beliefs don’t rule out that I’m in a situation where I
shell out money for an as-it-happens useless plan, my quantitative preferences
render an uninsured fire-ravaged house to be so calamitous an eventuality that,
even though I judge it to be pretty unlikely, the calamitousness overwhelms
the slim odds, making it worth shelling out a relatively small amount of
money.
8Stipulate for simplicity that the set W of worlds is finite.
9This is a slight simplification of Levinson’s ocial view. He actually defines ‘wants’
relative to evaluation functions g , in order to handle cases of active ambivalence between
outcomes resulting in seemingly contradictory desire attributions. (E.g. “I want the wine
[it will taste great], but I also don’t want it [it will cause a hangover].") This is a dierent
problem from the kind I’m interested in—in the in vino veritas case, what’s going on isn’t
that you change how you feel about total outcomes, but rather that, given your fixed total
preferences, dierent information states yield dierent results about what you want.
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Thus Levinson predicts what Heim fails to predict—that I can want p
even if not all of my belief worlds are ones where I prefer nearby p worlds
to nearby not-p worlds. This is a virtue of his account. Plus, the decision-
theoretic framework easily generalizes to graded desire attributions (“I really
want beer"; “I want beer, but I want whisky way more"), whereas it’s hard to
see how Heim would have the tools for this.10
Does Levinson’s semantics help with in vino veritas? Again, a quantitative
model and derivation of truth conditions relative to a true-to-case model
is sketched in the appendix. However, it’s again easy to see intuitively
why Levinson’s semantics won’t help. Just as my full beliefs and qualitative
preferences don’t change depending on my interlocutors’ information, neither
do my credences and utilities. Relative to them, I expect to be no better o
buying the Zinfandel than buying the Sauvignon Blanc. Indeed, even if my
credences and utilities rendered buying the Sauvignon Blanc the preferred
action, the store adviser, having better information, can still felicitously
correct my desire report. After he does this, I should retract any assertions
to the eect that I wanted the Sauvignon Blanc. So Levinson, while improving
on one aspect of Heim’s proposal, does not solve our problem about advisory
desire reports.11
5.2 ‘Wants’ in the consequent of conditionals
The above shows that some true sentences involving ‘wants’ in certain
contexts come out false on the theories oered by Heim and Levinson. In
this section I’ll show that their theories also fail to predict certain aspects
of its compositional behavior. Back to the wine. Consider the following
conditionals, said by you of me in the in vino veritas case:
(11) If his comrades prefer the Zinfandel, he wants the Zinfandel.
(12) If his comrades prefer the Sauvignon Blanc, he wants the Sauvignon
Blanc.
10See Lassiter (2011) for a probabilistic account of modality that incorporates scales,
familiar from the literature on gradable adjectives, to account for these data.
11Other proposals for the semantics of ‘wants’ exist: for example, those of von Fintel
(1999), van Rooij (1999), Villalta (2000), Lassiter (2011), and Condoravdi and Lauer (2016).
The dier in details, but all of them are fundamentally engineered to take the subject’s
doxastic state as the information relative to which the desire attribution is assessed.
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These are both not only true, they are extremely true, in that they’re among
the most natural ways to describe the state of mind I’m in when I’m standing
there dumbfounded in the store. Note here again the contrast with belief.
(13) is extremely false:
(13) If his comrades prefer the Zinfandel, he believes that the Zinfandel
is the wine to get.
You can use (11) and (12) to describe my conditional preferences, but (13)
cannot be used to describe my conditional beliefs. (13) means that my beliefs
are sensitive to my comrades’ preferences, which, as a feature of the in vino
veritas case, they are not. Granted, if I use a version of (13) first-personally,
it doesn’t sound too bad: “If my comrades prefer the Zinfandel, I think that’s
the wine to get."
But third personally it clearly doesn’t work. To see this, consider a more
knowledgable third party engaging in a bit of reasoning about what you
want/believe. He would do ill to reason:
If his comrades prefer the Zinfandel, he believes that the Zinfandel is the wine to get.
His comrades prefer the Zinfandel.
He believes that the Zinfandel is the wine to get.
My comrades do prefer the Zinfandel, but I don’t believe that the Zinfandel
is the wine to get. The most plausible diagnosis of why this is bad reasoning
is that the major premise is false; my beliefs aren’t sensitive to my comrades’
preferences, as it requires. However, given the availability of the advisory
‘wants’, he would do well to reason:
If his comrades prefer the Zinfandel, he wants the Zinfandel.
His comrades prefer the Zinfandel.
He wants the Zinfandel.
Indeed, this is exactly the kind of reasoning you’d engage in if wondering
which bottle you should hand me.
This suggests that the maybe-vaguely-true-ish first-personal version of
(13) is interpreted with the “thinks” taking wide scope over the conditional.
This response is not available for (11) and (12), however. It would have it
that sentences superficially of the form
ϕ→ x wants ψ
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are to be interpreted as
x wants (ϕ→ ψ).
This approach has several shortcomings, of which I’ll mention two. First,
it doesn’t validate the intuitively valid reasoning above, which results in your
concluding that I want (in the advisory sense) the Zinfandel, as an instance
of modus ponens. Perhaps the semantics of ‘wants’ could be fiddled with in
such a way as to make {p, x wants (p → q)} entail px wants qq, but this also
wouldn’t be valid on Heim’s or Levinson’s semantics without modification.
Since we’ll need to modify the semantics anyway to make sense of the truth
of these conditionals and the ability to reason with them using modus ponens,
we might as well not butcher the surface grammar.
Second, the strategy crashes when the consequents are truth-functionally
complex. Consider:
(14) If his comrades prefer the Zinfandel, then he wants to buy the
Zinfandel, and (/but) they are snobs.
It’s not clear how a defender of wide-scoping could interpret mixed condi-
tionals like this. You might try:
me wants (pz → (bz ∧ snobs))
But this would be false—not wanting snobs for friends, but taking it to be
quite possible that they prefer the Zinfandel, I certainly don’t want it to be
the case that, if my friends prefer the Zinfandel, they are snobs.12 The best
and simplest explanation here is that (11) and (12) are true, and have the
logical form they seem to have.
Here’s why Heim’s and Levinson’s accounts do not yield (11) and (12).
I’ll give a working semantics for the indicative conditional and show that
(11) and (12) don’t come out true in a moment. But first an informal
gloss: A conditional is true in a context when, suppositionally adding the
antecedent to the stock of information at that context, the consequent comes
12Something like this argument is present in Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) for con-
ditionals involving ‘ought’, and it traces back to Thomason (1981). The same mixed
conditional would tell against an attempt to treat ‘wants’ as a primitive dyadic operator, of
the form px wants (ϕ | ψ)q. In general, the dialectic here mirrors the dialectic involving the
interaction between deontic modals and conditionals. This, I argue in §V, is no accident,
but illustrates deep structural similarities between ‘wants’ and ‘ought’.
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out true under that hypothesis. So add to the common information in a
case like in vino veritas that my comrades prefer the Zinfandel. Is it true
that I want the Zinfandel, according to Heim or Levinson? No—adding that
information doesn’t instruct us to change anything about my credences/beliefs
or preferences/utilities. What I believe and prefer just depends on the world,
not on the state of information in the common ground. So roughly speaking,
the consequent will have the same truth conditions in the updated information
state as in the non-updated one, and we’ve already seen that it’s false with
respect to those truth conditions in cases like in vino veritas.
Formally, I’ll adopt a working semantics for → as a kind of epistemic
modal.13 On this view, a conditional functions as a test on the stock of infor-
mation mutually presupposed in the conversational context: it tests whether
adding the antecedent to that stock ensures that the consequent is true. In-
dicative conditionals are assessed relative to worlds and bodies of information
i. Some definitions will be helpful. Shorthand: [ϕ]i = {w | JϕKw,i = 1}.
Denition. An information state i accepts ϕ i [ϕ]i = Si. In other words,
i ∀w ∈ Si, JϕKw,i = 1.
Denition. The information state i updated by ϕ, written i + ϕ, is 〈Si ∩
[ϕ]i,Prϕi 〉, where Prϕi (x) = Pri(x | [ϕ]i).
The semantics for the indicative conditional→ is then:
Jϕ→ ψKw,i = 1 i i + ϕ accepts ψ.
It’s a straightforward matter to verify (see appendix) that (11) and (12) both
come out false on Levinson’s semantics, combined with this conditional.
What kind of account might fare better? When we use conditionals like
(11) and (12), we’re describing something like my conditional preferences.
Roughly speaking, (12) describes my state of mind when, restricting my
attention to worlds in which my comrades prefer the Sauvignon Blanc, my
preferences and updated credences judge I-buy-the-Sauvignon Blanc worlds to
be better. To predict these truth conditions, we’ll need the semantic value for
‘wants’ to be sensitive to the state of information that indicative conditionals
operate on. That way, the antecedents of conditionals can modify the
information parameter in the semantic entry for ‘wants’ in the right way.
13This kind of view is developed and defended in Yalcin (2007), Kolodny and MacFarlane
(2010), and MacFarlane (2014).
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This suggests that ‘wants’ belongs to the class of informational modals
like epistemic might/must, deontic ought/may, and probability operators.14
Indeed, I argue in §V, it functions as a systematic precisification of ‘ought’.
I’ll sketch two dierent proposals. The first posits a lexical ambiguity:
a predictive entry governed by a semantics like Levinson’s, and a “perfect
information" entry which relativizes the information parameter to the state
of perfect information at a world. I’ll sketch some reasons for dissatisfaction
with this bifurcation response, and then propose the semantics I’ll ultimately
endorse, according to which desire attributions express information neutral
propositions.
5.3 Overreaction: perfect information
A natural reaction here would be twofold. First, since ‘wants’ does seem
to have a sense, namely the predictive sense, more or less consonant with
Levinson’s semantics, one might posit a lexical ambiguity and use Levinson’s
semantics for ‘wantspred ’. Second, one would add a new semantic entry for the
advisory sense, ‘wantsadvise’. This semantics would have it that we wantadvise
whatever our preferences judge to be better, not according to the state of
information which characterizes our incomplete and possibly defective beliefs,
but rather according to the state of perfect information. We really want what
will actually put us into preferred worlds, in light of all facts known and
unknown. That would suggest something like the following:
Jx wantsadvise ϕKw = 1 i Minw(ϕ) wx Minw(¬ϕ).
This semantics can predict the data of in vino veritas: relative to the actual
world, nearby “I buy the Zinfandel" worlds are better according to me
than nearby “I buy the Sauvignon Blanc" worlds. It can also predict the
conditionals we’ve been interested in. Start out with a state of information
that doesn’t settle which wine my comrades prefer, and then update it with
“my comrades prefer the Sauvignon Blanc." Relative to the worlds in this
updated state, nearby worlds in which I buy the Sauvignon Blanc are better
than those in which I buy the Zinfandel. So as far as the considerations on
the table so far are concerned, bifurcation has everything going for it.
14Although see von Fintel (2012) for a defense of more classical approaches to these
phenomena.
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However, this response is an overreaction that we should reject for two
reasons. First, it would make the advisory sense extremely dicult justifiably
to use. Second, it can’t account for true advisory uses in situations of
known uncertainty—essentially, when Levinson-style insurance cases involve
advisory aspects due to disagreement about the likelihoods of the relevant
outcomes.
The first problem is simply that perfect information isn’t easy to come
by. To confidently assert that I want ϕ in the advisory sense, the perfect
information semantics has it that you have to be fairly confident that, taking
absolutely every consequence of my action throughout all time into account,
I’ll be better o by my own lights if ϕ than if ¬ϕ. That’s quite a claim. Sure,
you know that my comrades prefer the Zinfandel. But maybe but they are
in such good spirits today that if I buy the Zinfandel, the party will be too
rambunctious and we will all miss work tomorrow. Then I’d wantadvise not to
buy the Zinfandel. But maybe in addition to this all of our bosses will have
taken the day o, and missing the day will have no immediate consequences.
Then I’d wantadvise the Zinfandel after all. But maybe, in addition to all of
this, missing one day without consequence will instill in us a cavalier attitude
towards punctuality, causing problems in our personal and professional lives.
In this case, I don’t wantadvise the Zinfandel. And so on.
It might be claimed that this isn’t so bad, since usually I can be reasonably
confident, if never totally certain, that only relatively normal consequences
will ensue from my comrades’ enjoying a nice bottle of wine. So maybe we
can never know for sure the truth of an advisory desire attribution, but we
can often be justified in asserting them, and they can often turn out true.
But (the second problem) this simply gets the wrong result when I respon-
sibly use the advisory ‘wants’ in cases where I don’t have perfect information,
and I’m perfectly aware that my advice probably conflicts with that of those
with perfect information. Take a modified version of a Levinston-style insur-
ance case:
Insurance-Arsonists: You just declined to buy an insurance
plan, because according to your credences and utilities, it was
just barely too expensive to be worth it. However, I, unlike you,
happen to know that a gang of arsonists has just moved to town.
Thus the probability of your house burning down is much higher
than you think it is—enough to tip the scales back in favor of
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your buying the plan. You’ve just finished telling the insurance
salesman that you don’t want the plan.
I speak truly when I say to you (in a whisper, naturally, so as not to tip o
the lingering insurance salesman that his plan is probably mispriced):
(15) “No, that’s wrong—you actually do want to buy this plan. I’ll explain
why later."
Now, as it happens, the gang of arsonists spares your house. So your house
doesn’t burn down, and you lose the money you spent on the plan. And,
remember, you prefer no-housefire worlds in which you didn’t shell out for
the plan to ones where you did. Thus if wantsadvise is relativised to perfect
information, I speak falsely in (15). This seems wrong. (15) seems like true
and excellent advice, at least when I make it.
It’s open to maintain that (15) is false, but to explain its seeming like good
advice by holding that I was justified in asserting it. But it’s hard to see why
I would be justified in asserting it, if ‘wantsadvise’ has these truth conditions.
After all, when I assert (15), I know that it’s still more probable than not
that your house won’t burn down, marauding arsonists notwithstanding.
The arsonists aren’t that ecient. Thus if the semantics of ‘wants’ in (15)
were given by perfect information, I should think that (15) is very probably
false when I assert it. So it’s very dicult to see how I could nonetheless be
justified in doing so.
The Insurance-Arsonists case suggests two things—one about the source
of the information states that factor into the semantic values of advisory
desire reports, the other about their structure. First, it suggests that the
source of these information states isn’t something that we can simply read
o of the world of utterance. When advising people about what they really
want, we aren’t committing ourselves to something that only omniscient
beings could know—that, taking account of absolutely every downstream
consequence, you’ll prefer the worlds that will/would result if the ascribed
desire comes/came out true, compared to those in which it comes/came out
false. The source of this information is more modest, and plausibly depends
on context in some way.
Second, this case suggests that, whatever the source of these information
states, their structure must be more fine-grained than that of Heim’s seman-
tics: they must represent some notion of likelihood, combined with a more
fine-grained representation of preference. In the Insurance-Arsonists case,
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the metaphysically most similar worlds to ours in which you buy insurance
are still worlds where your house does not burn. This is so even relative
to the worlds doxastically accessible to me, the advisor. My information
diers from yours not in terms of brute doxastic possibilities vis-a-vis house-
burning: both of our doxastic possibilities include some housefire worlds
and some no-housefire worlds, regardless of whether insurance is bought. In
neither case will a semantics based on Heim’s predict, even relative to the
advisor’s information, that you want to buy insurance. But this is wrong; my
probabilistic information can make a dierence to the truth value of a desire
report. Thus whatever more flexible information base we relativize desire
attributions to, that information base must include some representation of
likelihood.15
One final reason to think that probabilistic structure is unavoidable, even
on a more flexible account of the information source: desire ascriptions
interact in non-trivial ways with probability operators in the antecedents of
conditionals. Say that your roommate Ahmed, caring about your well-being
and contemplating the possibility of rain, is advising you about whether to
take an umbrella. There are two umbrellas in the house: a large and very
eective one, and a small and moderately eective one. Your roommate is
concerned about your not getting wet, but also about your not traipsing
around unnecessary weight. We might communicate his desires concerning
which umbrella you should take as follows:
(16) If it’s probably not going to rain, Ahmed wants you not to take any
umbrella.
(17) If it’s probably going to rain, Ahmed wants you to take the small
umbrella.
(18) If it’s going to rain, Ahmed wants you to take the big umbrella.
15See Lassiter (2011) for further motivations for decision-theoretic semantics for a variety
of modals. I do have some reservations about the standard EU approach here. For one thing
it builds a huge amount of probabilistic and preferential coherence into the very meaning of
desire reports in a way that seems implausible; see Buchak (2013) for discussion. What I take
Insurance-Arsonists to show is that information states, even for advisory uses, must include
some representation of likelihood. I’ve chosen the EU framework of Levinson because it’s
by far the most well-known account. There are less committal alternatives: see Holliday
and Icard (2013) and Holliday, Icard, and Harrison-Trainor (2017). It’s plausible that a
more permissive theory would be more realistic, but delving into that more complicated
machinery would unnecessarily cloud matters here.
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Conditionals like these are easy to account for if the information states
relative to which advisory desires are assessed have probabilistic structure.
On a framework like Heim’s, it’s hard to see how such an account would go,
since she only has qualitative doxastic possibilities in her toolbox.
5.4 Information-neutral desires
What, then, is the source of the information states that factor into the
semantics of desire reports? It is not necessarily the desirer’s: advisers can
help themselves to information beyond that of the attributee herself. But it
is not, as Socrates seems to have claimed, the omniscient information state.
The information states that license even advisory desire attributions should
still be human-sized, so to speak, and sensitive to probabilities and utilities
in the way suggested by the Insurance-Arsonists case.
One could develop a contextualist semantics that indexes the information
state to the attributer ’s information, but this is unpromising, for it wouldn’t
explain the genuine disagreement we seem to be in when we disagree about
what someone really wants. If the proposition I express when I use the
advisory ‘wants’ is indexed specifically to my information, and yours is
specifically indexed to yours, then we simply talk past each other when we
disagree. On the contextualist account, if you and a third party disagreed
about which wine my comrades preferred, we should be happy to have the
following exchange:
You: “He wants the Zinfandel."
Third party: “Well, yes, I agree, but he doesn’t want the Zinfan-
del."
That should sound just as good as a long distance phone conversation
running:
You: “It’s raining here."
Third party: “Well, yes, I agree, but it’s not raining here."
But it doesn’t sound just as good. We’re not talking past each other; we have
genuinely incompatible views about what the agent really wants, not com-
patible views about what would put the agent in preferred states according
to our respective information.
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This dialectic is reminiscent of debates on epistemic and deontic modals.
The most promising options for such information-sensitive vocabulary are
some sort of flexible/group contextualism (Dowell (2011) and Dowell (2013)),
expressivism (Yalcin (2012b)) and relativism (Kolodny and MacFarlane
(2010)). For the sake of predictive concreteness, I’ll sketch a relativistic
version here, but my semantics can be easily adapted to expressivist or
flexible contextualist background theories.
My proposal has two features. First, I’ll model probabilistic informational
common grounds with blunt probabilistic information states. Second, I intro-
duce what I call ‘mixed’ expected utility functions EU igwx , where the utilities
come from one source (the agent x in world w), and the probabilities come
from another (the blunt information states I representing the probabilistic
common ground of the conversation). I’ll explain these elements in turn.
The blunt information states relative to which semantic values of formulas
are assigned are:16
Denition. A blunt information state I is a set of sharp information
states i = 〈Si,Pri〉, such that they agree on all the coarse-grained possibilities:
∀i1, i2 ∈ I , S1 = S2. (So it makes sense to speak of SI .)
My proposal says that you want what yields highest expected utility accord-
ing to your utilities, combined not with your credences, but instead with
the probabilities of the information state in the common ground. First, a
definition:
Denition. The mixed expected utility of ϕ, EU ig (ϕ), relative to a utility
function g and sharp information state i = 〈Si,Pri〉, is the expected utility of
ϕ derived from the probability function of i and the utility function g :
EU ig (ϕ) :=
∑
w′∈Si
g(w′)Pri(w′ | [ϕ]i)
My semantics uses these mixed functions. It goes:
16As Yalcin (2012c) shows, these kinds of states are in a much better position to represent
probabilistic common grounds than sharp ones. They, unlike sharp states, can mark a
dierence between failing to render ϕ likely and positively rendering ¬ϕ likely; for lots of
propositions, our common information state doesn’t say anything about their probabilities.
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Jx wants ϕKw,I = 1 i ∀i ∈ I ,EU igwx (ϕ) > EU igwx (¬ϕ).
I will ultimately endorse this semantic entry, together with a relativistic
postsemantics running as follows:17
An utterance of the form px wants ϕq is true as used at c1 and
assessed from c2 if and only if Jx wants ϕKwc1 ,Ic2 = 1.
This relativistic package, I’ll argue, can predict the problematic data, and isn’t
saddled with the undesirable baggage of the bifurcation, perfect information
response. I won’t explain the entire relativistic semantic apparatus from the
ground up—for that, see Bledin and MacFarlane. Instead, I’ll walk through
the predictions that this package uniquely makes. These predictions, I’ll
argue, are supported by the data, providing confirmation for this kind of
approach.
5.4.1 Relativistic veritas in vino
According to this theory, desire attributions require two contexts to be
assessed true or false: the context of use, and the context of assessment. So
to judge the theory, we have to give a bit more information about who is
asserting (1), and who is assessing it, in what kind of context.
Say that, in a context where I falsely believe that my comrades prefer the
Sauvignon Blanc, I say to myself:
(19) I want the Sauvignon Blanc.
This is true as used and assessed relative to c1, the context in which I utter
it. This explains why I am justified in doing so. Now suppose that, later on
in the shopping trip, you, having overheard (19), say:
(20) What you said before [in (19)] is actually wrong—you don’t want
the Sauvignon Blanc, you want the Zinfandel. That’s the one your
comrades prefer.
The relativistic semantics judges that, in this new context c2, you are right;
you’ve changed the context to include the information that my comrades
17See Bledin (2014) and especially MacFarlane (2014) for a general explanation of this
relativistic framework.
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prefer the Zinfandel. That means that (19), as used at c1 and assessed at
c2, is false; relative to this better information, I want the Zinfandel, not the
Sauvignon Blanc. Thus this package predicts that I’m obligated to retract
(19), once I learn that my comrades prefer the Zinfandel. This is the correct
result; the data of in vino veritas illustrate that it sounds very weird for me to
stand by assertions like (19), once I acquire information relative to which
my preferences render the opposite result. But it also predicts why it made
sense for me to assert (19); assessed relative to the context of assertion, what
I said was true.
It also yields, as the perfect-information semantics does not, the right
results in the modified insurance case. When I learn about the marauding
arsonists, my credence that nearby houses will burn rises. So when I whisper
to you that you’re wrong about wanting to decline the plan, I speak truly,
relative to your context of utterance and my context of assessment. While
your credences render the plan too expensive to be worth it, your utilities
mixed with my, the assessor’s, credences render the plan worth the money
after all. I’m not asserting, falsely, that you will be better o buying the plan.
I’m saying that it’s the best option, relative to your utilities and what I know
to be better information. That’s why I give excellent advice when I tell you
that you really want to buy the plan. Of course, if an even better-informed
third party came along who knew that the arsonists planned to spare your
house, then I should retract my assertion to the eect that you want the plan,
and you should retract your retraction. This all jives extremely well with the
information-neutral semantics, and isn’t possible on the perfect information
view.
5.4.2 Conditionals
Let’s look at how the relativistic framework deals with the conditionals that
were problematic for Heim and Levinson. Remember the conditionals:
(11) If his comrades prefer the Zinfandel, he wants the Zinfandel.
(12) If his comrades prefer the Sauvignon Blanc, he wants the Sauvignon
Blanc.
The semantics for the indicative conditional carries over exactly from before,
modified in a supervaluationist spirit to accommodate blunt probabilistic
information states:
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Denition. A blunt information state I accepts ϕ i ∀i ∈ I , i accepts ϕ.
Denition. The blunt information state I updated by ϕ, written I + ϕ, is
{〈Si ∩ [ϕ]I ,Prϕi 〉 | i ∈ I }, where Prϕi (x) = Pri(x | [ϕ]I ).
The semantics for the indicative conditional→ is basically unchanged:
Jϕ→ ψKw,I = 1 i I + ϕ accepts ψ.
The kind of information states where (11) and (12) are paradigmatically
asserted are ones which include open worlds where my comrades prefer
the Zinfandel, and open worlds where my comrades prefer the Sauvignon
Blanc. I provide in the appendix a particular such information state, and
show that the conditionals come out true. But again, intuitively, it’s not
hard to see what’s going on. The antecedent of an indicative conditional
like (11) restricts our attention to worlds in which my comrades prefer the
Zinfandel, and asks what my expected utilities are, relative to information
states including only those worlds, between my buying the Zinfandel and my
buying the Sauvignon Blanc. Relative to these information states, my utilities
render buying the Zinfandel the better option. So the indicative conditional
is true relative to the original information state. Mutatis mutandis for (12).18
So, this relativistic semantics can predict the assertability/retraction data
of the in vino veritas case. We’ve also seen that it, together with a plausible
semantics for the indicative conditional, can predict conditionals like (11)
and (12) in the contexts in which they seem true. Thus this relativistic theory
has two predictive marks in its favor over previous ones, without falling prey
to the inadequacies of the perfect information, bifurcation response.
18See the end of Appendix C for a consequence relation tracking information preservation
on which modus ponens comes out valid. Interestingly modus tollens fails, and this is
a good thing: In a context where we’re ignorant about which wine my comrades desire,
the following can plausibly all be true: A. If my comrades prefer the Zinfandel, I want
the Zinfandel. B. It’s not the case that I want the Zinfandel. C. My comrades prefer the
Zinfandel. The situation is similar to that of Yalcin (2012a): the conditional is true in virtue
of what would happen to the state of information after updating by the antecedent of the
conditional; the desire attribution is false because relative to the original, more ignorant
state of information, the Zinfandel and the Sauvignon Blanc yield equal expected utility;
and the statement of my comrades’ actual preferences is just a plain fact about the world.
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5.5 ‘Wants’ and ‘Ought’
On the view I’ve oered, desire attributions function not only to predict what
agents will do, but also to advise them about what courses of action they
should undertake, if they want to realize their aims. To assert that someone
wants ϕ is to communicate that, relative to her preferences and the best
information available, she’ll be better o by her own lights bringing about ϕ
rather than ¬ϕ. That’s not far from what we sometimes communicate with
‘ought’. Telling an agent what she really wants is basically a way of telling
her what she ought to do, given her basic aims, but our information about
how to achieve those aims.
This similarity is unsurprising, for ‘wants’ and ‘ought’ pattern similarly.
Just a few examples:
• Ross’ puzzle:
– x wants ϕ 2 x wants (ϕ ∨ ψ);
– x ought to ϕ 2 x ought to (ϕ ∨ ψ).19
• Puzzling assertion/retraction data:
– Both px wants ϕq and px ought to ϕq sound fine to assert if, rela-
tive to the common information at the context of assertion, x can
expect to be better o by her own lights supposing ϕ than suppos-
ing ¬ϕ; but such assertions must be retracted if new information
comes to light under which the opposite holds.
• Puzzling interaction with conditionals:
– Both pϕ→ x wants ψq and pϕ→ x ought to ψq can be used to
express conditional obligations/desires, motivating views of the
indicative conditional as a kind of modal restrictor.20
On my view, ‘wants’ is a precisification of ‘ought’—one which clarifies the
kind of advice that is being given to agents. ‘Ought’ has notoriously many
senses. If I claim that you ought to ϕ, I could be trying to communicate
19Ross’ puzzle is solved on the decision-theoretic semantics. A state of information and
utility function could give ϕ higher expected utility than ¬ϕ, while failing to give higher
expected utility to ϕ ∨ ψ than ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ).
20See Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010), Yalcin (2012a), and Bledin (2014).
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one of at least three things. I could be communicating that the better
thing for you to bring about, given your subjective preferences and your
subjective information, is ϕ rather than ¬ϕ. (“Oh well—even though your
gamble didn’t pay o and the prize you would have won is horribly ugly,
you did what you ought to have done.") Or I could be communicating that,
relative to your preferences, but my information, your basic ends are more
likely to be achieved by bringing about ϕ rather than bringing about ¬ϕ.
(“Stop, you ought not buy the Sauvignon Blanc! Even though I hate it and
think that everyone who prefers it is a snob, your comrades will be much
happier with the Zinfandel, and that’s what you care about.") Or I could be
communicating my disagreement with your ends themselves, represented by
your preferences on worlds. (“You ought to buy the Sauvignon Blanc, even
though your comrades hate it! Your comrades are snobs.") My theory of
desire attributions predicts that only the first two of these three meanings is
available for ‘wants’.21
This prediction is supported by data about how ‘wants’ and ‘ought’ embed
dierently under other attitude verbs. I’ll focus here on ‘thinks’. Consider
Fred, a fellow dining comrade in the in vino veritas case. Fred knows that my
comrades prefer the Zinfandel. He alone prefers the Sauvignon Blanc, and
furthermore he is a solipsistic hedonist; he thinks that only his preferences
should be taken into account when people are deciding what to do. My basic
preference is to please as many of my comrades as possible, without any
special provision for Fred. What does Fred think about all of this? I could
describe Fred’s attitudes as follows:
(21) Fred thinks that, although I think I want to buy the Sauvignon Blanc,
I actually want to buy the Zinfandel.
After all, he knows my preference is to please the majority of my comrades,
and he knows that my comrades prefer it. However, it doesn’t seem right to
say:
(22) ?Fred thinks that, although I think I ought to buy the Sauvignon
21Schroeder (2011) also contrasts ‘wants’ with ‘ought’, but the dierences he highlights
are orthogonal to those that I’m interested in. He points out that ‘wants’ functions as a
control verb, while ‘ought’ is ambiguous between a control verb (which builds in an agent,
as in “John ought to ski") and a raising verb (which operates solely on propositions, as in,
“it ought to be the case that John skis"). The dierences I highlight arise as a distinction
between ‘wants’ and the control verb sense of ‘ought’.
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Blanc, I actually ought to buy the Zinfandel.
If Fred thinks that I ought to buy the Zinfandel, then Fred himself prefers that
I buy the Zinfandel. But Fred doesn’t prefer this; he’s a solipsistic hedonist,
and only cares about getting his treasured Sauvignon Blanc. He thinks I
ought to buy the Sauvignon Blanc, even though what I really want is to buy
the Zinfandel, even though what I think I want is to buy the Sauvignon Blanc.
That suggests that the point of having an advisory ‘wants’ is to have a
linguistic device that behaves like ‘ought’ with respect to information, but
which rigidly fixes the agent whose preferences we’re evaluating the relevant
possibilities with respect to. A claim using ‘ought’ leaves undetermined
whether I’m adding to the common ground my own information, or my own
preferences, or both; a claim involving the advisory ‘wants’ clarifies that I’m
only concerned with the information component. Thus the advisory ‘wants’
clarifies the kind of advice I’m giving the agent. Whereas ‘ought’ can give
moral advice about how the agents’ preferences should ideally go, ‘wants’
can only give pragmatic advice about how agents can best achieve their
given aims.
5.6 Whither the predictive ‘wants’?
I haven’t said much about the predictive sense of ‘wants’, the only sense
hitherto accounted for in the literature. What’s the relation between predictive
uses and advisory uses?
The first thing to point out is that my modification to Levinson’s semantics
is, in many ways, pretty conservative. Usually—not always, but usually—
agents are aware of what consequences various actions are likely to bring
about. In a large number of central cases, the attributee of a desire attribution
is in more or less the same state of information as the attributers. Thus
predictive and advisory uses can be expected to coincide in tons of cases.
I attribute to you a desire to have one of the beers in the fridge; rarely
do I have unique access to evidence that the beer is poisoned, or that the
refrigerator is full of malevolent hobgoblins whom it would be better to leave
undisturbed. This explains in large part why the advisory uses illustrated
by cases like in vino veritas have gone unnoticed until now. Stalnaker, Heim,
and Levinson focused on cases where there’s no interesting asymmetry in
information regarding the likely consequences of the desire’s content.
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Nonetheless, in cases where there is such an asymmetry, advisory and
predictive uses come apart. So we need to tell some story about the also
fine-sounding but incompatible predictive uses. I oer two possibilities, one
more radical than the other. The non-radical proposal posits ambiguity;
the more radical proposal attempts to account for predictive uses with only
the advisory semantic entry, together with general principles concerning
assertion. Ultimately, I suggest, the choice between them comes down to
empirical questions about the cross-linguistic robustness of advisory uses.
5.6.1 Lexical ambiguity
The ambiguity view is exactly what it sounds like, and doesn’t need much
explanation. According to it, we simply have two semantic entries for ‘wants’:
one where both the preferences and the information are hardwired to those
of the desirer (Levinson’s semantics), and one where the preferences are
rigidly indexed to the desirer but the information state is variable. We use
one ‘wants’ to predict what agents will do (in this sense I don’t want the
Zinfandel) and one to advise them about how to best satisfy their preferences
(in this sense I do want the Zinfandel), given the information that’s live in
the relevant context. This is the view I’d fall back on, if the non-ambiguity
view sketched below proves unworkable.
5.6.2 Non-ambiguity
The ambiguity view posits two semantic entries. It seems, at first glance,
unavoidable to say something like this. After all, aren’t (1) and (4) both
true, in dierent senses, in the in vino veritas case, when both uttered and
assessed in the same contexts?
Maybe not. It’s possible to explain predictive uses, where they dier
from advisory ones, with a single advisory entry together with general
principles allowing us sometimes to take up the agent’s perspective in making
assertions. It’s not so uncommon an idea that, when we’re engaged in the
project of explaining and predicting the behavior of agents, we sometimes
utter sentences we know to be false, by way of describing the world as it
looks from the agent’s perspective.22 Some examples:
22See Schlenker (2004) for background.
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• (One police detective to the other, having previously taken the treasure
out of the thief’s hiding spot): A: “Why is the thief furiously digging
there?" B: “He knows that the treasure is buried there."
• (In a context where we all know that Achilles hasn’t defected to Athens):
A: “Why haven’t the Trojans invaded Athens yet?" B: “Achilles might
have defected to Athens.”
• (Said among fellow infidels:) A: “Why is that guy reciting the Athene-
sian Creed every morning?" B: “If he doesn’t, God will smite him."
In none of these cases do we want to use the explanatoriness of the explanans
as evidence for fiddling with the semantic entries of their components. In
the first case that would give us non-factive knowledge; in the second, a
semantics of “might” on which “might p" is compatible with “not p"; in
the last, a theory on which it’s fine for atheists to say that God exists and
occasionally smites people.
In cases like these, I can successfully explain why someone did something,
or predict that they are about to do something, by uttering sentences which
I know to be false in my context. I know that it’s not true that thief knows
that the treasure is buried there. I utter that sentence by way of describing
what the thief takes the world to be like, not what the world is actually like.
Same with the other two cases: I know that it’s not true that Achilles might
have defected, because I know that he didn’t defect; but I say that anyway,
sketching the world as the Trojans conceive of it, to explain why they’re not
sending their legions. And describing the world according to the God-fearing
man, as if it were actual, can explain why he’s muttering the Athenesian
Creed each morning.
The non-ambiguity view of the predictive ‘wants’ holds that the same
phenomenon occurs when we use ‘wants’ to predict and explain agents’
actions, in cases where we know that performing that action won’t likely
satisfy the agent’s preferences. In in vino veritas, not only is there a reading
on which (1) is true and (4) is false; that’s the only reading that is literally
true. There’s no sense at all in which I want the Sauvignon Blanc, even
if I’m doing everything in my power to buy it, because it’s not what will
actually satisfy my preferences relative to the information available to those
asserting (1). But they can still talk as if I wanted it when they are predicting
what I will leave the store with, because I take myself to want it. Thus the
fine-sounding explanation:
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• (Conversation between you and a bystander who also knows that my
comrades prefer the Zinfandel): Bystander: “Why is that guy reaching
up to that high shelf?" You: “Because that’s where the Sauvignon Blanc
is, and he wants the Sauvignon Blanc."
On the non-ambiguity view, you just explained my action using a sentence
you know to be false in your context. There’s not a dierent entry for ‘wants’
that tracks what agents believe will satisfy their preferences; instead, there’s
a dierent kind of speech act that licenses unembedded quasi-assertions of
false sentences, the believing of which makes sense of an agent’s behavior.
Is this plausible? To assess this, we’d need a good theory of this general
phenomenon against which to measure the data we find for ‘wants’. Here
are two relatively flat-footed considerations in its favor. First, it avoids lexical
ambiguity, which is always nice when possible. Second, the predictive ‘wants’
patterns in some key ways like the other dialogues above. One feature
paradigmatic of such explanations is that you can coherently continue the
dialogue by asserting the negation of the just-seemingly-asserted explanans.
In the treasure case, you can coherently continue: “Of course, the thief
doesn’t really know that the treasure is buried there, because it’s in our police
car." In the Achilles case, you can coherently continue, “Of course, it’s not
really the case that Achilles might have defected; we all know he didn’t." In
the God case: “Of course, that’s ridiculous; there’s no God, and even if there
were he wouldn’t smite you for forgetting to recite an occasional Athenesian
Creed." And—maybe—in the in vino veritas case: “Of course, he doesn’t
really want the Sauvignon Blanc, because his comrades prefer the Zinfandel.
He really wants the Zinfandel, and someone should go tell him that."
There are, however, some considerations against non-ambiguity. Pre-
dictive uses of ‘wants’ are very common, especially cross-linguistically (see
footnote 3). If it turns out that English is unique in containing advisory
uses, that would lend credence to the idea that it has some special word for
expressing it. On the other hand, if we find that other languages sometimes
contain desire reports whose relevant states of information don’t necessarily
coincide with the desirer’s, that would support a non-ambiguity theory, on
which the information state is variable at the level of the semantics. So the
choice between these two options may depend on these empirical matters.23
23Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point. Rooryck (2017) points out
that, even in English, advisory uses are very hard to hear in the first person. Ambiguity
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5.7 The purpose of desire attributions
It’s one thing to give a relativistic semantics for ‘wants’ that makes some
good predictions in cases that make trouble for other semantics. It’s another
thing to give some deeper explanation for why a natural language might
have developed such a tool. Can it really be that what I want isn’t just a
function of what the world is like, but also depends on who is attributing the
desire to me, and what information they have? I want to conclude here with
a brief pragmatic sketch of why ‘wants’ might have evolved in this way.24
What is it to attribute a desire to somebody? One clear answer is the
predictive one that I mostly haven’t been concerned with here: it’s to claim,
of that person, that they are psychologically motivated to make the content
of that desire come true. If this were the only use we had for attributing
desires, we would never utter sentences like (1) in contexts like in vino veritas.
But our desires are not all of a piece. We want some things in virtue of
wanting other things. I never just want to get on a particular train, end of
story; I want to get on that train because it’s the train going to Berlin, and
I want to go to Berlin. And I don’t just want to go to Berlin, either; I want
to go to Berlin because that’s where my friend is having her birthday party,
and I want to be there to help her lament the passing of the years. Plausibly,
these chains of explanation eventually bottom out; some things I just want,
like (maybe) pleasure, or the Good.
The fact that our desires have this kind of structure opens up space for
the possibility that you, knowing the general structure of my desires, have
access to facts that interfere with these chains of dependence, facts that I
myself don’t know. Maybe this particular train, which I think I want to get
on in order to go to Berlin, isn’t the train to Berlin, but rather the mislabeled
train to Paris. There you are, in the train station bidding me adieu, generally
aware of the structure of my desires, just having noticed that I’m about to
step on the wrong train.
In a case like this, it makes sense to have a linguistic device to commu-
nicate that my preference to go to Berlin stands a much greater chance of
theories can explain this by positing a dierence in the two semantic entries for ‘wants’.
Non-ambiguity theories can account for this too: when I assert, in the present tense, that I
want the Sauvignon Blanc, the information state parameter is saturated with my information
in that context. So the non-ambiguity theory predicts that only a predictive reading is
available in such cases.
24This kind of strategy is in the spirit of MacFarlane (2014), ch. 12).
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being satisfied if I don’t get on the train I think I want to get on. How are
you to get this across? You could say, “You ought not get on that train!",
but I might misconstrue what you mean. Maybe you’ve been insisting all
along that Berlin is a den of Sin and Debauchery, and have been arguing the
whole time that I ought not go to Berlin (even though you are fully aware
that, relative to my rather more hedonistic preferences, Sin and Debauchery
are things to seek out, not to avoid). What you need is a linguistic device to
communicate that you A) are generally aware what my preferences are, and
B) have information relative to which they’ll actually stand a better chance
of being satisfied if I do something other than what I think I want to do.
English might have developed any number of such devices, but the one that
actually developed is the advisory ‘wants’. You yell: “Stop! You don’t want
to get on that train!" and thereby accomplish exactly your communicative
aim.
It’s due to this function that ‘wants’ came to be assessment-sensitive. On
the view I’ve oered, to add a claim of the form px wants ϕq to the common
ground of a conversation is to assert that ϕ outcomes are better than ¬ϕ
outcomes, relative to x’s base preferences and our best information. Insofar
as we care about x’s preferences being satisfied, we should strive to make ϕ,
and not ¬ϕ, come true. And if we subsequently acquire more information,
information according to which x’s preferences now render ¬ϕ better than ϕ,
we’re obliged to take back our prior assertion. To stand by it is to let linger
false information about what would be good for x by her lights. That is why
it made sense for ‘wants’ to evolve to be assessment-sensitive; keeping a tally
of who wants what is a way of keeping track of what should be done, if we
want to help people realize their aims.
Appendix C
Consider the following language:
t := ni
At := pi
ϕ ::= At | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∨ ϕ) | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | (ϕ→ ϕ) | t wants ϕ
Let’s think of t as a set of names of agents, and At as a set of propositional
atoms.
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Some abbreviations for readability: let me = n1 with the intended inter-
pretation of me, let pz = p1 with the intended interpretation of ‘my friends
prefer the Zinfandel’, ps = p2 for ‘my friends prefer the Sauvignon Blanc’,
bz = p3 for ‘I buy the Zinfandel’, and bs = p4 for ‘I buy the Sauvignon Blanc’.
A base modelM for the ‘wants’-free fragment of this little language is a
pair 〈W , v〉. W is a finite, non-empty set of worlds, and v is an interpretation
function that sends every atom-world pair 〈w, p〉 to {0, 1}. Semantic values
of formulas are defined relative to models, worlds, and blunt information
states. Some definitions:
Denition. A sharp information state i relative toM is a pair 〈Si,Pri〉,
where Si ⊆W and Pri is a function A → R[0,1], for A a Boolean algebra of
subsets of W , such that Pri(Si) = 1, and for disjoint A,B ∈ A, Pri(A ∪ B) =
Pri(A) + Pri(B).
Denition. A blunt information state I is a set of sharp information states
i such that ∀i, i′ ∈ I , Si = Si′ . (Thus we speak without ambiguity of SI .)
Denition. [ϕ]I = {w ∈ SI : JϕKM,w,I = 1}.
Denition. The blunt information state I updated by ϕ, written I + ϕ, is
{〈Si ∩ [ϕ]I ,Prϕi 〉 | i ∈ I }, where Prϕi (x) = Pri(x | [ϕ]I ).25
Denition. [ϕ] = {w ∈W : ∀I , JϕKM,w,I = 1}.
Denition. A blunt state of information I accepts ϕ inM just in case, for
all w ∈ SI , JϕKM,w,I = 1. In other words, if [ϕ]I = I .
Semantic values of formulas are defined relative to models, worlds, and
blunt information states:
JpKM,w,I = 1 i v(w, p) = 1;Jϕ ∧ ψKM,w,I = 1 i JϕKM,w,I= 1 and JψKM,w,I= 1;Jϕ ∨ ψKM,w,I = 1 i JϕKM,w,I= 1 or JψKM,w,I= 1;
25I + ϕ is undefined if [ϕ]I is empty, which leads to some counterintuitive results and
some nice results. One of the counterintuitive ones is that my semantics predicts that
you can’t want what it’s absolutely informationally certain you won’t do. But I’m not so
concerned with those results here; in paradigmatic instances of the advisory use, namely
a context of advice-giving, you think it’s not impossible that your advice will be heeded.
Causal decision theory, which builds counterfactual notions into the definition of conditional
probability, could help here.
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J¬ϕKM,w,I = 1 i JϕKM,w,I= 0;Jϕ→ ψKM,w,I = 1 i I + ϕ accepts ψ.
Heim
A Heim modelM is a tuple 〈W ,Ag ,Min,,B , v〉. W is as before a finite,
non-empty set of worlds. Ag is a set of agents. v, in addition to assigning
semantic values to atoms, assigns members of Ag to agent names t. Min
assigns to each world w a selection function Minw : P(W )→ P(W ), where
Minw(A) is the subset of A most similar to w.  assigns, for each world
w and agent α, a preorder wα on worlds, representing α’s preferences on
outcomes w. B assigns, for each agent α and world w, a set Bwα of of worlds
compatible with the beliefs of α in w. As a convention, in models where wα
and/or Bwα do not depend on w, we write simply α and/or Bα, respectively.
For sets W1, W2 of worlds, W1 wα W2 := ∀w1 ∈ W1,∀w2 ∈ W2,w1 wα w2.
With these models, Heim’s semantics runs:
Jt wants ϕKM,w,I = 1 i ∀w′ ∈ Bwv(t),Minw′([ϕ]) wv(t) Minw′([¬ϕ])
Here’s a relatively realistic model of in vino veritas. Let’s make it a sad model,
in which, in the actual world w3, I buy the Sauvignon Blanc, but my friends
prefer the Zinfandel. W = {w1,w2,w3,w4}, and v(me) = me. Also Min is
strongly centered in the model: every ϕ world is its own unique closest ϕ
world.
The labeled solid lines represent Minw; they point from a world to its closest
neighbor(s) in which the label is true. (So the metaphysically most similar
world to w1 in which I buy the Zinfandel instead of the Sauvignon Blanc
is w2—after all, my decision about which to buy won’t aect my comrades’
taste.) No basic belief or preference change is included in the model, so we
speak of Bme and me. Bme is the entire set—we’re thinking of a time before
I’ve made any decisions, so all possibilities are open. Thus at all worlds, all
four possibilities are live options in w, in the sense important for Heim’s
semantics: my beliefs don’t (yet) rule any of them out.
(1) teaches us that, in a situation like this, pme wants bzq should have a
true reading. And Heim’s semantics does not give us this. This is easy to
see:
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Bme
w1 ≈me w4 me w2 ≈me w3
ps, bs
w1
ps, bz
w2
pz, bs
w3
pz, bz
w4
Minw1([bz ])
Minw2([¬bz ])
Minw3([bz ])
Minw4([¬bz ])
Figure 5.1: A model of in vino veritas
Jme wants bzKM,w3,I = 1 i ∀w′ ∈ Bv(me),Minw′([bz]) v(me) Minw′([¬bz])
only if Minw1([bz]) me Minw1([¬bz])
only if {w2} me {w1}
only if w2 me w1
only if ⊥.
Heim’s semantic entry for ‘wants’ is not information-sensitive, so it doesn’t
matter what I is; for any I , w1 is a counter-instance to the universal quantifier.
Therefore Heim predicts that pme wants bzq is false in w3. This is why Heim’s
semantics fails in predicting the advisory use.
Her semantics also doesn’t predict the conditionals (11) and (12). These
conditionals, in our language, are:
(11) pz → me wants bz
(12) ps → me wants bs
The paradigmatic kinds of information states where conditionals like these
are asserted are those with open possibilities in which my comrades prefer the
Zinfandel, and open possibilities in which my comrades prefer the Sauvignon
Blanc. Thus let I = {〈{w1,w2,w3,w4},Pri〉} such that Pri(w) = .25 for all
w ∈ SI .
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Jpz → me wants bzKM,w3,I = 1 i ∀w′ ∈ SI+pz , Jme wants bzKM,w′,I+pz = 1
i Jme wants bzKM,w3,I+pz = 1
and Jme wants bzKM,w4,I+pz = 1
only if Jme wants bzKM,w3,I+pz = 1
i ⊥. (Same calculation as above.)
Mutatis mutandis for (12). Thus Heim doesn’t predict these conditionals
relative to natural models of them, and information states relative to which
they are naturally asserted, using a pretty natural semantics for→.
Levinson
A Levinson modelM is a tuple 〈W ,Ag , g ,Cr , v〉. W is as before a finite,
non-empty set of worlds. Ag is a set of agents. v, in addition to assigning
semantic values to atoms, assigns members of Ag to agent names t. g assigns,
to each α ∈ Ag and w ∈ W , a utility function gwα : W → R. Cr assigns,
to each α ∈ Ag and w ∈ W , a sharp information state Crwα = 〈Swα ,Prwα 〉,
representing that agent’s epistemic possibilities and credences. As before, we
conventionally drop the world superscripts for gwα and Cr
w
α , in models where
these are stable across worlds. With these models, Levinson’s semantics
runs:
Jx wants ϕKM,w,I = 1 i EUx,w([ϕ]) > EUx,w([¬ϕ])
i
∑
w′∈Swv(x)
gwv(x)(w′)Prwv(x)(w′ | [ϕ])
>
∑
w′∈Swv(x)
gwv(x)(w′)Prwv(x)(w′ | [¬ϕ]).
Here is a Levinson model of in vino veritas. As before W = {w1,w2,w3,w4},
and v(me) = me.
pme wants bzq, remember, should have a true reading in a situation like this.
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Sme
ps, bs
w1
gme(w1) = 10
Prme(w1) = .25
ps, bz
w2
gme(w2) = −10
Prme(w2) = .25
pz, bs
w3
gme(w3) = −10
Prme(w3) = .25
pz, bz
w4
gme(w4) = 10
Prme(w4) = .25
Figure 5.2: A Levinson-style model
What does Levinson’s semantics say about it? Well:Jme wants bzKM,w3,I = 1 i EUv(me),w3([bz]) > EUv(me),w3([¬bz])
i EUme([bz]) > EUme([¬bz])
i
∑
w′∈Sme
gme(w′)Prme(w′ | [bz])
>
∑
w′∈Sme
gme(w′)Prme(w′ | [¬bz])
i (10 ∗ 0+−10 ∗ .5+−10 ∗ 0+ 10 ∗ .5)
> (10 ∗ .5+−10 ∗ 0+−10 ∗ .5+ 10 ∗ 0)
i 0 > 0.
Since zero is not greater than zero, Levinson’s semantics doesn’t help.
Same for (11) and (12); relative to the I defined above, the Levinson
truth conditions for (12) runs:
Jpz → me wants bzKM,w3,I = 1 i ∀w′ ∈ SI+pz , Jme wants bzKM,w′,I+pz = 1
i Jme wants bzKM,w3,I+pz = 1
and Jme wants bzKM,w4,I+pz = 1
only if Jme wants bzKM,w3,I+pz = 1
i 0 > 0. (Same calculation as above.)
Mutatis mutandis for (12). Therefore natural Levinson models of in vino
veritas do not predict (11) or (12) with respect to information states in which
they are naturally asserted.
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My proposal
My models are simply Levinson models. The only dierence between me
and Levinson is the semantic clause for ‘wants’.
Denition. A mixed expected utility function Euig , relative to a utility func-
tion g and sharp information state i, is a function: P(W ) → R, defined
as:
EU ig (A) :=
∑
w′∈Si
g(w′)Pri(w′ | A ∩ Si)
My semantic clause for ‘wants’ is then:
Jt wants ϕKM,w,I = 1 i ∀i ∈ I ,EU igwx ([ϕ]) > EU igwx ([¬ϕ])
i ∀i ∈ I , ∑
w′∈Si
gwv(t)(w′)Pri(w′ | [ϕ]I )
>
∑
w′∈Si
gwv(t)(w′)Pri(w′ | [¬ϕ]I ).
Relative to the above information state I , (11) and (12) both come out true.
Here’s the derivation of (12). Note that I + ps = {〈{w1,w2},Pr [ps ]i 〉}, where
Pr [ps ]i (w1) = Pr [ps ]i (w2) = .5.
Jps → me wants bsKM,w3,I = 1 i ∀w′ ∈ SI+ps , Jme wants bsKM,w′,I+ps = 1
i Jme wants bsKM,w1,I+ps = 1
and Jme wants bsKM,w2,I+ps = 1
i ∀i ∈ I + ps,EU ime([bs]) > EU ime([¬bs])
i 10 ∗ .5 >= −10 ∗ .5
i >.
Mutatis mutandis for (11).
Relative to any non-trivial information state I ′ that accepts pz (i.e. such
that [pz]I ′ = SI ′) and the above Levinson model, my semantics predicts
pme wants bzq. Any such information state has SI = {w3,w4}. Thus
Jme wants bzKM,w3,I ′ = 1 i ∀i ∈ I ′,EU ime,w3([bz]) > EU ime,w3([¬bz])
i 5 > −5
i >.
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The kinds of states of information in which it makes sense to assert the
advisory (1)—namely those which accept pz, as in in vino veritas—it’s true
to ascribe to me a corresponding desire to buy the Zinfandel.
Finally, here is an informational account of consequence:26
Denition. ϕ1 . . . ϕn  ψ i, for every M, no information state which
accepts ϕ1 . . . ϕn inM fails to accept ψ inM.
On this definition of consequence, modus ponens comes out valid. Suppose
that I accepts ϕ and ϕ→ ψ relative to some arbitraryM. Since I accepts ϕ,
I + ϕ = I . And since I accepts ϕ→ ψ, I + ϕ accepts ψ. But then I cannot
fail to accept ψ. Thus modus ponens is valid.
However, modus tollens is not valid. This can be shown using the
above model and the information state I = 〈{w1,w2,w3,w4},Pri〉 where
Pri(wj) = .25 for all j . We’ve already seen that this information state accepts
ps → me wants bs . This information state also accepts ¬(me wants bs), for it
assigns bs the same expected utility as bz . However, if the actual world is
w3, this model accepts ps . Thus we have a model and and information state
relative to which ϕ→ ψ is accepted, ¬ψ is accepted, but ¬ϕ is not accepted.
26See Yalcin (2012a) and Bledin (2014).
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Conclusion
The line pursued in Chapter 5 suggests another possible response to the
argument of Chapter 4. Recall that my argument against global case denying
involved eschewing radically externalist theories of desire. The idea was
that it’s largely up to Mal and Ben what they desire when. In particular,
Mal, who may be on the opposite side of the world and causally isolated
from Ben, can’t change what Ben is able to desire merely by changing what
she desires. That possibility, I claimed, would be too radically externalist a
view to countenance. The content of our desires may supervene widely in
the usual ways motivated by standard arguments for content externalism—
cases involving natural kinds and singular thoughts, for instance—but Mal’s
changing her mind about what she desires doesn’t seem like the sort of thing
that could prevent Ben, no matter how hard he tries, from forming desires
that he’d otherwise be able to form. Or so went my argument against global
case-denying.
However, as we’ve seen in the previous chapter, advisory desire attributions
behave in exactly this way. Recall (1):
(1) He doesn’t know it, but he wants the Zinfandel.
(1) can go from true to false depending on the information state at the context
of assessment, without changing anything about my underlying psychological
state. Thus, it seems, whether I’m in a state of desiring to buy the Zinfandel
depends on more than my narrow psychological state; it depends on the
information of those assessing (1). If these assessors get information to the
eect that my comrades will be happier with the Zinfandel, (1) is true; and
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if they get information relative to which they’d prefer the Sauvignon Blanc,
it is false. This wide supervenience isn’t tied to my ability to entertain the
contents of the desires, as is plausibly the case with standard cases of content
externalism. Instead, my state of desire flips between two dierent contents,
both of which I’m perfectly able to entertain in either case, depending just
on what the assessors of the corresponding attribution know about which
wine my comrades desire.
How does the relativistic theory of desire attributions developed in the
previous chapter treat the case of Mal and Ben? Recall the (putative) case:
Mal’s strongest desire: That Ben doesn’t get whatever he most
strongly desires.
Ben’s strongest desire: That Mal gets whatever she most
strongly desires.
This case is intended to characterize Mal’s and Ben’s underling states of
desire. It is not in the first place about desire attributions. But the two are
closely connected. Let’s explicitly formulate the English-language desire
attributions corresponding to the Mal/Ben case:
(2) Mal wants most that Ben doesn’t get whatever Ben wants most.
(3) Ben wants most that Mal gets whatever Mal wants most.
Could (2) and (3) be true together, in a single context? The availability of a
predictive reading of ‘wants’ strongly suggests an answer in the armative.
For if such a reading is available, then the case I originally made for the co-
possibility of Mal’s and Ben’s desires carries over exactly to the attributions
of those desires (2) and (3). Mal’s and Ben’s behavior is best explained in
the relevant context by attributing to them desires as in (2) and (3); they
explain why Mal is trying to interfere with all of Ben’s activities, while Ben
is trying to aid Mal in hers. Thus to predict and explain Mal’s and Ben’s
behavior, we do well to attribute (2) and (3). Doing this folk-psychological
predictive work is, after all, largely what the predictive use is for.
On an advisory reading, however, it’s less clear that (2) and (3) have
natural true readings relative to a single context of assessment. Let’s start
from a simpler case. Suppose Mal is in the state naturally described by (2),
and deeply desires the frustration of Ben’s desires. Say that you happen to
know, as Mal does not, that Ben most strongly desires that the Yankees win
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their upcoming baseball match. Then you could felicitously utter not only
(2), but also something like:
(4) Mal doesn’t know it, but she wants the Yankees to lose their upcoming
sports match.
This is a typical example of the advisory use at work. You use your informa-
tion about Ben’s love of the Yankees to draw out consequences about what
more specific states of aairs would satisfy Mal’s more basic desires, and
make an advisory attribution on that basis. Since Ben wants the Yankees to
win and Mal wants that desire frustrated, she ends up wanting the Yankees
to lose, i.e. (4), whether she knows that or not.
Say now that you observe Ben change his desires. Abandoning his ardor
for the Yankees, he gets into the state of desire naturally described by (3).
Suppose you try to make the same kind of advisory attribution. You would
say:
(5) Mal doesn’t know it, but she wants it not to be the case that she gets
what she most wants.
After all, if (2) and (3) are both the case, a third party should be able to use
them to form advisory desire attributions by filling in the conditions that
would actually satisfy Mal’s more basic desire, whether she knows that or
not. Since those conditions involve Ben’s desires which in turn involve Mal’s
desires, (5) results.
Does (5) seem true in the relevant sense here? There is a case to be
made that it does. Indeed, it could play a natural intermediate step in an
argument directed at Mal that she should change her desires. The following
argument sounds pretty convincing:
Look, you shouldn’t most want Ben not to get what he most
wants. You may not have known this, but Ben actually most
wants that you get what you most want! So in a sense, you most
want yourself not to get what you most want, and that’s crazy.
This monologue uses (5) in the course of arguing that Mal should desire
something dierent from what she actually desires. This argument makes
sense only if we grant that, originally, Mal does desire the thing the argument
is trying to get her not to desire, namely, the frustration of all of Ben’s desires.
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If that’s right, then there is a case to be made that, even on an advisory
reading, (2) and (3) can be true.
However, one might worry that this is not taking the advisory reading
far enough. After all, the data of Chapter 5 suggests that anytime a third
party has information according to which the desirer’s more basic aims are
frustrated by ϕ, she does not really desire ϕ, no matter how much it may
seem like she does. This seems to be the case here: whatever Mal’s basic aims
might plausibly be said to be, it seems like forming a strongest desire to the
eect that Ben not get what he most strongly desires cannot be conducive to
Mal’s actual well-being (given what Ben desires). If that’s right, then on the
advisory reading, Mal never desired that all along. As soon as Ben started
desiring the satisfaction of Mal’s strongest desire, Mal would be badly o
desiring the frustration of Ben’s. And since she’d be badly o doing that, she
doesn’t really want it in the advisory sense.
There’s definite plausibility to the idea that Mal and Ben each must
have some more basic aims than attributed in (2) and (3), aims which are
not actually furthered in the relevant case by the formal satisfaction of the
downstream paradoxical desires that they each seem to have. However, this
runs counter to the spirit of the case originally described in Chapter 4. In
that description, Mal was supposed to fundamentally and primitively most
strongly desire the frustration of Ben’s strongest desire—not in virtue of
beliefs about what other of her aims that might further, but just as a basic
fact about her fundamental aims. Her well being is characterized by, and
depends exclusively on, the frustration of Ben’s desires. Thus she has no
deeper aims in virtue of which she’s formed this desire; this desire exhausts
her deepest aims.
This is, of course, highly implausible as a description of any actual agent.
Perhaps such an agent is incompatible with certain principles of psychology.
The question, though, is whether logic alone can exclude the possibility of
such agent. And however we conceive of logic, it would be very surprising
to learn that logic alone forbid something substantive about what most basic
desires agents can have. This is especially so if one is a global case denier—
for then what logic forbids me from desiring depends on what others far
away from me happen to desire.
Thus, the prospects for using the data of Chapter 5 to undermine the
dialectic of Chapter 4 seem, if not hopeless, at least dim. One would have
to both deny the possibility of a predictive reading of “wants”—which, as
we saw in 5.6, is a live but not settled option—and make the case that no
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possible pair of agents is such that, relative to an advisory reading, something
like (2) and (3) are both true. This is quite a narrow line to walk. Thus, a
non-classical approach to the paradoxical situation of Chapter 4 remains a
more robust and well-motivated solution than an appeal to the non-existence
of a predictive “wants” and the logical impossibility of having basic desires
like those of Mal and Ben.
This is by no means the end of the story. A non-classical model of desire
attributions that allows for the simultaneous truth of (2) and (3) remains
forthcoming, and will have to await future work. I hope to have made the
case here that such a thing is worth creating.
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